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cause unbalance of mind any more than politics or political fervor." IIe attributes much of the insanity among women to overwork when bearing and rearing children. We are inclined to attribute much of the insanity among the agricultural class to overwork and underfeeding-working till the body is cramped and deformed, and living on pork and molasses and the like. Suicide, the essayist attributes largely "to a lowered sense of honor and personal responsibility, and loose views in regard to the future life." His conclusion is: "Insanity is only a bodily sickness which disturbs mental action, and that taken in its inception it is very amenable to treatment; that insanity is born only of illhealth. Like fire that a pail of water may quench in the beginning, but neglected may defy all means, so it is with this disease, but with this difference in its favor, that every man and woman has within reach the means of timely avoidance or prevention. * * * A man who abandons himself is inevitably lost. When he begins to listen to pity and to pity himself, he not only becomes pusillanimous, but a helpless and hopeless drift-wood in the current of appetite. If he would accomplish any thing for himself he must, in his sober moments, rise to the dignity of asserting: I am still a man, and will be my own master."

The question of the propriety of employing decoys and detectives is becoming very important. In the pending trial of the Chicago anarchists detective testimony is produced, although it does not yet show any evidence of decoying. In alluding to the Preller case the New Jersey Law Journal for July says: "If the life of the prisoner is so carefully guarded by the law that neither judge nor counsel may compel him to make an answer that criminates himself, if no confession can be received that is made to an officer in fear of punishment or for hope of favor, is it right that a man acting as agent of the prosecutor should obtain a confession from a prisoner in jail by deception and through hope of escape? Is it not abominable that a man acting on the part of the State and assisting in the administration of the law should pretend to commit a crime, impose upon the grand jury by the connivance of the prosecutor, be solemnly tried and convicted and be sent to jail as a criminal, and be placed in the same cell as the prisoner whose confession was wanted, and then, as in this Preller case, obtain the confidence of the prisoner, and by pretending to help him obtain false witnesses, extract from him the story of his crime, and having got it, be released and appear on the witness stand in his character as officer on the trial of the prisoner for murder, and repeat the confession which secures his conviction?" And the Washington Law Reporter observes: "In the Nardello trial in our own court we have a case of the detectives' testifying to a confession alleged to have been made by the Italian prisoner, a man who could speak only a few words of English. One of the detectives claimed that the prisoner had confessed to him his participation in

the crime with which he was charged, while he was being conveyed to the jail heavily manacled in a wagon, and while he was being jeered at, reviled and insulted by a number of his countrymen who had surrounded the vehicle. Justice MacArthur very strongly reprehended the extorting of a confession at such a time and under such circumstances. The learned judge was undoubtedly right in condemning such a practice, yet this was a less extreme case than that of Preller. Another far more reprehensible practice that detectives are wont to engage in is exemplified in cases where they aid and induce the commission of crime. The books contain many such cases. Some person is suspected of an evil intent, and the detectives, be it because of a desire to gain a reputation, or because of a mistaken idea of their duties, make it possible for the criminally disposed to carry their intentions into effect, instead of preventing or taking such steps as would be likely to prevent the commission of an unlawful act, which they could well do, being forwarned. There is no law to punish a man for entertaining criminal intentions so long as he refrains from committing an unlawful act, and it should be the endeavor of officers of the law to prevent, as far as possible, the carrying into execution of evil intentions, instead of making the way clear for the perpetration of a crime. As a learned judge in Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218, says: 'Human nature is frail enough at best, and requires no encouragement in wrongdoing. If we cannot assist another, and prevent him from violating the laws of the land, we should at least abstain from any active efforts in the way of leading him into temptation. Desire to commit crime and opportunities for the commission thereof would seem sufficiently general and numerous, and no special efforts would seem necessary in the way of encouragement or assistance in that direction.' We are not exaggerating when we state that a large proportion of the detective methods are not looked upon with favor by members of the bar and people generally, and as the learned judge in the case above quoted says: "The encouragement of criminals to induce them to commit crimes in order to get up a prosecution against them is scandalous and reprehensible.'"

NOTES OF CASES.

IN People Stew, pop, 1999, it was held that

N People v. Steubenvoll, Mich. Sup. Ct., July 8,

where one chases another with intent to catch him and slap his face, and draws a pistol with intent to fire in the air and scare the fugitive, and accidentally shoots and kills him, the offense is manslaughter. Campbell, C. J., and Morse, J., dissent. The court said, Champlin, J.: "It thus appears from his testimony that he meant to do two things, both of which were unlawful: 1. He chased the deceased with intent to slap him in the face, or in other words, to do him bodily harm. 2. He meant to shoot his pistol — a deadly weapon, loaded with powder and ball—in the air for the purpose of

than affright? The people's testimony showed that the respondent made threats, and had deliberately taken his pistol from his pocket while behind the tree, and that he pursued, and deliber

scaring the boys. Under such circumstances, if death of a person ensues from the act the crime is, at least, manslaughter, whether he intended to kill the person or not. It seems to me that it would be monstrous to hold that the respondent is not le-ately took aim and fired the fatal shot. I gally responsible for such criminal carelessness as his own story shows he was guilty of. Can it be that human life has come to be so cheap that it can be sacrified without provocation, and the slayer go unpunished, because he did not intend to take life by his rash or careless act? And yet such was the effect of the respondent's requests to charge the jury above quoted. Mr. Bishop, in his work on Criminal Law, says: 'It is reasonable to hold that where one uses a deadly weapon without justification he evinces a disregard for human life and safety amounting to malice.' Was there any justification for the use of the deadly weapon in this case? Assuredly not. Its use was uncalled for and wanton. The boy chased and killed was but fifteen years old. He had committed no crime, and respondent had no right to lay violent hands upon him much less to shoot him. In the case of State v. Smith, 2 Strob. 77, the prisoner fired a pistol at a person on horseback merely to frighten his horse, and caused it to throw its rider, and the ball caused the death of another person. The offense was held to be murder. Mr. Justice Evans, in deciding the case, said: 'If the prisoner's object had been nothing more than to make Carter's horse throw him, and he had used such means only as was appropriate to that end, then there would be some reason for applying to this case the distinction that where the intent 'was to commit only a trespass or a misdemeanor, the accidental killing would be only manslaughter.' The above case, in many of its features, is quite similar to this. The occurrence happened after dark. A crowd had assembled in the street, among whom was the prisoner. Two children had been sent upon an errand, and meeting the crowd had climbed upon the fence and sat there. Carter rode by upon horseback. The prisoner discharged his pistol, and accidentally hit and killed one of the children. The prisoner said that he did not know the child was there, and would not have hurt him for the world if he had known it. Again, being asked, when he said he did not mean to kill the negro: Well, who did you mean to kill?' He hesitated, and said: 'Really, I did not intend to kill anybody. I shot at that d-d mulatto, but did not intend to kill him.' Again, he said: 'I shot with this intention: to make Carter's horse cut or caper, and throw him down; and I thought I had elevated the pistol high enough to be out of danger.' And again: 'I designed a frolic, to scare Carter or his horse, and thought I had raised the pistol so as not to hit any body. In this case, if the object of respondent was simply to frighten the boy, the means used were entirely inappropriate for the purpose. If that had been his only object his giving chase seems effectually to have accomplished it, for they were fleeing from him; and for what reason other

think there was testimony in the case that would have justified the court in submitting it to the jury whether the respondent was not guilty of murder in the first degree. Adverting again to decided cases: It has been held that where a parent corrects his child, if the correction exceeds the bounds of due moderation, either in the measure of it, or in the instrument made use of for that purpose, it will be murder or manslaughter, according to the circumstances. Rex v. Cheeseman, 7 Car. & P. 455; Anonymous, 1 East, P. C. 261; 1 Hale, P. C. 455; Foster, 262. In Wigg's case, 1 Leach, 378, a boy having the care of some sheep suffered some of them to escape through the hurdles of the pen, and the master, seeing the sheep escaping, ran toward the boy, threw a stake at the boy, which hit and killed him. The jury, under the direction of the court, found the master guilty of manslaughter. In the case of Rex v. Sullivan, 7 Car. & P. 641, a lad, in frolic, without meaning to harm any one, took the trapstick out of the forepart of a cart, in consequence of which it was upset, and the carman, who was in it putting in a sack of potatoes, was thrown backward on some stones and killed. The lad was held to be guilty of manslaughter. So it was held that where one whips a horse on which another is riding so that it springs out, and runs over and kills a child, he is guilty of manslaughter. 2 Bush. Crim. Law, § 693. It is also manslaughter, if on a sudden quarrel between two persons, a blow intended for one of them accidentally falls upon a third, whom it kills. Rex v. Brown, 2 Leach, 135; 1 East P. C. 231, 245, 274. Mr. Bishop says: 'It appears to be a doctrine of the courts that if parties become excited by words, and one of them attempts to chas tise the other with a weapon not deadly, he will be held for manslaughter, though death is unintentionally inflicted.' Vol. 2, § 704. And when a man discharges a gun at another's fowls in mere wanton sport, he commits, if he accidentally kills a human being, the offense of manslaughter, while his intended act is only a civil trespass. 2 Bish. Crim. Law, § 692. In State v. Roane, 2 Dev. 58, it was held the firing of a gun simply for the purpose of frightening another, by which shooting death is produced, is manslaughter. In this case the prisoner's counsel requested the court to charge the jury that if the defendant did not intend to kill, but only to frighten the deceased, they should find him not guilty of any offense,' which was refused; and the judge charged that if the defendant discharged his gun in a careless, negligent and heedless manner, and thereby caused the death of the deceased, he was guilty of manslaughter, although he did not intend to kill. Held, no error. And in People v. Fuller, 2 Parker, C. C. 16, it was held that where one carelessly discharged a gun into the street in the night time, and shot deceased

day of its passage,' like the expressions 'from the date' and 'from the day of the date,' are synonymous (Bigelow v. Willson, supra; Pugh v. Duke of Leeds, supra), and if a day is an individual point of time there can be no distinction between a computation from an act done and a computation from the day on which the act was done. It therefore seems to us that when a Legislature declare that an act shall take effect from and after its passage,' or from and after the day of its passage,' it may be fairly presumed that they use these terms as exclu

unintentionally, not knowing he was there, it was manslaughter. Mr. Bishop formulates the doctrine to be drawn from the adjudicated cases as follows: 'If an act is unlawful, or is such as duty does not demand, and of a tendency directly dangerous to life, however unintended, it will be murder. But if the act, though dangerous, is not directly so, yet sufficiently dangerous to come under condemnation of the law, and death unintended results from it, the offense is manslaughter; or if it is one of a nature to be lawful, properly performed, and it is performed improperly, and death comes from it unex-sive of the day of the passage of the act. This furpectedly, the offense still is manslaughter.' 2 Bish. Crim. Law, § 689. Applying the principle to be deduced from the cases referred to, and the doctrine above laid down, to the case under consideration, and viewing the transaction in the light of the most favorable circumstances shown by the testimony, the act of respondent in killing the lad was manslaughter." See note, 31 Am. Rep. 606.

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In Parkinson v. Brandenburgh, Minn. Sup. Ct., June 11, 1886, 28 N. W. Rep. 919, it was held that where a statute provides that it shall take effect "from and after its passage," in computing the time when it takes effect the day of its passage is to be excluded. The court said: "Undoubtedly the great weight of authority is to the effect that a statute which is to take effect from and after its passage' takes effect upon the day of its passage. Arnold v. United States, 9 Cranch, 104; Matthews v. Zane, 7 Wheat. 211; Mallory v. Hiles, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 53; People v. Clark, 1 Cal. 406. The reason usually assigned for this is that it is in accordance with the general rule that when a computation of time is to be made from an act done, the day on which the act is done is to be included. Arnold v. United States, supra; Mallory v. Hiles, supra. And yet the general and now prevailing rule is that where the computation of time, as prescribed in statutes, is to be made from an act done, the first day-that on which the act is done is to be excluded. Sedg. Const. St. 356; Smith Comm., § 616; Bigelow v. Willson, 1 Pick. 485. How this rule is to be reconciled with that suggested in Arnold v. United States and Mallory v. Hiles, supra, we have never been able clearly to understand. It may well be doubted whether any inflexible rule can be laid down as of universal application to all classes of causes. word 'from may, in vulgar use, and even in strict propriety of language, mean either inclusive' or 'exclusive.' It must always depend upon the context and subject-matter whether it shall be inclusive or exclusive of the terminus a quo. Pugh v. Duke of Leeds, Cowp. 719. It seems to us that the words from and after,' as used by the Legislature in this connection, are words of exclusion. And if

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a day is to be deemed an indivisible point of time,

and in accordance with the general rule, fractions of a day disregarded it logically follows that the day of the passage of the act should be excluded. The expressions from its passage' and 'from the

nishes a certain and convenient rule, which avoids serious practical difficulties resulting from holding that the day of the passage of the act is to be included. Some of the authorities which hold that such a statute takes effect on the day of its passage take the position that it is to be deemed in force from the earliest moment of that day, and that any inquiry as to the exact hour of its passage is inadmissible. In re Welman, 20 Vt. 654; Mallory v. Hiles, supra.

But it would seem wrong in principle that laws designed as rules of conduct should be, by a mere legal fiction, made retroactive, even for a fraction of a day. To avoid this result, the tendency now is to hold that the statute takes effect only from the exact moment of its approval, and that when necessary to determine conflicting rights courts of justice will inquire as to the exact hour of its passage. In re Richardson, 2 Story, 571; People v. Clark, supra; Louisville v. Savings Bank, 104 U. S. 409. The objection to this is that while all right in theory it is difficult of application in practice. There is usually no satisfactory means of ascertaining the exact hour at which the executive approved any given statute. The question must generally be decided on mere conjecture, or by indulging in presumptions, as in Kennedy v.

6

Palmer,

Gray, 316. It certainly does not seem fit or proper that the time of the commencement of a law, whenever the question arises, should be left to depend upon the uncertainty of parol proof, or upon any thing extrinsic to the law itself and the authenticated recorded proceedings in passing it. By excluding the day of the passage of the act, and holding that it takes effect at the beginning of the following day, all these practical difficulties are avoided, and a rule established which is not only certain and convenient, but as we think, entirely in accord with recognized canons of construction. It is also in harmony with the usual method of computing time in other cases. therefore see no good reason for receding from the rule laid down in Duncan v. Cobb, 32 Minn. 460."

COMMON WORDS AND PHRASES.

A BUTTING

We

"Doubtless it is true that the words bounding and abutting have no such inflexible meaning as to require the lots assessed or injured to touch the improvement, though the usual meaning of the words is that the things spoken of

do actually adjoin. Without entering very much into the origin of the word abutting, it is sufficient to say that according to Latham it does not imply that the things spoken of are 'necessarily in contact,' and to the same effect see Webster, Worcester and Murray." Cohen v. Cleveland, 43 Ohio St. 190.

ACCOUNT.-In Nelson v. Board of Commissioners of Posey County, 105 Ind. 287, it was said: "The word 'account' has no very clearly defined legal meaning. In Rensselaer Glass Factory v. Reid, 5 Cow. 587, 593, Sandford, C., said: 'An account is no more than a list or catalogue of items, whether of debts or credits.' The primary idea of 'account' is some matter of debt and credit, or of a demand in the nature of debt and credit between parties, arising out of contract, or of a fiduciary relation, or some duty imposed by law. It is none the less an account that all the items of charge are by one person against another, instead of being a statement of mutual demands of debit and credit, provided the charges arise out of contract, express or implied, or from some duty imposed by law."

BALANCE. --"It may be true that the word 'balance,' in the sense of residue or remainder, is not considered elegant English, but in this country it is very often used in that sense, and there is no difficulty in understanding what the testator meant by the phrase 'balance of my estate.' In one of his definitions Worcester gives the sense in which it is understood: 'The remainder of any thing, as the balance of an edition,' etc. 'No particular form of words is required to pass a residuum. It is sufficient if the testator's intention to include every thing not otherwise disposed of is shown.' 2 Wms. Exrs. 1310. The balance of my estate' held to be a residuary clause. Skinner v. Lamb, 3 Ired. 155;" Lopez v. Lopez, 23 S. C. 258.

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CUT.-In United States v. Leatherberry, 27 Fed. Rep. 606, it was held a violation of section 2461 of the Revised Statutes to box and chip trees growing on the public domain, for turpentine purposes. The court said: "It is admitted in this case that the trees were not severed or felled, and that the only cutting was what is known as boxing and chipping the trees, in order to extract the gum or sap for turpentine or resin. The counsel for the defendant moves the court to exclude the evidence of the plaintiff, as it does not make out an offense against the law. I am however of the opinion that the motion must be overruled. The object and purpose of the statute (section 2461) is to protect the public timber. This purpose would, in a great measure, be defeated should the view of defendant's counsel prevail. The language of the statute is 'cut, or procure to be cut; or aid or assist or be employed in cutting,' etc., with intent to export, dispose of, use or employ the same in any manner whatsoever other than for the use of the navy of the United States.' Certainly cutting the timber in order to extract its gum and sap for one's private use is cutting it with intent to use and employ it in a manner other than for the navy of the United States."

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FAMILY. Where a single man, twenty-five years of age, resides in Kansas, and his father and mother and unmarried sister reside in Illinois, and the son has not resided with his father and mother and unmarried sister for about seven years, held, that he is not a part of his father's family within the meaning of the exemption laws. Zimmerman v. Franke, 34 Kans. 650.

FUNDS. Means all resources, and not merely cash. Miller v. Bradish, Iowa Supreme Court, June 21, 1886. The court said: "One material question is as to the meaning of the word 'funds,' and in the foregoing statute. Counsel for the appellant contend that it means 'cash on hand,' and it is said that when one is in funds to meet all obligations it would not be understood that such funds consisted of notes and accounts and real estate; and Bouvier's Law Dictionary and Webster are referred to. That such is the restricted meaning of the word, and that it should be so construed in some cases will be conceded. But it is quite clear that it has a broader meaning, and in some cases should be construed to include property of every kind, when such property is specially contemplated as something to be used or applied in the payment of debts. The word 'funds' occurs twice in the foregoing statute, and as first used it undoubtedly means that if the property of the corporation be diverted, and any one is thereby injured, the person causing such diversion will be liable to the penalties provided in the statute. As thus used the word means and includes something more than cash on hand. It evidently means all the resources of the corporation, and no sufficient reason has been given why it does not mean the same thing when it is used the second time in the same section of the Code. 'Diversion of funds' and 'insufficient funds,' in so far as the meaning of the word 'fund' is concerned, must, it seems to us, be construed to mean precisely the same thing. A corporation may, we think, lawfully declare and pay a dividend, although it does not have cash on hand to pay all its liabilities. Necessarily this must be so, for there is not a National bank in the State that has been in business over a year that has at any time cash on hand sufficient to pay all its liabilities."

HABITUAL DRUNKARD. - In Walton v. Walton, 34 Kans. 195, it is said: "A precise definition of this expression applicable to every case cannot well be given. It is true, as argued by the defendant, that a man may drink occasionally to excess, and yet not be an habitual drunkard; but to constitute him one it is not necessary that he should be constantly under the influence of intoxicating liquors. A man may be an habitual drunkard even though there be intervals when he entirely refrains from the use of intoxicating drinks. But before he can be regarded as such it must appear that he drinks to excess so frequently as to become a fixed practice or habit with him. From the facts found by the court it appears that the defendant could not resist the temptation of drinking to excess whenever he had an opportunity to obtain liquor. And where a per

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son indulges in the practice of becoming intoxicated whenever the temptation is presented, and the opportunity is afforded him, it may safely be said that he is an habitual drunkard within the meaning of the statute relating to divorce. Ludwick v. Commonwealth, 18 Penn. St. 172; State v. Pratt, 34 Vt. 223; Magahey v. Magahey, 35 Mich. 210; Blaney v. Blaney, 126 Mass. 205."

HOUSEHOLD GOODS.-In Smith v. Findley, 34 Kans. 316, the question was whether potatoes, bacon, vinegar and salt are to be considered household goods within a contract of carriage. The court said: "Bouvier defines household goods to mean 'every thing of a permanent nature (that is, articles of household which are not consumed in their enjoyment) that are used or purchased, or otherwise acquired by a person for his house, but not goods in the way of his trade. Plate will pass by this term, but not articles of consumption found in a house, as malt, hops or victuals.' Vol. 1, p. 758. Abbott gives a like definition. Law Dict., vol. 1, p. 575. Worcester calls the furniture of a house and utensils convenient for a family 'household stuff.' The evidence tended to show, and the jury found as a fact, that a part of the bacon, salt and vinegar transported in the car Findley sold, or endeavored to sell, after his arrival in Minneapolis. Under all the facts of the case we think that the phrase 'household goods' does not include the potatoes, bacon, etc."

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INTOXICANTS. Not an equivalent of "intoxicating liquors." In re M'Laughlin, Vt. Sup. Ct., July 6, 1886.

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NECESSARY APPENDAGE. In Creager v. Wright School Dist., No. 9, Mich. Sup. Ct., June 27, 1886, it was held that a fence was a necessary appendage to a school-house. The court said: "It was a line fence, and therefore presumably necessary to be built. It comes within the same category as a well, wood-house, or a privy, and has been held a necessary appendage in Hemme v. School District, 30 Kans. 377; S. C., 1 Pac. Rep. 104. While it is not an annexation to the school-house, it can certainly be considered an accessory to it. The word 'appendage,' as used in our school statutes, does not mean simply the school apparatus to be used inside the building; nor do I think it can be limited to such articles as brooms, pails, cups, etc., but must be construed in a broader sense, as it has in other courts, to include fuel, fences, and necessary outhouses."

PEDDLER, MERCHANT.-In City of Kansas v. Collins, 34 Kans. 434, it was held that "where an agent, such as is usually denominated a 'drummer' or 'commercial traveler,' simply exhibits samples of goods kept for sale by his principal, and takes orders from purchasers for such goods, which goods are afterward to be delivered by the principal to the purchasers, and payment for the goods is to be made by the purchasers to the principal on such delivery, such agent is neither a peddler nor a merchant; nor will a single sale and delivery of goods by such agent, or by any other person, out of the

samples exhibited, or out of any other lot of goods, constitute such agent or other person a peddler or a merchant."

PRODUCE.-In Mayor v. Davis, 6 W. & S. 279, the court said: "Swine, horses, neat cattle, sheep, manure, cordwood, hay, and many other things not more savory, would be out of place in a markethouse for the sale of poultry, vegetables, fruit, eggs, milk, butter, lard, and other provisions for the mouth; yet they are strictly the produce of the farm; much more so indeed than beef, which though it comes like every thing else primitively from the soil, is as much a manufactured article as leather, cloth or charcoal. The ox is the produce of the farm; beef is the produce of the slaughterhouse and shambles. It is manufactured by the professional skill of the artisan, whose business is as distinct from that of a farmer as is that of a flaxdresser or a wool-comber. That the farmer sometimes works up his own raw materials cannot prevent it from taking a new denomination from the additional labor expended on it. The versatility so conspicuous in the American people often makes him his own weaver; yet it follows not that his linsey-woolsey, though cut from his own sheep, is the less manufactured, or the less improperly denominated the produce of his farm. The blending of trades does not change the nature of the wares. When the farmer slaughters his own ox the beef is not the less the product of the slaughter-house." And it was held that beef is not the "produce of a farm." In State v. Borroum, 23 Miss. 477, the court took judicial notice that cotton is a "product or commodity."

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Sleeper & Whiton, for appellant.
Page & Booth, for appellee.

SCHOLFIELD, J. Assuming, first, that appellant is not chargeable with knowledge of the existence of any other bank than that of Wright & Messmore, at Cadillac, Michigan; and second, that all the information it had, or could reasonably obtain at the time in respect to the financial standing of Rice & Messmore, was that they were solvent-were Rice & Messmore suitable agents to whom to transmit the certified check for collection after it was placed by appellee in appellant's possession? We do not think it is of much consequence whether appellant took the check as payment on account, or for the purpose merely of collection: for in either view it is entitled to show that the check, if it has discharged its duty by an effort to collect it, has availed nothing. Nor do we regard the evidence that certain banks in Chicago were in the

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