Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

MORTGAGE.

Under the law of Illinois, a grantee who by the terms of an absolute con-
veyance from the mortgagor assumes the payment of the mortgage
debt, is liable to an action at law by the mortgagee; the relation of the
grantee and the grantor towards the mortgagee is that of principal
and surety; and therefore a subsequent agreement of the mortgagee
with the grantee, without the assent of the grantor, extending the time
of payment of the mortgage debt, discharges the grantor from all per-
sonal liability for that debt. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hanford, 187.
See RAILROAD, 1, 2.

NATIONAL BANK.

The conversion of a state bank into a national bank, with a change of
name, under the National Banking Act, does not affect its identity, or
its right to sue upon liabilities incurred to it by its former name.
Michigan Insurance Bank v. Eldred, 293.

NATIONAL BOARD OF HEALTH.

The National Board of Health had no authority to incur any liability upon
the part of the government for salaries or other expenses in excess of
the amounts appropriated by Congress for such purposes; and the
plaintiff in error did not perform services as a member of that board,
or as its chief clerk, or its secretary, or as a disbursing agent of the
Treasury Department under any implied contract that he should be
compensated otherwise than out of the moneys specifically appropri-
ated to meet the expenses incurred by the board in the performance of
the duties imposed upon it. Dunwoody v. United States, 578.

NATURALIZATION.

Boyd was born in Ireland in 1834, of Irish parents. His father emigrated
to the United States in 1844, with all his family, and settled in Ohio,
in which State he has since resided continuously. In 1849 the father
duly declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States,
but there is no record or other written evidence that he ever completed
his naturalization by taking out his naturalization certificate after the
expiration of the five years. For many years after the expiration of
that time, however, he exercised rights and claimed privileges in Ohio,
which could only be claimed and exercised by citizens of the United
States and of the State. The son, on attaining majority, voted in
Ohio, under the belief that his father had become a citizen. In 1856
he removed to Nebraska, in which State he resided continuously until ·
the commencement of this action. He voted there at all elections, held
various offices there which required him to take an oath to support the
Constitution of the United States, served in the army during the war,
was a member of a convention to frame a state constitution, was mayor
of Omaha and, after thirty years of unquestioned exercise of such

rights and privileges, was elected governor of the State of Nebraska,
receiving a greater number of votes than any other person voted for.
He took the oath of office, and entered on the discharge of its duties.
His predecessor, as relator, filed an information in the Supreme Court
of Nebraska, in which were set forth the facts as to the declaration of
intention by Boyd's father, and it was further averred that the father
did not become a citizen during the son's minority, nor until the Octo-
ber term of the Court of Common Pleas in Muskingum County, Ohio,
in the year 1890, when the son was 56 years of age, and it was claimed
that Boyd, the son, never having himself been naturalized, was not, at
the time of his election, a citizen of the United States, and was not,
under the constitution and laws of Nebraska, eligible to the office of
governor of that State, and the relator therefore prayed judgment that
Boyd be ousted from that office, and that the relator be declared
entitled to it until a successor could be elected. To this information
the respondent, in his answer, after stating that his father, on March
5, 1849, when the respondent was about 14 years of age, made before
a court of the State of Ohio his declaration of intention to become a
citizen of the United States, and averring "that his father, for 42
years last past has enjoyed and exercised all of the rights, immunities
and privileges and discharged all the duties of a citizen of the United
States and of the State of Ohio, and was in all respects and to all
intents and purposes a citizen of the United States and of the State of
Ohio," and particularly alleging his qualifications to be a citizen, and
his acting as such for forty years, voting and holding office in that
State, further distinctly alleged "on information and belief, that prior
to October, 1854, his father did in fact complete his naturalization in
strict accordance with the acts of Congress known as the naturalization
laws, so as to admit and constitute him a full citizen thereunder, he
having exercised the rights of citizenship herein described, and at said
time informed respondent that such was the fact. To this answer the
relator interposed a demurrer, and on these pleadings the court below
entered a judgment of ouster against Boyd, to which judgment a writ
of error was sued out from this court. Held,

(1) That as the defence relied on arose under an act of Congress, and pre-
sented a question of Federal law, this court had jurisdiction to review it;
(2) That the fact that the respondent's father became a citizen of the
United States was well pleaded, and was admitted by the demurrer;
(3) That upon this record Boyd had been for two years, next preceding his
election to the office of governor, a citizen of the United States and of
the State of Nebraska;

(4) That where no record of naturalization can be produced, evidence that
a person having the requisite qualifications to become a citizen did in
fact and for a long time vote, and hold office, and exercise rights belong-
ing to citizens, is sufficient to warrant a jury in inferring that he has
been duly naturalized as a citizen.

And it was further, Held, by FULLER, C. J., and BLATCHFORD, LAMAR,
and BREWER, JJ. :

(5) That, the Supreme Court having denied to Boyd a right or privilege
existing under the Constitution of the United States, this court had
jurisdiction, an that ground also, to review the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Nebraska;

(6) That, even if the father did not complete his naturalization before the
son attained majority, the son did not lose the inchoate status which he
had acquired through his father's declaration of intention to become a
citizen, and that he occupied in Nebraska the same position which his
father would have occupied had he emigrated to that State;

(7) That within the intent and meaning of the acts of Congress he was
made a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nebraska
under the organic and enabling acts of Congress, and the act admit-
ting that State into the Union;

(8) That Congress has the power to effect a collective naturalization on the
admission of a State into the Union, and did so in the case of Nebraska;
(9) That the admission of a State on an equal footing with the original
States involves the adoption, as citizens of the United States, of those
whom Congress makes members of the political community, and who
are recognized as such in the formation of the new State with the
assent of Congress;

(10) That the rule prescribed by § 4 of the act of April 14, 1802, 2 Stat.
155, c. 28, was to be a uniform rule, and there was no reason for limit-
ing such a rule to the children of those who had been already natural-
ized, but, on the contrary, the intention was that the act of 1802
should have a prospective operation. Boyd v. Thayer, 135.

NEBRASKA.

See RIPARIAN Owner.

NEW TRIAL.

If the whole evidence introduced by the defendant upon one issue is in-
competent to support it, and is admitted and considered against the
plaintiff's exception, and the judge, by ruling that this evidence is
decisive against the plaintiff's right to recover, without regard to
another issue in the case, induces the plaintiff not to put in evidence
on the other issue, the plaintiff is entitled to a new trial, although he
has not also excepted to a direction to return a verdict for the defend-
ant. Michigan Insurance Bank v. Eldred, 293.

PATENT FOR INVENTION.

1. The invention secured to Joseph F. Glidden by letters patent No. 157,124,
dated November 24, 1874, for an improvement in wire fences, involved
invention, and the patent therefor is valid. Barbed Wire Patent, 275.

2. Courts incline to sustain a patent to the man who takes the final step in
the invention which turns failure into success. Ib.

3. When an unpatented device, the existence and use of which are proven
only by oral testimony, is set up as a complete anticipation of a patent,
the proof sustaining it must be clear, satisfactory, and beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Ib.

4. Letters patent No. 228,186, issued June 1, 1880, to Maurice Gandy, for
an improved belt or band for driving machinery and an improved me-
chanical process for manufacturing the same, are valid, and the novelty
and utility of the invention protected by it are not disturbed by the
evidence in this case. Gandy v. Main Belting Co., 587.

5. The "public use or sale" of an invention "for more than two years prior

to" the "application" for a patent for it, contemplated by section
4886 of the Revised Statutes as a reason for not issuing the patent or
for its invalidation if issued, must be limited to a use or sale in this
country. Ib.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 1;
MAILS, TRANSPORTATION of.

PLACE OF TRIAL.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 1.

PLEADING.

See LOCAL LAW;

NATURALIZATION.

PRACTICE.

As the judgment in this case rests upon a sound principle of law this court
affirms it, although it was put by the court below upon an unsound
principle. Sullivan v. Iron Silver Mining Co., 431.

See CHARGE TO JURY;

EXCEPTION;

NEW TRIAL.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.
See MORTGAGE.

PROHIBITION, WRIT OF.

1. Prohibition will not go after judgment and sentence, unless want of
jurisdiction appears on the face of the proceedings; but, before judg-
ment, the superior court can examine not simply the process and
pleadings technically of record, but also the facts and evidence upon
which action was taken. In re Cooper, 472.

2. On an application for a writ of prohibition, the inquiry being confined
to the matter of jurisdiction, only the record proper should be looked
into, and not documents and other evidence in addition to the record
which may be sent up under the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 698. Ib.
3. When a party aggrieved by a judgment has an appeal to this court
which becomes inefficacious through his neglect, a writ of prohibition
to prevent the enforcement of the judgment will not issue from this
court. lb.

See BEHRING SEA.

PUBLIC LAND.

1. The grant of public land to the State of Iowa by the act of May 15,
1856, 11 Stat. 9, c. 28, "in alternate sections to aid in the construction
of certain railroads in that State" was a grant in præsenti, which did
not attach until the time of the filing of the map of definite location,
although the beneficiary company (under the Iowa statute) may have
surveyed and staked out upon the ground a line of its own road.
Sioux City & Iowa Falls Land Co. v. Griffey, 32.

2. The plaintiff, claiming under the said grant to the State of Iowa,
brought an action against the defendant to recover a tract, a part of
the grant. The defendant claimed under a patent from the United
States subsequent to the filing of the map of definite location, but
issued on a preemption claim made prior thereto, and filed a cross-bill
for quieting his title. Held, that it was not open to the plaintiff to
contest the bona fides of the preëmption settlement. Ib.

3. A grant to a railroad company of public lands, within defined limits, not
sold, reserved or otherwise disposed of when the route of the road be-
comes definitely fixed, conveys no title to any particular land until the
location, and until the specific parcels have been selected by the gran-
tee and approved by the Secretary of the Interior. New Orleans Pa-
cific Railway Co. v. Parker, 42.

See MINERAL LAND.

RAILROAD.

1. A mortgage by a railroad company of its railroad, rights of way, road-
bed and all its real estate then owned or which might be thereafter
acquired appurtenant to or necessary for the operation of the railroad,
and all other property wherever situated in the State, then owned or
which might thereafter be acquired by the company, and which should
be appurtenant to or necessary or used for the operation of its road,
and also the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto
belonging, does not cover a grant of lands within the State subse-
quently made by Congress to the company in aid of the construction
of its road. New Orleans Pacific Railway Co. v. Parker, 42.

2. If a holder of one or more of a series of bonds issued by a railroad com-

« AnteriorContinuar »