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Opinion of the Court.

rates are prescribed directly by the legislature. Not only was that the case in the statute of Illinois in Munn v. Illinois, but the doctrine was laid down by this court in Wabash &c. Railway Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 568, that it was the right of a State to establish limitations upon the power of railroad companies to fix the price at which they would carry passengers and freight, and that the question was of the same character as that involved in fixing the charges to be made by persons engaged in the warehousing business. So, too, in Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680, 686, it was said that it was within the power of the legislature to declare what should be a reasonable compensation for the services of persons exercising a public employment, or to fix a maximum beyond which any charge made would be unreasonable.

But in Dow v. Beidelman, after citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155, 161, 162; Peik v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway, 94 U. S. 164, 178; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Rail road v. Ackley, 94 U. S. 179; Winona & St. Peter Railroad v. Blake, 94 U. S. 180; Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. 181; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 526; Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 541; Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307; Stone v. Illinois Central Railroad, 116 U. S. 347; and Stone v. New Orleans & Northeastern Railroad, 116 U. S. 352, as recognizing the doctrine that the legislature may itself fix a maximum beyond which any charge! would be unreasonable, in respect to services rendered in a public employment, or for the use of property in which the public has an interest, subject to the proviso that such power of limitation or regulation is not without limit, and is not a power to destroy, or a power to compel the doing of the services without reward, or to take private property for public use without just compensation or without due process of law, the court said that it had no means, "if it would under any circumstances have the power," of determining that the rate fixed by the legislature in that case was unreasonable, and that it did not appear that there had been any such confiscation of property as amounted to a taking of it without due process of law,

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Dissenting Opinion: Brewer, Field, Brown, JJ.

or that there had been any denial of the equal protection of the laws.

In the cases before us, the records do not show that the charges fixed by the statute are unreasonable, or that property has been taken without due process of law, or that there has been any denial of the equal protection of the laws; even if under any circumstances we could determine that the maximum rate fixed by the legislature was unreasonable.

In Georgia Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174, 179, in the opinion of the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Field, it was said that this court had adjudged in numerous instances that the legislature of a State had the power to prescribe the charges of a railroad company for the carriage of persons and merchandise within its limits, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, subject to the limitation that the carriage is not required without reward, or upon conditions amounting to the taking of property for public use without just compensation, and that what is done does not amount to a regulation of foreign or interstate commerce.

It is further contended for the plaintiffs in error that the statute in question violates the Fourteenth Amendment, because it takes from the elevator owners the equal protection of the laws, in that it applies only to places which have 130,000 population or more, and does not apply to places which have less than 130,000 population, and thus operates against elevator owners in the larger cities of the State. The law operates equally on all elevator owners in places having 130,000 population or more; and we do not perceive how they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Judgments affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE FIELD and MR. JUSTICE BROWN, dissenting.

I dissent from the opinion and judgment in these cases. The main proposition upon which they rest is, in my judgment, radically unsound. It is the doctrine of Munn v. Illinois, 94

Dissenting Opinion: Brewer, Field, Brown, JJ.

U. S. 113, reaffirmed. That is, as declared in the syllabus and stated in the opinion in that case: "When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created." The elaborate discussions of the question in the dissenting opinions in that case, and the present cases when under consideration in the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, seem to forbid anything more than a general declaration of dissent. The vice of the doctrine is, that it places a public interest in the use of property upon the same basis as a public use of property. Property is devoted to a public use when, and only when, the use is one which the public in its organized capacity, to wit, the State, has a right to create and maintain, and, therefore, one which all the public have a right to demand and share in. The use is public, because the public may create it, and the individual creating it is doing thereby and pro tanto the work of the State. The creation of all-highways is a public duty. Railroads are highways. The State may build them. If an individual does that work, he is pro tanto doing the work of the State. He devotes his property to a public use. The State doing the work fixes the price for the use. It does not lose the right to fix the price, because an individual voluntarily undertakes to do the work. But this public use is very different from a public interest in the use. There is scarcely any property in whose use the public has no interest. No man liveth unto himself alone, and no man's property is beyond the touch of another's welfare. Everything, the manner and extent of whose use affects the well-being of others, is property in whose use the public has an interest. Take, for instance, the only store in a little village. All the public of that village are interested in it; interested in the quantity and quality of the goods on its shelves, and their prices, in the time at which it opens and closes, and, generally, in the way in which it is managed; in short, interested in the use. Does it follow that that village public has a right to control these matters? That

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Dissenting Opinion: Brewer, Field, Brown, JJ.

which is true of the single small store in the village, is also true of the largest mercantile establishment in the great city. The magnitude of the business does not change the principle. There may be more individuals interested, a larger public, but still the public. The country merchant who has a small warehouse in which the neighboring farmers are wont to store their potatoes and grain preparatory to shipment occupies the same position as the proprietor of the largest elevator in New York. The public has in each case an interest in the use, and the same interest, no more and no less. I cannot bring myself to believe that when the owner of property has by his industry, skill and money made a certain piece of his property of large value to many, he has thereby deprived himself of the full dominion over it which he had when it was of comparatively little value; nor can I believe that the control of the public over one's property or business is at all dependent upon the extent to which the public is benefited by it.

Surely the matters in which the public has the most interest, are the supplies of food and clothing; yet can it be that by reason of this interest the State may fix the price at which the butcher must sell his meat, or the vendor of boots and shoes his goods? Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness;" and to "secure," not grant or create, these rights governments are instituted. That property which a man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations: First, that he shall not use it to his neighbor's injury, and that does not mean that he must use it for his neighbor's benefit; second, that if he devotes it to a public use, he gives to the public a right to control that use; and, third, that whenever the public needs require, the public may take it upon payment of due compensation.

It is suggested that there is a monopoly, and that that justifies legislative interference. There are two kinds of monopoly; one of law, the other of fact. The one exists when exclusive privileges are granted. Such a monopoly, the law which creates alone can break; and being the creation of law justifies legislative control. A monopoly of fact any one

Dissenting Opinion: Brewer, Field, Brown, JJ.

can break, and there is no necessity for legislative interference. It exists where any one by his money and labor furnishes facilities for business which no one else has. A man puts up in a city the only building suitable for offices. He has therefore a monopoly of that business; but it is a monopoly of fact, which any one can break who, with like business courage puts his means into a similar building. Because of the monopoly feature, subject thus easily to be broken, may the legislature regulate the price at which he will lease his offices? So, here, there are no exclusive privileges given to these elevators. They are not upon public ground. If the business is profitable, any one can build another; the field is open for all the elevators, and all the competition that may be desired. If there be a monopoly, it is one of fact and not of law, and one which any individual can break.

The paternal theory of government is to me odious. The utmost possible liberty to the individual, and the fullest possible protection to him and his property, is both the limitation and duty of government. If it may regulate the price of one service, which is not a public service, or the compensation for the use of one kind of property which is not devoted to a public use, why may it not with equal reason regulate the price of all service, and the compensation to be paid for the use of all property? And if so, "Looking Backward" is nearer than a dream.

I dissent especially in these cases, because the statute in effect compels service without any compensation. It provides that the parties seeking the service of the elevator "shall only be required to pay the actual cost of trimming or shovelling to the leg of the elevator when unloading, and trimming cargo when loading." This work of trimming or shovelling is fully explained in the briefs of counsel. It is work performed by longshoremen with hand-scoops or shovels, on the vessel unloading or receiving the grain. They are not in the regular employ of the elevator; but engaged in an independent. service, and yet one whose careful and skilful performance is essential to the successful transfer of grain into and through the elevator. The full service required of the elevator com

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