Opinion of the Court. accession or abstraction of mere particles, the river as it runs continues to be the boundary. One country may, in process of time, lose a little of its territory, and the other gain a little, but the territorial relations cannot be reversed by such imperceptible mutations in the course of the river. The general aspect of things remains unchanged. And the convenience of allowing the river to retain its previous function, notwithstanding such insensible changes in its course, or in either of its banks, outweighs the inconveniences, even to the injured party, involved in a detriment, which, happening gradually, is inappreciable in the successive moments of its progression. "But, on the other hand, if, deserting its original bed, the river forces for itself a new channel in another direction, then the nation, through whose territory the river thus breaks its way, suffers injury by the loss of territory greater than the benefit of retaining the natural river boundary, and that boundary remains in the middle of the deserted river bed. For, in truth, just as a stone pillar constitutes a boundary, not because it is a stone, but because of the place in which it stands, so a river is made the limit of nations, not because it is running water bearing a certain geographical name, but because it is water flowing in a given channel, and within given banks, which are the real international boundary. "Such is the received rule of the law of nations on this point, as laid down by all the writers of authority. (See ex. gr. Puffend. Jus. Nat. lib. iv, cap: 7, s. ii; Gundling, Jus. Nat. p. 248; Wolff, Jus. Gentium, s. 106-109; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. i, chap. 22, s. 268, 270; Stypmanni, Jus. Marit. cap. v. n. 476–552; Rayneval, Droit de la Nature, tom. i, p. 307; Merlin, Répertoire, ss. voc. alluv.)" Further reference is made in the opinion to the following authorities: "Don Antonio Riquelme states the doctrine as follows: "When a river changes its course, directing its currents through the territory of one of the two coterminous States, the bed which it leaves dry remains the property of the State (or States) to which the river belonged, that being retained as the limit between the two nations, and the river enters so far Opinion of the Court. into the exclusive dominion of the nation through whose territory it takes the new course. Nations must, of necessity, submit their rights to these great alterations which nature predisposes and consummates. But, when the change is not total, but progressive only, that is to say, when the river does not abandon either State, but only gradually shifts its course by accretions, then it continues still to be the boundary, and the augmentation of territory, which one country gains at the expense of the other, is to be held by it as a new acquisition of property.' (Derecho Internacional, tom. i, p. 83.) "Don Andres Bello and Don José Maria de Pando both enunciate the doctrine in exactly the same words, namely: "When a river or lake divides two territories, whether it belong in common to the conterminous riparian States, or they possess it by halves, or one of them occupies it exclusively, the rights, which either has in the lake or river, do not undergo any change by reason of alluvion. The lands insensibly invaded by the water are lost by one of the riparian States, and those which the water abandons on the opposite bank increase the domain of the other State. But if, by any natural accident, the water, which separated the two States, enters of a sudden into the territory of the other, it will thenceforth belong to the State whose soil it occupies, and the land, including the abandoned river-channel or bed, will incur no change of master.' (Bello, Derecho Internacional, p. 38; Pando, Derecho Internacional, p. 99.) "Almeda refers to the same point, briefly, but in decisive terms. He says: "As the river belongs to the two nations, so, also, the river-bed, if by chance it become dry, is divided between them as proprietors. When the river changes its course, throwing itself on one of two conterminous states, it then comes to belong to the state through whose territory it runs, all community of right in it so far ceasing.' Derecho Publico, tom. i. p. 199. "Leaving authorities of this class, then, let us come to those which discuss the question in its relation to private rights, and as a doctrine of municipal jurisprudence. Opinion of the Court. "The doctrine is transmitted to us from the laws of Rome. (Justinian, Inst. lib. ii, tit. i, s. 20-24; Dig. lib. xii, tit. i, l. 7. See J. Voet ad Pandect. tom. i, p. 606, 607. Heinec. Recit. lib. ii, tit. 2, s. 358–369; Struvii Syntag. ex. 41, c. 33–25; Bowyers's Civil Law, ch. 14.) "Don Alfonso transferred it from the civil law to the Partidas. (Partida iii, tit. 28, 1. 31.) Thus it came to be, as it still remains, an established element of the laws of Spain and of Mexico. (Alvarez, Instituciones, lib. ii, tit. i, s. 6; Asso, Instituciones, p. 101; Gomez de la Serna, Elementos, lib. ii, tit. 4, sec 3, no. 2; Escriche, Dic. s. vocc. accession natural, alluvion, avulsion; Febrero Mexicano, tom. 1, p. 161; Sala Mexicano, ed. 1845, tom. ii, p. 62.) "The same doctrine, starting from the same point of departure, made its way through the channel of Bracton, into the laws of England, and thence to the United States. (Bracton de Legg. Angliae, lib. 2, cap. 2, fol. 9; Blacks. Comm. vol. ii, p. 262; Woolrych on Waters, p. 34; Angell on Water Courses, ch. 2; Lynch v. Allen, 4 De. & Bat. N. C. R. p. 62; Murry v. Sermon, 1 Hawks, N. C. R. p. 56; The King v. Lord Scarborough, 3 B. & C. p. 91; S. C. 2 Bligh, N. S. p. 147. "Such, beyond all possible controversy, is the public law of modern Europe and America, and such, also, is the municipal law both of the Mexican Republic and the United States." Vattel states the rule thus (Book 1, c. 22, secs. 268, 269, 270)1: 1 § 268. Du droit d'alluvion. Si le territoire qui aboutit à un fleuve limitrophe n'a point d'autres limites que le fleuve même, il est au nombre des territoires à limites naturelles, ou indéterminés (territoria arcifinia), et il jouit du droit; c'est-à-dire que les atterrissements qui peuvent s'y former peu à peu par le cours du fleuve, les accroissements insensibles, font des accroissements de ce territoire, qui en suivent la condition et appartiennent au même maître. Car si je m'empare d'un terrain en déclarant que je veux pour limites le fleuve qui le baigne, ou s'il m'est donné sur ce pied-là, j'occupe par celà même d'avance le droit d'alluvion, et, par conséquent, je puis seul m'approprier tout ce que le courant de l'eau ajoutera insensiblement à mon terrain. Je dis insensiblement, parce que dans le cas très-rare que l'on nomme avulsion, lorsque la violence de l'eau détache une portion considérable d'un fonds et la joint à une autre, Opinion of the Court. "If a territory which terminates on a river has no other boundary than that river, it is one of those territories that have natural or indeterminate bounds (territoria arcifinia), and it enjoys the right of alluvion; that is to say, every gradual increase of soil, every addition which the current of the river may make to its bank on that side, is an addition to that territory, stands in the same predicament with it, and belongs to the same owner. For, if I take possession of a piece of land, declaring that I will have for its boundary the river which washes its side- or if it is given to me upon that footing, I thus acquired beforehand the right of alluvion; and, consequently, I alone may appropriate to myself whatever additions the current of the river may insensibly make to my en sorte qu'elle est encore reconnaissable, cette pièce de terre demeure naturellement à son premier maître. De particulier à particulier, les lois civiles ont prévu et décidé le cas; ils doivent combiner l'équité avec le bien de l'État et le soin de prévenir les procès. En cas de doute, tout territoire aboutissant à un fleuve est présumé n'avoir d'autres limites que le fleuve même, parce que rien n'est plus naturel que de le prendre pour bornes, quand on s'établit sur ses bords; et dans le doute, on présume toujours ce qui est plus naturel et plus profitable. § 269. Si l'alluvion apporte quelque changement aux droits sur le fleuve. Dès qu'il est établi qu'un fleuve fait la séparation de deux territoires, soit qu'il demeure commun aux deux riverains opposés, soit qu'ils le partagent par moitié, soit enfin qu'il appartienne tout entier à l'un des deux, les divers droits sur le fleuve ne souffrent aucun changement par l'alluvion. S'il arrive donc que, par un effet naturel du courant, l'un des deux territoires reçoive de l'accroissement, tandis que le fleuve gagne peu à peu sur la rive opposée, le fleuve demeure la borne naturelle des deux territoires, et chacun y conserve ses mêmes droits, malgré son déplacement successif; en sorte, par exemple, que s'il est partagé par le milieu entre les deux riverains, ce milieu, quoiqu'il ait changé de place, continuera à être la ligne de séparation des deux voisins. L'un perd, il est vrai, tandis que l'autre gagne; mais la nature seule fait ce changement: elle détruit le terrain de l'un, pendant qu'elle en forme un nouveau pour l'autre. La chose ne peut pas être autrement dès qu'on a pris le fleuve seul pour limites. § 270. De ce qui arrive quand le fleuve change son cours. Mais si, au lieu d'un déplacement successif, le fleuve, par un accident purement naturel, se détourne entièrement de son cours, et se jette dans l'un des deux États voisins, le lit qu'il abandonne reste alors pour limites; il demeure au maître du fleuve (§ 267). Le fleuve périt dans toute cette partie, tandis qu'il naît dans son nouveau lit, et qu'il y naît uniquement pour l'État dans lequel il coule. Opinion of the Court. land. I say 'insensibly,' because, in the very uncommon case called avulsion, when the violence of the stream separates a considerable part from one piece of land and joins it to another, but in such manner that it can still be identified, the property of the soil so removed naturally continues vested in its former owner. The civil laws have thus provided against and decided this case, when it happens between individual and individual; they ought to unite equity with the welfare of the state, and the care of preventing litigations. "In case of doubt, every territory terminating on a river is presumed to have no other boundary than the river itself; because nothing is more natural than to take a river for a boundary, when a settlement is made; and wherever there is a doubt, that is always to be presumed which is most natural and most probable. "As soon as it is determined that a river constitutes the boundary line between two territories, whether it remains common to the inhabitants on each of its banks, or whether each shares half of it, or, finally, whether it belongs entirely to one of them, their rights, with respect to the river, are in nowise changed by the alluvion. If, therefore, it happens that, by a natural effect of the current, one of the two territories receives an increase, while the river gradually encroaches on the opposite bank, the river still remains the natural boundary of the two territories, and, notwithstanding the progressive changes in its course, each retains over it the same rights which it possessed before; so that, if, for instance, it be divided in the middle between the owners of the opposite banks, that middle, though it changes its place, will continue to be the line of separation between the two neighbors. The one loses, it is true, while the other gains; but nature alone produces this change; she destroys the land of the one, while she forms new land for the other. The case cannot be otherwise determined, since they have taken the river alone for their limits. "But if, instead of a gradual and progressive change of its bed, the river, by an accident merely natural, turns entirely out of its course and runs into one of the two neighboring |