Ist CC-Winner Contest Committee's Invitation Class Prize. 2nd CC Second Place in Contest Committee's Invitation Class Prize. 1st DH Winner of DH Class Prize. 2nd DH Second Place in DH Class Prize. 2nd V― Winner second place in Vought Class Prize. Special rigging, not eligible for DH Class Prize. **- Disqualified for cutting pylon at Lufbery Field on last lap. The Contest Committee believes this report to be accurate, but, as much of the information contained therein had to be obtained from the contestants, mechanicians, etc., there may be some errors. The Contest Committee of the Aero Club of America included Benjamin F. Castle, Chairman, Caleb S. Bragg, H. S. Brown, Douglas Campbell, Maurice G. Cleary, W. Redmond Cross, Harry Guggenheim, Richard F. Hoyt, Alan R. Hawley, Albert B. Lambert, William A. Larned, David McCulloch, Edward O. McDonnell, Charles E. Merrill, George M. Myers, Howard A. Scholle. CHAPTER XIII TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN AIRCRAFT CONSTRUCTION IN 1920; SURVEY OF SITUATION DURING PRECEDING SIX YEARS B THE PRE-WAR PERIOD Y August 1914, the construction of airplanes had progressed from the pioneer efforts of Wright and Curtiss to a point where practical machines were produced which could be depended upon to fly in satisfactory balance and control. The construction was to a large extent still empirical and based upon the methods of the more successful builders, but at the same time the theory of design had been established on a sound engineering basis. The aerodynamic foundations of the art rest upon wind tunnel testing of models and by 1914, the properties of aerofoils and the general problem of balance, stability and control had been stripped of mystery. The theory of flight was ready for use. Similarly, the structural design of airplanes had received engineering attention, and the principles of governing strength were understood. In other words, at the beginning of the World War, airplane design and construction had emerged from the phase of invention into that of engineering. The freak arrangements had been tried and rejected and the world had settled upon four fundamental types; the tractor land plane and seaplane (with pontoons) and the pusher land plane and flying boat. All were single engined machines,1 some biplanes (England and United States), some monoplanes (France and Germany). The performance in the air at that time was, of course, limited by the engines and materials of construction available and, in different countries, the national types were further differentiated by the stimulus which had been given to obtaining excellence in particular features. For example, the French airplanes of 1914 were much the fastest in the world, due in part to the effect of racing for handsome prizes. The world's record for speed was held by Prevost at 125 miles per hour. 2 1 Except the Russian Sikorski with 4 engines. 2 Deperdussin 100 Gnome, Rheims, Sept. 29, 1913. The Germans had also stimulated development by prize competitions, but while the French competitions were sporting affairs, the German competitions were purely military. The German premium was placed on reliability and endurance. The world's record for non-stop flight was held by Boehm at 24 hours, 12 minutes, and the altitude record by Oelrich 2 at 26,730 ft. The German airplanes were slow, rugged affairs that carried two men and were easy to fly. In England less attention seems to have been given to world's records, but the theoretical and engineering side of the subject had probably received the soundest treatment. British airplanes were faster than the German, and better load carriers than the French. The great achievement of British designers before 1914 consisted in the practical application of the theory of stability to a stable airplane that could be flown "hands off." The British went into the war with a good two-seater general utility machine in the B. E.-2c. In 1914, the United States had neither a really good engine nor an airplane that could compare favorably with foreign designs. The fundamental cause of this obvious lack of progress was, no doubt, absence of military pressure; in other words "preparedness." Government appropriations for aeronautics were trifling, and the commercial demand was satisfied by a few exhibition machines for county fairs and amusement purposes. The activities of small groups of sportsmen, Aero Clubs, etc., failed to arouse any real public interest and some of these activities took such a form that the general public became skeptical. Airships in 1914, had reached their greatest development in Germany in the Zeppelin, Schütte-Lanz, and Parseval. No other country had rigid airships. The French and British had non-rigid types and the Italians a semi-rigid which were fairly useful craft. The United States had none of any type. Strangely enough, in 1914 the flying boat was less advanced in Europe than here. This situation was due to the work of one man, Glenn H. Curtiss, THE WAR PERIOD During the progress of the War, the national airplane types were modified and adapted to meet the constantly changing military demands. The French racing machines were made more reliable and slowed down. The British two-seaters were speeded up and made into single-seaters. The slow German general utility machines were relegated to schools, and a single-seater developed for fighting. At first no planes carried anything more offensive than a camera. 1 Albatross 100 h.p. Mercedes, Johannisthal, July 10-11, 1914. D.F.W.100 h.p. Mercedes, Leipsig, July 14, 1914. Then came pistols, hand rifles, machine guns, radio, bombs, etc. With the addition of equipment the design changed. The fighting was carried up beyond the clouds and design was further changed by the provision of higher compression for the engine, and low wing loading. This led to specialization by types, a form of differentiation which developed types for one purpose only. The German development is indicated in the following table which may be considered as forced by the growing ascendancy of the Allies. GERMAN AIRPLANE PRODUCTION BY TYPES 1 The excessive specialization of the military airplane was the outstanding result of the pressure of military necessity and has rendered military airplanes practically useless for civil aviation. AT THE TIME OF THE ARMISTICE At the time of the Armistice, the single place combat machine was an acrobatic freak of no commercial value. To a less degree the two-seater observation plane had excessive power and speed, rendering its operation uneconomical. The large bombers required perfect landing fields, such as could only be provided by military appropriations in war time. In general, all of the war planes had costly high strung engines, landing speed too high for ordinary landing fields and, finally, their construction too complicated and fragile. Two unfortunate effects of the war on airplane development were apparent: first, designers had formed the habit of designing for maximum performance mak1 Hoff, "Zeit. Vereines deutscher Ingenieure." 1920, p. 493. Baumann, ibid., 1919, p. 497. ing use of special materials and delicate and complicated details of construction, regardless of building cost; and second, since the war planes never lasted long enough on the front to deteriorate from the action of the weather, constructors had formed the habit of disregarding maintenance costs. NAVAL AIRCRAFT The development of seaplanes and flying boats during the war paralleled that of the land planes and in a similar manner became highly specialized. The great naval problem for the Allies was antisubmarine operations and for this purpose large flying boats of great endurance were produced. In Germany, the naval requirement was to attack and drive off Allied flying boats. Consequently, the Germans specialized in small seaplanes for fighting, to the neglect of flying boats. The torpedo plane and the ship plane to be flown from men-of-war were in an experimental stage in England at the time of the Armistice; other countries had not yet taken up this development. In large flying boats the United States had the lead in 1914 and retained it at the time of the Armistice. In 1914 the United States had no airships, but during the war several American designs of non-rigid were brought out and at the time of the Armistice the United States was abreast of the foreign countries in this field. FIRST YEAR AFTER ARMISTICE The first year after the Armistice, so far as visible progress in aeronautics is concerned, was lost. The manufacturers were engaged in closing out war contracts, adjusting claims against the government, and opposing the dumping on the market of foreign surplus aircraft. It was a period of readjustment and contraction. Technically, 1919 was a fallow year, but the readjustment had to be got over and the unfounded optimism of certain enthusiasts given a chance to cool off. There were, of course, some splendid records of performance made in 1919, such as the crossing of the Atlantic by the N. C.-4, the demonstration of several high speed fighting airplanes, the Martin Bomber. Hart variable pitch propeller, Moss supercharger, etc., but these are really carry-overs from the momentum of projects started before the Armistice. SIMPLIFIED AND CHEAPER CONSTRUCTION Progress in simplifying and cheapening construction during 1920 has not been marked. Designs demonstrated during the year continue to adhere to the conventional construction and, in some cases, |