or concerned and places under his office administrative duties concerning aviation which do not properly belong there. These duties are handled under the Planning Section of Operations, a section not created or equipped for administrative purposes.

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Under the present arrangement, cognizance of the many closely associated elements entering into the experimental design, development and operation of aviation, is scattered through various offices of the Navy Department and their co-ordination through the present departmental organization is attended with serious loss of time and with unnecessary difficulties. The aviation section of Operations is at present held tacitly responsible on all aviation matters. No responsibility or authority, however, is actually vested in the present organization assigned to the control of aviation; nor is it possible to delegate this authority without legislation.

"For the purposes of bettering co-ordination and in order to give the Navy Department an aviation organization competent to deal with corresponding organizations in the other departments of the government, it is important that a bureau for the direct control of aviation should be established."

The Office of Naval Operations has three main divisions: Materiél, Ship Movements, and Planning. It appears that the least unsuitable of these divisions in which to place aviation was the Planning Division. Aviation was therefore made a section of the Planning Division. The senior officer of this section (Section F), being simply the senior member of a subsection of the Planning Division, has no administrative or executive authority, and yet, if aviation does not properly progress, the responsibility for failure is brought to the door of this officer and the Chief of Naval Operations, to whom he is directly responsible. The Chief of Naval Operations has little time to concern himself with aviation affairs, and the senior officer of Section F has a most difficult time coordinating the efforts of the many Bureaus and directing where no power to direct is given, the training, supplies, and operations, so as to bring about the establishment of an efficient fighting unit.

The Bureau of Navigation directs all aviation personnel and controls the development of aerial navigational instruments, aerography, and photography. The Bureau of Construction and Repair has control over all matters pertaining to the design, construction, and repair of aircraft. The Bureau of Engineering controls the design and development of aircraft power plants, radio apparatus, and helium for lighter-than-air craft. The Bureau of Ordnance is charged with aircraft ordnance. The Bureau of Yards and Docks controls all aviation shore station buildings, construction, real estate, etc. The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts and the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery control the aviation matters germane to the general activities of these bureaus.

In spite of these great handicaps, the loyal officers assigned to aviation duties have by great effort brought about progress in Naval Aviation.

During the fiscal year ending June 30th, 1920, Naval and Marine Corps aircraft flew a total of 1,570,892 miles. Notable feats were the seven months' cruise through the West Indies of the F.-5-L squadron with the Atlantic Fleet, and the 8,000-mile recruiting flight of the N.-C.4 under Commander Albert C. Read, of trans-Atlantic fame.1

The Secretary's Report indicates the existing disposal of naval aircraft equipment. Both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets now have units designated "Air Forces" made up of a Seaplane Squadron, an N.C. Squadron, a Ship Board Plane Detachment, and a land station. The Seaplane Squadron of the Atlantic Fleet is called the "Air Boat Squadron." The land station of the Atlantic Fleet is Hampton Roads and of the Pacific Fleet is San Diego. The aerial equipment of each land station is subject to the call of the respective Commanders in Chief of the Fleet. These naval air stations, in common with others, also report to the various naval district commanders.

The Atlantic and Pacific Fleet "Air Forces" have attached to them certain marine craft. The Shawmut and Sandpiper, are tender and auxiliary tender, respectively, for the Atlantic "Air Boat Squadron," which consists of F.-5-L's. The Atlantic N.C. Squadron has the Harding as tender. The Pacific "Seaplane Squadron" has the Aroostock as tender, while the Pacific N.C. Squadron has the Mugford.

The Ship Board Plane Detachment consists of equipment for the four battleships of each fleet that are fitted with turret platforms.

The Navy Department is converting the collier Jupiter into an experimental airplane carrier renamed the Langley. The Department is also converting into a tender a type B Shipping Board Transport, to be know as the Wright.

The R.-38 (renamed the Z.R.-2), the huge rigid dirigible purchased from England and now under construction there, was expected to be ready for flight to America by the Spring of 1921.1 Fourteen officers and fifty-eight men are in training at Howden, England. Hangars for this airship as well as the one being constructed at League Island are being erected at Lakehurst and Cape May, N. J. Another hangar is to be erected on the Pacific Coast.

1 See Chronology.

CHAPTER XI

GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES AFTER THE WAR; AIRCRAFT THE DECIDING FACTOR; CIVILIAN RESERVE IN TRAINED PERSONNEL AND PRODUCTION RESOURCES NECESSARY TO NATIONAL DEFENSE.

W

HEN the terrible effectiveness of aerial warfare was revealed during the conflict with Germany, it became apparent to both civil and military leaders among the Allies, that, no matter what the outcome of the struggle then in progress, the first — and possibly the last-battle of the next war would be fought in the air. For they recognized in aircraft a swift, universal system of transport instantly convertible into vehicles of destruction.

This conviction was voiced by Great Britain and France as far back as 1917, when the United States had barely entered the war and was so occupied with the immediate needs of the Allies that she had no thought for her own future.

Thus England, with that wisdom and forethought which have characterized her governmental policies for generations, took time, during the darkest hours of the war, to lay plans for British dominion in the air, where there is and can be no insularity. The Parliamentary Committee on Civil Aerial Transport reported: "Cost what it may, this Country must lead the world in civil aerial transport." For the commercial aircraft of the future will be to aerial defense what the merchant marine has been to the Grand Fleet.

PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

The French were alert, mindful of the cruel misery of fear burdening an unprotected people. In April, 1917, M. D'Aubigny, President of the Aeronautical Subcommittee of the French Army, wrote a letter to M. Daniel Vincent, Under Secretary of State for Military Aeronautics, indicating the manner in which the entry of the United States into the war could best be utilized to help aeronautics. After a recital of all the things desired, he wrote: "It is necessary to also hold account in the negotiations, of this other fact, that the

war has given birth to a new industry, to which we owe in the national interest to reserve for after the war a vast market by limiting in whatever measure possible, the competition of foreigners." This is a literal translation from "History of the Aerial War," published in La Vie Aerienne, March 4, 1920.

The herculean efforts put forth by each of the belligerents in the construction of aircraft brought the production at the end of the war to a figure greatly in excess of even the colossal consumption at the front. It is estimated that at the time the Armistice was signed, or shortly thereafter, there were actually in existence in Great Britain, France, the United States and Germany more than 50,000 aircraft and possibly twice as many motors. Production in the United States had increased so rapidly during the closing months of the war that, by the end of 1918, we had on hand some 15,000 machines and 25,000 or 30,000 engines. The surplus in Great Britain was somewhat larger and in France somewhat smaller, but Germany is officially stated to have had some 18,500 aircraft liable to confiscation or destruction.

This latter fact is the central point of inspiration for the postbellum aerial policies adopted by the Allies. Back of practically every public utterance in Great Britain and France has been the shadow of fear- the fear that the German mind, unchastened by defeat, defiant of a distraught world, would, at the first opportunity, arise like a wingéd plague.

So in the Armistice terms it was written that all manufacture of aircraft in Germany should cease for six months from the signing of the Treaty of Peace. It was provided further that the aircraft stocks on hand November 11, 1918, should be surrendered or destroyed. This done, the Allies felt that they could safely turn to their own problems.

THE "CATACLYSM OF PEACE "

It was a British statesman, who, beholding the vast aircraft industry nurtured by war, prayed Parliament for protection from the "Cataclysm of Peace." Parliament heeded; for the English have today an aerial policy which made possible the early adoption of a code based upon the international treaty, the encouragement and development of the "Key Industry," and, finally, centralization of all aeronautical activities into one department. Yet there remained the surplus aircraft. What to do with the thousands of ships and engines was the problem. To release them in the British Empire would be to imperil British industry. What more logical (from the British point of view), than to dump them in the most

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favorable foreign market, thus eliminating competition and establishing new business lines for the plants at home?

And the United States was chosen as the dumping ground! Among the first to perceive the dangerous significance of this move were officers of the United States Air Service. They appealed at once to Congress for protection. The House and Senate Military Affairs Committees undertook to add a rider to the current Army Appropriation Bill, but unanimous consent was necessary and this, due to the confusion of the closing days of the session, was difficult to obtain.

BRITISH DUMPING PLANS IN AMERICA

Senator Harry S. New, of Indiana, on introducing the amendment, which had the support of both parties, said:

"I think that our military and naval leaders agree that the aerial arm is necessary to our national defense.-There are two ways in which to maintain and develop this arm:

"1. By governmental appropriation only, which will mean simply experimental work and which consequently will entail a considerable yearly expense without an economic return.

"2. By governmental appropriation partly, but mainly by providing the aircraft industry with such legitimate encouragement and protection as will enable it to compete with similar industries in other countries for the aerial commerce of the world. The greater the share in aerial transport which a nation obtains, the less will be the military burden."

The Senator then described in detail the plan whereby the British Government hoped to rid itself of its surplus aircraft by the formation of the Aircraft Disposal Co. He said:

...

"According to the British aeronautical journal, the Aeroplane, approximately 10,000 airplanes and between 20,000 and 30,000 engines, which cost the British government between one hundred million and one hundred and fifty million pounds to manufacture, were turned over to the . . . syndicate for one million pounds, or less than 1 per cent. In the contract, however, it was stipulated that the British government was to receive 50 per cent. of all profits. Thus the enterprise assumes an international character of profound significance.

"Now, it has been printed in the public press of this country that the Aircraft Disposal Company contemplates the early dumping of at least 2,500 airplanes in the United States. The State Department reports that between May 4 and May 10, 57 airplanes with engines were invoiced out of London for America. So you see the material which England hopes to dump into this country is actually on the way. Indeed, I am informed that some of it already has arrived — and has been sold. It is stated that D. H.-9 airplanes, which cost the British government more than $15,000 to make, have been sold to purchasers in this country for $1,500- and others proportionately."