but was held enforceable as to its application in the Territory of New Mexico. El Paso Railroad Company v. Gutierrez, supra. A statute forbidding foreign corporations to do business within a State without a license and from suing in the State Courts until such license was obtained is held to be inseparable as to the license and litigation provisions. International Text Book Company v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91. A statute regulating pilotage and containing special provisions relative to coasters operating between ports in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida was held inseparable as to the general and special provisions. Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U.S. 90. A statute restricting the right of negroes to vote on a basis including race, color, and previous condition of servitude was held unenforcable as to the exclusion provisions based on other grounds. U. S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214. A statute regulating trade marks in State and interstate commerce was held unenforceable as to the interstate features. Trade Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82. In the face of this uncertainty the best guide to judicial prophecy would appear to lie in the pronouncements of the Supreme Court that the intention of Congress should be determined in the light of history, common sense, and practicability. The conclusions in this report, therefore, will frankly be based on the assumption that Congress intended (or rather would have intended) the expedient solution of the problem now being considered. In order to apply this interpretative standard, therefore, it will be necessary to digress for a moment from the problem of law to the problem of expediency. In determining that problem the following factors are presented for consideration: 1. Existing revenue laws appear to afford adequate administrative and enforcement provisions to prevent frauds on the revenue. In fact, prohibitionenforcement officials have almost invariably used the revenue laws as the basis for prosecutions in place of the prohibition laws whenever they could do so. 2. Revenue laws requiring distillers, brewers, rectifiers and blenders, and wholesale and retail dealers in alcoholic beverages either to pay certain Federal taxes or obtain approval of their operating plants before commencing business afford the Bureau of Internal Revenue an adequate means of knowing who is in the legitimate alcoholic-beverage business. This would appear to make the continuation of the permit system of the prohibition acts unnecessary. 3. It is probably desirable to continue the application of the prohibition acts to the District of Columbia until Congress can enact a substitute control measure. The act of March 3, 1917 (39 Stat. 1123), relative to the control of alcoholic beverages in the District of Columbia has been held by the corporation counsel to have been repealed by the National Prohibition Act. If the application of the prohibition acts to the District is held to cease with repeal the District will be "wide open ", which is regarded as undesirable. The corporation counsel purposes, therefore, to rule that the prohibition acts remain in effect in the District of Columbia. As a logical corollary to such ruling it should be ruled that the prohibition acts remain in effect in all territories subject to the plenary legislative jurisdiction of Congress. 4. As a purely revenue measure it is desirable that title III of the National Prohibition Act should remain in effect for the purpose of continuing the present supervision over industrial alcohol operations. 5. It is desirable that administrative and penalty provisions of the prohibition acts insofar as they affect title III of the National Prohibition Act should remain in effect for the purpose of administering and enforcing the provision of that title. 6. It is desirable, if only for reasons of popular demand, that all other provisions of the prohibition statutes should cease to be in effect on repeal of the eighteenth amendment. Having thus established the measure of expediency it remains only to be seen whether that measure can be supported as a matter of law. It is sub བ་བ་མམ་ ན Pཔས་ས་ cau. entire prohibition code can be held to remain in effect in all territory to the plenary legislative jurisdiction of Congress under the authority aso Railroad Company v. Gutierrez, supra. III of the National Prohibition Act would appear to be clearly separintent, application, and administration from the remainder of the tion system. Its purpose is expressed in section 13, title III of the National ProAct to be event diversion of the alcohol to illegal uses and to place the none alcohol industry and other industries using such alcohol as a al raw material or for other lawful purposes upon the highest possible f scientific and commercial efficiency consistent with interests of the ment and which shall insure an ample supply of such alcohol and its use in scientific research and the development of fuels, dies, and wful production." t was enacted and took effect prior to the adoption of the eighteenth ent. (National Prohibition Act, title III, sec. 21.) uld appear to follow that so long as any substantive provisions of the tion Act remain in effect administrative provisions of that act and trative provisions of supplementary and amendatory acts will remain : for the purpose of carrying out those substantive provisions. uld appear not only possible but entirely reasonable to consider all covisions of the prohibition statutes as being "so mutually connected d dependent on each other as conditions, considerations, or compensar each other as to warrant the belief that the legislature intended them hole", and that since some of the parts will become unconstitutional e repeal of the eighteenth amendment "all the provisions which are pendent, conditional or connected must fall with them.” (Allen v. a, supra.) -See, however, discussion of continuance of present import permit system disappendix B. APPENDIX B CONTINUATION AFTER REPEAL OF THE PRESENT IMPORT PERMIT SYSTEM resent permit system relating to imports of alcoholic beverages is set section 2 of the act of November 23, 1921 (42 Stat. 222), and paragraph he Tariff Act of 1930. act of November 23, 1921, provides that no import permits shall be until available supplies of alcoholic beverages ave been reduced to a quantity that in the opinion of the Commissioner h the liquor that may thereafter be manufactured and imported be t to supply the current need thereafter for all nonbeverage purposes." act, therefore, makes the import standard the nonbeverage supply of d spirits a standard which becomes absurd with the restoration of a erage market. The unwillingness of courts to reach a conclusion which o give an unreasonable operation to a Federal statute (see cases in x A) makes it not unlikely that after repeal the Court will find this "so mutually connected with and dependent on" the prohibition proof the statute as conditions, considerations or compensations for each to warrant a belief that the Legislature intended them as a whole ", since the prohibition provisions will become unconstitutional with the f the eighteenth amendment this particular provision will come within ng that "all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional or d must fall with them." (Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 83.) raph 814 of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides in part: 66 vines, spirits, or other liquors shall be imported or permitted entry n a permit issued thereafter by the Commissioner of Prohibition." I be noted that this section does not apply a nonbeverage standard to surement of imports and it would, therefore, be not altogether unreason port permits, the constitutionality of this section of the Tariff Act is open to grave doubt in view of the fact that it sets no limit upon the exercise of the commissioner's discretion. The doubt which thus attends the continued enforcement of either or both of these sections after the repeal of the eighteenth amendment is complicated by the practical danger that a court of first instance might enjoin their further enforcement after repeal and thus permit substantial imports pending review by the appellate courts. A number of such injunctions were issued in New Jersey to prevent the enforcement of the permit provisions of the National Prohibition Act with reference to breweries. |