unreasonable prices, but more than one-half of the work on large contracts has been done and paid for without being advertised or offered to the lowest bidders.

The contractor gains these results by the following strategy:

When the engineer's estimate of quantities and kinds of materials are published by the commissioners, the contractor will find out by collusion, or in some other way, what quantities of each kind of work or material will, in fact, be required, or he will see what influence he can exert to change the contract after it is made. If it is changed, no new letting is had, but he claims the job as his right.

He then puts in his bid, offering to do such work or to furnish such material as he finds will not be required at all, or in small quantities, at absurdly low prices, at a quarter or in some instances at a twentieth part of its cost. The items which will be required in full, and probably in extra quantities, he will put at unreasonably high rates, and it turns out that what the contractor offers at low prices, is called for in small quantities, if at all, while those which are put at high prices are not only required in full, but in most cases in extraordinary quantities.

An example will more clearly illustrate how the state is defrauded by these devices.

The engineer having estimated certain work and materials as follows:

100 cubic yards of vertical wall at $3.

$300.00

3,855

66

slope-wall at $1.50.......

5,782.50

2,400 feet B. M. white oak, at $50....

120.00

A's bid for the job at these rates amounted to $7,102.50. B's bid for the same was, for

2,400 feet B. M. white oak, at $70.....

168.00

The proposal of B, apparently so advantageous to the state, was accepted, and the contract awarded to him as the ⚫ lowest bidder.' But afterward, by some influence, it was decided to make only vertical, and no slope wall, and to use only oak and no hemlock timber. There was no reletting, although the agreement had been, in fact, revamped into a new and different contract, which enabled B to collect from the state for

3,955 cubic yards of vertical wall, at $6..... $23,730.00 64,400 feet B. M. white oak, at $70..

The sum of.....

4,368.00

$28,098.00

and they are

It will be seen that in such transactions numerous in violation of the constitution, the contractor gets the work without there having been in fact any public letting, or any chance for competition by others.

For the purpose of showing actual results of this system, I state the following ten cases, which give the amount the state has paid on certain contracts in comparison with the

sum for which the contractor agreed to do the work at the lettings made by the commissioners.

These show that the state has already paid nearly four times the amount which was involved by the terms of the contracts, and though this excess amounts to more than a million of dollars, some of the expenditures are still going on with no prospect of completion. It also appears that of the expenditures of $1,560,769.84, only $424,735.90, less than one-third, was submitted to a public letting.

By manœuvres of this character the costs of public works are run up to extravagant sums. Appropriations are absorbed, deficiencies are created to be paid by new appropriations, and the people are loaded down by taxes.

REMEDIAL MEASURES.

Desiring to co-operate with you in a reform of existing abuses, and of the systems which have conduced to them, I submit to your consideration such suggestions for new legislation as seem to me adapted to meet the wishes and protect the interests of our common constituents.

ENGINEERS' ESTIMATES.

Methods ought to be devised to make the estimates of the kinds and quantities of work, exhibited on the quantity

sheet for lettings of contracts, to conform to the actual work to be done. On a change of the plan or specifications of the contract, the work under the old contract should be closed, and a new letting should take place.

BIDDINGS.

The law authorizes the canal board to make regulations as to the biddings, and one of those regulations provided for discarding bids which show bad faith upon their face.

As the officers who let the contracts have not enforced this regulation, except in a recent case, a law should be passed defining their rights and duties in this respect.

I recommend that hereafter the bids be opened, and the awards of contracts be made by the canal board. It is a larger body, and contains the officer who is charged with the fiscal administration of the state, and also the state engineer. It was formerly vested with these duties, and the change was only made to serve a temporary party object.

OFFICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY.

In the organization of governmental powers two conditions seem essential to the well-working of the machinery of administration.

First. While undue concentration of powers should be avoided, and checks and balances, in the requirement of the concurrent action of several persons, are preserved, a certain unity of function and of organization is necessary to enable the people to enforce any real responsibility.

An issue in regard to the conduct of public officers, or in regard to a policy of administration, should be submitted to the people with the simplicity of an issue to a jury at common law. The million of voters in the state cannot resolve themselves into a committee of investigation to hunt out, by long and tedious search, the particular wrong-doer. They cannot convert themselves into a court to go through

a complicated and protracted trial. Amid the numerous and changing objects of interest which attract their attention they cannot devote themselves to a single specific measure of ordinary importance for three successive years. All schemes of administration which involve such impracticable demands for the co-operation of such vast numbers of individuals, discard the idea of representation in government. They compel the whole voting mass to conduct the complex affairs of human society in person. They are snares invented to destroy the power of the people in their own government, to neutralize the elective principle, and to create official irresponsibility.

The members of the canal board, other than the canal commissioners and the lieutenant-governor, are all chosen at one election. The elective power of the people is effectual to make a change of persons or policy. But the canal commissioners are elected one each year, and it takes three years to make a complete change. They have practically ceased to act as a board. Each one carries on his administration over his division of the canals as if he were a totally independent authority. They make three separate reports. Each one prepares a separate annual estimate for future expenditures. They formerly sat as members of a board of canal commissioners, who consulted, decided and acted as one integral body. Their most important functions were performed as members of the canal board, or in concert with the canal board, which embraced the great officers of the state, including its fiscal representative, who is under an ever active pressure to make both ends meet in the financial affairs of the state. They were practically subordinate to the fiscal members of the administration.

Secondly. It is fundamental that the spending officers must be subject to the influence and control of the officers whose duty is to provide the ways and means. No great corporate business, no private affairs could be conducted successfully on any other plan. The experience of the state,