States," refers purely to a geographical uniformity, and is synonymous
with the expression "to operate generally throughout the United
States." Ib.
5. The statute considered in this case embraces the District of Columbia.
Ib.
6. The assignments of error in this case raised only the constitutionality of
the taxes sought to be recovered, which has just been decided adversely
to the plaintiffs in error in Knowlton v. Moore, ante, 41, and there is
nothing in the record to enable the court to see that the statute was
mistakingly construed by the collector; but as the interpretation of the
statute which was adopted and enforced by the officers administering
the law was the one held to be unsound in Knowlton v. Moore, the ends
of justice require that the right to resist so much of the tax as may
have arisen from the wrong interpretation of the statute should not be
foreclosed by the decree of this court. High v. Coyne, 111.
7. The right to take property by will or descent is derived from and regu-
lated by municipal law; and, in assessing a tax upon such right or privi-
lege, the State may lawfully measure or fix the amount of the tax by
referring to the value of the property passing; and the incidental fact
that such property is composed, in whole or in part, of Federal securi-
ties, does not invalidate the state tax, or the law under which it is im-
posed. Plummer v. Coler, 115.
8. The relation of the individual citizen and resident to the State in which
he resides is such that his right, as the owner of property, to direct its
descent by will or permit its descent to be regulated by statute, and
his right as legatee, devisee or heir to receive the property of his tes-
tator or ancestor, are rights derived from and regulated by the State;
and no sound distinction can be drawn between the power of the State,
in imposing taxes upon franchises of corporations, composed of indi-
vidual persons, and in imposing taxes upon the right or privilege of
individuals to avail themselves of the right to grant and to receive
property under the statutes regulating the descent of the property of
decedents. Ib.
General creditors attaching the goods of an insolvent debtor upon the
ground that they had been purchased under fraudulent representations,
when sued by chattel mortgagees of said debtor, may attack the mort-
gage by showing that the mortgagees knew that the goods had been
fraudulently purchased. Browning v. De Ford, 196.
INSURANCE.
See CONTRACT, 1.
JURISDICTION.
A. GENERALLY.
1. A neglected right, if neglected too long, must be treated as an abandoned
right, which no court will enforce. Moran v. Horsky, 205.
B. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME Court.
1. The defence of laches, put in in this case, is the assertion of an indepen-
dent defence, proceeding upon the concession that there was, under the
laws of the United States a prior right, and conceding that, says that
the delay in respect to its assertion prevents its present recognition;
and the court is of opinion that the decision of the Supreme Court of
Montana in this case was based upon an independent non-Federal ques-
tion, broad enough to sustain its judgment. Moran v. Horsky, 205.
2. For the reasons set forth in the opinion of the court, the case was dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction. Pittsburgh & Lake Angeline Iron Co.
v. Cleveland Iron Mining Co., 270.
3. The appellant herein filed its original petition in the Court of Claims
against the United States and the Apache Indians on September 6, 1892.
Subsequently and by leave of court an amended petition was filed
March 2, 1894, from which it appears that the petitioner is a corpora-
tion chartered under the laws of the State of New York and doing busi-
ness in the state of Chihuahua, county of Guleana, Republic of Mexico,
and that property to the value of nearly seventy-five thousand dollars,
belonging to the petitioner, and situated at the time in the Republic
of Mexico, was taken therefrom in 1881 and 1882, and stolen and carried
off by the Apache Indians, then in amity with the United States, and
brought from the Republic of Mexico into the United States. By vir-
tue of the act of Congress entitled "An act to provide for the adjudi-
cation and payment of claims arising from Indian depredations," ap-
proved March 3, 1891, judgment for the value of the property thus taken
by the Indians was demanded. The United States filed a plea in bar,
alleging that the claimant ought not to have and maintain its suit, “be-
cause the depredation complained of is alleged to have occurred in the
Republic of Mexico, beyond the jurisdiction of the United States and
the courts thereof, and that the court, therefore, had no jurisdiction
to entertain this suit." The plaintiff demurred to the plea in bar as
bad in substance. The Court of Claims overruled the demurrer, sus-
tained the plea in bar, and dismissed the petition. Held, that the judg-
ment of the Court of Claims was right, and it must be affirmed. Cor-
ralitos Company v. United States, 280.
4. This case is dismissed for want of jurisdiction, as the Supreme Court of
Minnesota did not deny the validity of the New York statute with re-
gard to insurance, but only construed it, and even granting that its
construction was erroneous, faith and credit were not denied to the
statute. Banholzer v. New York Life Insurance Company, 402.
See ADMIRALTY;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 4.
C. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL.
1. Upon the showing made by the Court of Appeals it is clear that that
court had jurisdiction, and should have proceeded to dispose of this
case on its merits, instead of dismissing it for want of jurisdiction.
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Phinney, 327.
2. The record shows that the cause came on for trial without a jury, a trial
by jury having been expressly waived by written consent of the parties,
that a referee was duly appointed by similar consent, in accordance
with the rules and customs of the District in which the trial was had,
and that his findings, rulings and decisions were made those of the
court. Held, that the question whether the judgment rendered was
warranted by the facts found was open for consideration in the Circuit
Court of Appeals, and is so here. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul
Railway Co. v. Clark, 353.
D. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS.
1. Where a plaintiff asserts, as his cause of action, a claim which he can-
not be legally permitted to sustain by evidence, a mere ad damnum
clause will not confer jurisdiction on the Circuit Court, but the court
on motion or demurrer, or of its own motion, may dismiss the suit.
North American Transportation & Trading Co. v. Morrison, 262.
2. In the circumstances disclosed by the plaintiff's declaration, and in the
certificates of the trial judge, the defendant company, though liable
in a court of competent jurisdiction for the other claims asserted, can-
not be held for the amount of wages or profits which the plaintiff sug-
gests he might have earned had he reached Dawson City. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3;
NATIONAL BANK.
E. JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS.
MANDAMUS.
See ADMIRALTY;
NATIONAL BANK, 1.
1. A national bank was closed by order of the Comptroller of the Currency
and a receiver appointed. An assessment was made upon the holders
of stock. Overton and Hoffer were among those who were assessed,
and payment not having been made, suit was brought against them.
Service was made upon H., but not upon O., who was very ill, and who
died without service having been made upon him. He left a will, under
which J. P. O. was duly appointed his executor. The executor was
summoned into the suit by a writ of scire facias. A motion was made
to set aside the scire facias and the attempted service thereof, which
motion was granted. The executor being substituted in the place of
the deceased as defendant, the court decided that it had acquired no
jurisdiction over the deceased, and could acquire none over his exec-
utor. Thereupon the receiver applied to this court for a writ of man-
damus to the Judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Ninth Circuit commanding them to take jurisdiction and proceed against
J. P. O. as executor of the last will and testament of O., deceased, in
the action brought by the receiver to recover the assessments. Held:
(1) That mandamus was the proper remedy, and the rule was made
absolute; (2) that the action of the Circuit Court in setting aside the
scire facias was here for review; (3) that scire facias was the proper
mode for bringing in the executor, and under Rev. Stat. § 955, it gave
the court jurisdiction to render judgment against the estate of the
deceased party in the same manner as if the executor had voluntarily
made himself a party. In re Connaway, Receiver, 421.
2. An attachment sued out against a bank as garnishee is not an attach-
ment against the bank or its property, nor a suit against it within the
meaning of section 5242 of the Revised Statutes. Earle v. Pennsyl-
vania, 419.
3. When the Chestnut Street National Bank suspended and went into the
hands of a receiver, the entire control and administration of its assets
were committed to the receiver and the comptroller, subject, however,
to any rights or priority previously acquired by the plaintiff through
the proceedings in the suit against Long. Ib.
4. The state court had no authority to order execution in favor of the plain-
tiff of any dividends upon the money on deposit in the bank to Long's
credit at the time the bank was served with the attachment, and direct
the sale of the shares of stock originally held by the bank as collateral
security. Ib.
5. A receiver of a National Bank may be notified, by service upon him of
an attachment issued from a state court, of the nature and extent of
the interest sought to be acquired by the plaintiff in the attachment in
the assets in his custody; but, for reasons stated in Earle v. Pennsyl-
vania, ante, 449, such an attachment cannot create any lien upon specific
assets of the bank in the hands of the receiver, nor disturb his custody
of those assets, nor prevent him from paying to the Treasurer of the
United States, subject to the order of the Comptroller of the Currency,
all moneys coming to his hands, or realized by him as receiver from
the sale of the property and assets of the bank. Earle v. Conway, 456.
In this case it was rightly decided in the court below, that in determining
under the provisions of Rev. Stat. sec. 902, whether the Spanish vessels
sunk or destroyed at Manila were of inferior or superior force to the
American vessels engaged in that battle, the land batteries, mines and
torpedoes, not controlled by those in charge of the Spanish vessels,
but which supported those vessels, were to be excluded altogether
from consideration, and that the size and armaments of the vessels
sunk or destroyed, together with the number of men upon them, were
alone to be regarded in determining the amount of the bounty to be
awarded. Dewey v. United States, 510.
The fourth and fifth sections of the River and Harbor Act, approved Sep-
tember 19, 1890, provide: "§ 4. That section nine of the River and
Harbor Act of August 11, 1888, be amended and reënacted so as to
read as follows: That whenever the Secretary of War shall have good
reason to believe that any railroad or other bridge now constructed or
which may hereafter be constructed over any of the navigable water-
ways of the United States is an unreasonable obstruction to the free
navigation of such waters on account of insufficient height, width or
span, or otherwise, or where there is difficulty in passing the draw-
opening of the draw-span of such bridge by rafts, steamboats or other
water crafts, it shall be the duty of said Secretary, first giving the
parties reasonable opportunities to be heard, to give notice to the per-
sons or corporations owning or controlling such bridge so to alter the
same as to render navigation through or under it reasonably free, easy
and unobstructed; and in giving such notice he shall specify the changes
to be made and shall prescribe in each case a reasonable time in which
to make them. If at the end of such time the alteration has not been
made, the Secretary of War shall forthwith notify the United States
District Attorney for the district in which such bridge is situated to
the end that the criminal proceedings mentioned in the succeeding
section may be taken. § 5. That section ten of the River and Harbor
Act of August 11, 1888, be amended and reënacted so as to read as
follows: That if the persons, corporations or associations owning or
controlling any railroad or other bridge shall, after receiving notice to
that effect, as hereinbefore required, from the Secretary of War, and
within the time prescribed by him, wilfully fail or refuse to remove
the same, or to comply with the lawful order of the Secretary of War
in the premises, such person, corporation or association shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding $5000, and every month such person,
corporation or association shall remain in default as to the removal or
alteration of such bridge, shall be deemed a new offence and subject
the person, corporation or association so offending to the penalties
above described." 26 Stat. 426, 453, c. 907. Proceeding under that
act the Secretary of War gave notice to the County Commissioners of
Muskingum County, Ohio, to make on or before a named day certain
alterations in a bridge over the Muskingum River, Ohio, at Taylors-
ville in that State. The Commissioners, although having control of
the bridge did not make the alterations required and were indicted
under the act of Congress. Held, that however broadly the act of
Congress may be construed it ought not to be construed as embracing
officers of a municipal corporation owning or controlling a bridge who
had not in their hands, and under the laws of their State could not ob-
tain, public moneys that could be applied in execution of the order of
the Secretary of War within the time fixed by that officer to complete
the alteration of such bridge. Rider v. United States, 251.
1. As the parties below proceeded upon a mutual mistake of law in con-
struing and applying the statute the court thinks that the practical in-
justice that might result from an affirmance of the judgment may be
|