Opinion of the Court.

on a writ of attachment from a court of the United States, directing him to attach the property of one person, could not be taken from his possession on a writ of replevin from a state court in behalf of another person who claimed the attached property as his own. See also Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 625; Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, 341; Covell v. Heyman, 111 U. S. 176, 182.

The second question certified relates to this point, although it is not so clearly expressed as it might be, and omits to mention in whose possession the property was when the writ of replevin was sued out. To that question, as explained and restricted by the facts set forth in the statement which accompanies it, our answer is: "After an adjudication in bankruptcy, an action of replevin in a state court cannot be commenced and maintained against the bankrupt to recover property in the possession of and claimed by the bankrupt at the time of that adjudication, and in the possession of a referee in bankruptcy at the time when the action of replevin is begun."

The first question remains: "Whether the District Court sitting in bankruptcy had jurisdiction by summary proceedings to compel the return of the property seized?"

By section 720 of the Revised Statutes, "The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." Among the powers specifically conferred upon the court of bankruptcy by section 2 of the Bankrupt Act of 1898 are to "(15) make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments, in addition to those specifically provided for, as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this act." 30 Stat. 546. And by clause 3 of the Twelfth General Order in Bankruptcy applications to the court of bankrupty "for an injunction to stay proceedings of a court or officer of the United States, or of a State, shall be heard. and decided by the judge; but he may refer such an application, or any specified issue arising thereon, to the referee to ascertain and report the facts." 172 U. S. 657.

Not going beyond what the decision of the case before us

Statement of the Case.

requires, we are of opinion that the judge of the court of bankruptcy was authorized to compel persons, who had forcibly and unlawfully seized and taken out of the judicial custody of that court property which had lawfully come into its possession as part of the bankrupt's property, to restore that property to its custody; and therefore our answer to the first question must be: "The District Court sitting in bankruptcy had jurisdiction by summary proceedings to compel the return of the property seized."

These answers to the first and second questions render any further answer to the third question unnecessary. Ordered accordingly.

TAYLOR AND MARSHALL v. BECKHAM (NO. 1).

ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATF OF KENTUCKY.

No. 603. Argued April 30, May 1, 1900. - Decided May 21, 1900.

By the constitution and laws of Kentucky, the determination of contests of the election of Governor and Lieutenant Governor is, and for a hundred years has been, committed to the General Assembly of that Commonwealth.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky decided that the courts had no power to go behind the determination of the General Assembly in such a contest, duly recorded in the journals thereof; that the office of Governor or of Lieutenant Governor was not property in itself; and, moreover, that, under the constitution and laws of Kentucky, such determination being an authorized mode of ascertaining the result of an election for Governor and Lieutenant Governor, the persons declared elected to those offices on the face of the returns by the Board of Canvassers, only provisionally occupied them because subject to the final determination of the General Assembly on contests duly initiated. Held:

(1) That the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the effect that it was not empowered to revise the determination by the General Assembly adverse to plaintiffs in error in the matter of election to these offices was not a decision against a title, right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States; and plaintiffs in error could not invoke jurisdiction because of deprivation, under the circumstances, of property or vested rights, without due process of law;

Statement of the Case.

(2) That the guarantee by the Federal Constitution to each of the States of a republican form of government was intrusted for its euforcement to the political department, and could not be availed of, in connection with the Fourteenth Amendment, to give this court jurisdiction to revise the judgment of the highest court of the State that it could not review the determination of a contested election of Governor and Lieutenant Governor by the tribunal to which that determination was exclusively committed by the state constitution and laws, on the ground of deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States.

THIS was an action in the nature of quo warranto brought, under the statutes of Kentucky, by J. C. W. Beckham against William S. Taylor and John Marshall, for usurpation of the offices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor of Kentucky, in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, in that Commonwealth.

The petition averred that at a general election held on the 7th of November, 1899, in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, William Goebel was the Democratic candidate for Governor and J. C. W. Beckham was the Democratic candidate for Lieutenant Governor, and that at said election William S. Taylor and John Marshall were the Republican candidates for the said offices respectively; that after said election the State Board of Election Commissioners, whose duty it was to canvass the returns thereof, canvassed the same, and determined on the face of the returns that said Taylor and said Marshall were elected Governor and Lieutenant Governor, respectively, for the term commencing December 12, 1899, and accordingly awarded them certificates to that effect, whereupon they were inducted into those offices.

The petition further alleged that within the time allowed by law said William Goebel and J. C. W. Beckham gave written notices to Taylor and Marshall that they would each contest the said election on numerous grounds set out at large in the respective notices; that said notices of contest were duly served on said Taylor and Marshall, filed before each house of the General Assembly, and entered at large on the journals thereof; that thereafter Boards of Contests were duly selected by each House of the General Assembly, and sworn to try said contests as required by law; that at the time appointed for

Statement of the Case.

the hearing the said Taylor and Marshall appeared, and each filed defences and counter notices, and the evidence of contestants and contestees was heard by the Boards from January 15, 1900, until January 29, 1900, inclusive, and upon January 30, 1900, said contests were submitted without argument to the Boards for decision.

That thereafter the Boards, having considered the matters of law and fact involved in the contests, did each separately decide the contest submitted to it, and made out in writing its decision and reported the same to each House of the General Assembly for action thereon.

That in the contest for Governor the Board determined, and so reported to each House of the General Assembly, that William Goebel had received the highest number of legal votes cast for Governor at the election held on November 7, 1899, and that he was duly elected Governor for the term beginning December 12, 1899; and that in the contest for Lieutenant Governor the Board determined and so reported that the contestant Beckham had received the highest number of legal votes cast at said election, and was duly elected to the office of Lieutenant Governor for said term.

The petition also alleged that the reports and decisions of the Contest Boards were thereafter duly adopted and approved by both Houses of the General Assembly in separate and in joint sessions; that there were present in the House of Representatives at said time 56 members and in the Senate 19 members, which was a quorum of each House, and that there were present 75 members in joint session, and that the General Assembly did then and there decide and declare that William Goebel and J. C. W. Beckham had each received the highest number of legal votes cast at said election for the offices of, and were duly elected, Governor and Lieutenant Governor as aforesaid. The Journals of both Houses of the General Assembly, showing the proceedings and facts aforesaid, were referred to and made part of the petition, and attested copies thereof filed therewith.

It was further averred that after the determination of said contest by the General Assembly, the said William Goebel and

Statement of the Case.

J. C. W. Beckham were duly sworn and inducted into the offices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor of the Commonwealth and at once entered upon the discharge of their respective duties. That thereafter, on the third of February, 1900, William Goebel died, and by law said Beckham was required to discharge the duties of the office of Governor, and accordingly on that day he took the oath prescribed by law, and immediately entered on the discharge of the duties of said office.

It was further alleged that the powers of Taylor as Governor and of Marshall as Lieutenant Governor immediately ceased on the determination of the contest by the General Assembly, but that notwithstanding the premises the said Taylor and Marshall had usurped the said offices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor, and refused to surrender the records, archives, journals and papers pertaining to the office of Governor, and the possession of the executive offices in the Capitol in the city of Frankfort.

The prayer of the petition was "that the defendant, William S. Taylor, be adjudged to have usurped the office of Governor of this Commonwealth, and that he be deprived thereof by the judgment of this court; that this plaintiff be adjudged entitled to the said office and be placed in full possession of said office of Governor, the executive offices provided by the Commonwealth for the use of the Governor, and that all the records, archives, books, papers, journals and all other things pertaining to the said office be surrendered and delivered to this plaintiff, by the said Taylor, and that the said Taylor be enjoined and restrained from further exercising or attempting to exercise the office of Governor of this Commonwealth; that the said John Marshall be adjudged to have usurped the office of Lieutenant Governor of the Commonwealth, and that he be deprived thereof, and declared not entitled to the same by the judgment of this court, and enjoined from assuming to act as such Lieutenant Governor; that plaintiff, Beckham, be adjudged the lawful incumbent of said office; and finally the plaintiff prays for his costs in this behalf expended, and for all proper relief."

Defendants Taylor and Marshall filed answers and amended