inducements to that conduct, the danger of invasion is not to be apprehended, even on a failure of our present negotiation. If France wishes to continue the dispute, I believe it will be because she has another object in view, and that object is solely to plunder our commerce. This may be an inducement, but the other cannot, on account of her want of power to execute it, or, if she had power, the want of inducement. The argument, however, on which the gentleman from Virginia principally rests his opposition is grounded on a supposition that the present motion will have an unfavorable effect upon the negotiation, inasmuch as it is, in his opinion, a partial dereliction of the system of resistance adopted by this country, and to which he ascribes the present temper of France. I do not believe such an effect can be produced by it; if I did, or had the least apprehension, I should be among the last to advocate it; for I certainly wish for nothing that can impede the negotiation. I do not believe it, sir, because, for the reasons I have just now given, I consider this army as useless even in case of a continuation of hostilities with that nation, and because I do sincerely believe that France entertains a similar idea on the subject with ourselves; and that our having three or four thousand men effective, or from nine to ten thousand nominal men, more or less, will not produce the least change in the opinion of our ability to resist an invasion, or in her expectation of success should she continue to be hostile. In the next place, I do not conceive this motion to be a dereliction of the system of resistance against France, because the additional army never made a part of that system, which was adopted by the last Congress. That system, besides putting in a situation of defence by sea our ports and harbors, which are completely garrisoned by the permanent army, independent of these troops, consisted in repelling force by force at sea, in resisting the aggressions of France on the element where they had been committed, and in suspending our treaties and commercial intercourse. The only addition to those measures was merely one of caution. by giving the President power to call out a provisional army in case of "war, invasion, or danger of invasion." All these measures were proposed by the Committee of Defence, and were passed between April and June, or thereabout. After these acts were passed, a motion was brought into the House, and carried, to create these twelve regiments. This was entirely an independent and unconnected motion from the measures reported by the committee at an earlier period. Further: although this law did pass in July, it was not attempted to be carried into execution till the next Winter, which was about six months after the law passed. The first appointment of officers was made after the meeting of Congress in that Winter, and of course the enlistments did not take place for a considerable time. I therefore argue that this was not a part of the necessary system of defence, or, rather, resistance, before determined on and executed. I well remember what were the arguments adduced in favor of the measure at that time, and the circumstances which led to its adoption, JANUARY, 1800. which was carried by a very large majority of the House. We were told of the proximity of St. Domingo to the Southern parts of America; we were told of the weakness of that part of the country, arising from their black population, and the danger to which they were exposed from an invasion of blacks from Hispaniola; we were told that it was not doing justice to so important a part of the country if we neglected to add to it the same security which other parts enjoyed. Not that much danger of invasion was apprehended, but that that part of the country should be placed beyond the power of complaint. I know many members received impressions so far as to induce them to vote for it, of which number I was one. Yes, sir, I then voted for the law, under consideration, but I consider the situation of things is now materially changed. So far from this being the situation at present, a treaty has been formed with the Government of St. Domingo, and therefore invasion cannot be apprehended from that quarter. Another reason in favor of this law at the period of its proposition was, that several members of this House had doubts whether or not the law for raising a provisional army was strictly Constitutional, because power was given to the President to raise it "in case he should, in his discretion, think proper." They therefore voted for this rather than to see that carried into execution which they doubted the constitutionality of. At present, neither of these reasons can be operative; the law giving this discretionary power to the President expires at the end of the present session of Congress, and the danger from St. Domingo is set aside by a treaty. Ι therefore think that, inasmuch as this does not make any part of the system of defence, or resistance against French aggression, the repealing of it cannot affect our negotiation, or impress that nation with an opinion of our imbecility. The gentleman from Delaware goes farther: he says, that if we are disposed to think so friendly of France as to disband our troops, we shall next propose to disband our navy, renew our intercourse, and abolish all those measures to which we were driven by her hostile conduct. I will, for my part, say, that I see no connexion between the one measure and the other. Although I was opposed to all the measures, nearly, to which he alludes, yet I would not, in our present situation, vote for the repeal of either of those laws. I was averse to the general system of hostility adopted by this country; but, once adopted, it is my duty to support it until negotiation shall have restored us to our former situation, or some cogent circumstances shall compel a change. At present, I think it proper that the system of hostility and resistance should continue, and I would vote against any motion to change that system. At the same time, I am of opinion that a Naval Establishment is too expensive for this country; but, as we have assumed an attitude of resistance, it would be wrong to change it at present. There is but one of those laws about which I have any doubt, that is, respecting our commercial intercourse with France. I will not say that our suspension is not injurious to us upon the whole; perhaps it might be better policy to repeal that law; but I state this merely as the only point connected with our system of resistance on which I have not made up my mind. The gentleman from Virginia, after opposing the motion, told us there was some middle way, some modification of the army, which might be adopted and would save a great part of the expense. We ask the dismission of 3,500, which is the number enlisted towards the 9,300 ordered by law. We then keep 5,400, besides 1,000 marines. The object of the gentleman would be to prevent a certain number being enlisted, perhaps all those who are still wanting. I ask, then, if to reduce our Military Establishment is a dereliction of our system of resistance, and may, as insisted on by that gentleman, have a fatal effect on the negotiation, I ask whether any modification will not produce precisely the same effect? Sir, let the modification be in whatever manner, whether to reduce the number of regiments, or of men in each regiment. it will still be receding from measures established eighteen months ago. In whatever manner introduced, it will be neither more nor less than saying that the situation of affairs is altered, and that it is not necessary to keep up all these forces. Eighteen months ago we thought 1.500 necessary, but now we think proper to modify agreeably to our situation. All the difference between the gentleman's proposition and ours is, he thinks the forces may be reduced to 8,000-we think they may be reduced to 5,000; and there is only a question between eight, and five; the principle is the same, and the effect on the negotiation the same. But, sir, I believe a modification in either way would not have the least effect. I think that the concession of that gentleman in favor of a modification is exclusively in support of my position, that this army could not affect the negotiation, and therefore that it was useless; but I will go farther, and say it is pernicious. I think so, because taking these men from their occupations and employments, and putting them into a service where their labors are perfectly unproductive and where they contract habits of idleness, is of itself an evil. But, further the army exhausts our resources, by putting us to a greater expense than can be justified, except from urgent necessity. I believe that if there is any danger to be apprehended from France, it is by sea, and therefore I think that gentlemen who go on that plan, ought, in conformity to their own system, to apply our resources to the object which will protect our commerce. I shall not enter into a detail of our actual finanical situation, because the statement made yesterday by the gentleman from Virginia was sufficiently accurate, and because documents are not yet before the House on which to ground one perfectly correct. We cannot however value our receipts derived from revenue at more than nine millions. Our actual expenditure for the present year, according to the existing establishment, will be about fourteen millions of dollars, to be supplied by a loan. And the expense of the year 1801 will be increased by the interest on that loan, and by that on the deferred debt, viz: $1,100,000, which | H. OF R. then begins to be due. Those two objects will make an addition of one million and a half for the next year. The ability and willingness of the people to pay their taxes, as an abstract principle, cannot be doubted; but, however willing they may be to pay taxes, this year's deficiency must be supplied by a loan. Our income is now insufficient; the Secretary of the Treasury has told us that we must have recourse to a loan; no tax which we can now lay will remove the deficiency, because its receipts would not come into the Treasury till 1801. Our situation then is, that, upon a revenue of nine millions, we borrow five millions at the rate of eight per centum. I think this simple statement to be a sufficient reason why we should retrench an expenditure of two millions and an half, the appropriation necessary for that additional army which it is the object of this motion to discharge. I think this motion, accompanied with the statement which has been made, leaves but one opinion on the floor-we either must decrease our establishments or increase our revenue or our debt. I will not say that it is impossible to increase our revenue I know it is possible to raise more even by direct taxes; but I know, at the same time, that it cannot be done without inconvenience to our citizens, and the more so as our produce has experienced a considerable depression. Gentlemen who are not disposed to diminish the establishments will find it extremely difficult to raise new taxes, or to increase those already laid, in the present circumstances of the people. This, I think, requires no proof. We are told, by the gentleman from Delaware, that the people of this country would pay fifty per cent. for money rather than submit to a foreign invasion. I admit that if the danger was imminent and real they would agree to pay anything. We do not conceive there would be any reluctance to pay taxes were such our situation, but, when it is not, it will be difficult to convince them of the propriety of additional taxation. Yet the confidence expressed by that gentleman in the willingness of the people to pay, does not very well comport with another part of his argument, wherein he insinuated a want of confidence in a considerable part of the people, whom he supposes so far as even to wish that our Government should be overturned. In support of his opinion, he alluded to several Legislative declarations and official addresses and answers. He infers, therefrom, that it would be unnecessary to keep up this standing force, because the militia would be fully confided in for the defence of the country. I am astonished at the palpable inconsistency of the gentleman-that the people would willingly pay fifty per cent. of their property for defence against an enemy, and yet no reliance is to be placed on those very people when the enemy comes! Much weight appears to be placed on the argument of the necessity of these troops in case of the failure of the negotiation; and that we must wait till that failure actually takes place, for we do not know what will be the situation of affairs at that time. The force of this argument does not strike H. OF R. Reduction of the Army. JANUARY, 1800. impression on my mind in that view. I am not afraid of invasion from any Power. I know it is within the possibility of events, but I do not think it probable. I have only used them to show that this is as proper a time to disband these troops as can exist, and indeed more proper, whether the event of the negotiation be a treaty or not. I think the present time is proper; that if it is not thought so by Congress we cannot anticipate any one whatever. I will add that I understand our permanent establishment at this moment is not full, and therefore, if the soldiers are now discharged from this additional army, they may avoid all the hardships so humanely contemplated by the gentleman last up, by enlisting in that army. With respect to the officers, if they have a prospect of being discharged from the service in a short time, the sooner they return to their homes and occupations the better; for the habits acquired in encampments are, in my opinion, nowise calculated to promote their future usefulness to society or to themselves. me, because I always consider it my duty to give my vote on the present situation of affairs, and not on what may occur some months hence. At that time we shall be told, notwithstanding there may be no apparent want of this force, that it would be very improper to disband the army then, because we could not tell what might happen three months after. These three months passover, and then three months more, but when is the proper time? This argument would hold good while the war in Europe continues, under the uncertainty I will only add a few ideas in answer to the of what may happen. The present and existing gentleman last up, as to the impression the meastate of things and probability of events are the sure would make on the soldiers themselves. This only ground of legislation. But if we legislate on as a general argument is not a good one, because mere possibilities, however remote and improba-soldiers and officers enlist or accept their commisble, there never can be a time when an army shall be sions during the existing disturbance, "unless thought unnecessary. The same reasoning might sooner discharged;" therefore we have reserved a be urged by gentlemen even if the negotiation right to discharge them at any time. The gentleshould succeed, for, from these apprehensions we man from Virginia (Mr. MARSHALL) thought a should not then be out of danger, and while in middle way would be preferable. The motion on danger we must prepare for it. I will go further, the table does not exclude a modification, if any and say that, if the accommodation with France gentleman should propose it. does succeed, there will be stronger ground in favor of the continuance of the troops, on account of the danger of a rupture with Great Britain. If we form a treaty with France, in my opinion this will not be the least probable event; and, from her, invasion is more likely than it can be from France at any period. It is well known that at this time our disputes with that nation are not trifling. The depredations of Britain are now at least equal to those of France, and are a sufficient ground of offence. In addition to this, two of the articles of our treaty with that nation are in a state of suspension. The one for adjudicating her Mr. HARTLEY said he did not intend to have spoliations upon our commerce was suspended by risen on this subject, but, on the recollection that His Britannic Majesty; the other, on this side the he was entrusted with a petition to the House Atlantic, relating to British debts, being a subject from his constituents, last session, on this subject of dispute between the Commissioners, is also sus- and against a standing army, he was bound to it pended. If, to the unsettled British spoliations, from a duty he owed them. These troops he beand debts, and British captures, you add another lieved did not fall under the denomination of the cause of dissatisfaction, by a change of our situa- permanent Military Establishment, and therefore tion in relation to France, her enemy, from war he was not of the opinion that it was an attempt to peace, and from suspension of commerce to free to reduce the Military Establishment. This law trade, I appeal to any gentleman's good sense to was passed under the existing differences with the say whether a rupture with that country will not French Republic. We had been, and continued be more to be apprehended than invasion from to be insulted, and he did not conceive there was France ever was, now is, or then will be? If we any change in circumstances to warrant a change retrace our steps we shall see we have always been in measures. He said he voted for the raising of insulted by one nation in proportion as we attached these men, and could see no reason to alter his vote. ourselves to the other. This gave cause to the Mr. H. said he would wish to revive an idea mission of Mr. JAY; we were supposed by Britain thrown out by the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. to have entertained an undue attachment towards MARSHALL,) on the propriety of a modification. France. When the treaty with Britain was passed, He wished gentlemen to consider whether a France was under the same impressions. I do modification could not be made so as to reduce the not say that a treaty with France would be the expense, and yet not to abandon the measure. The cause of a war with Britain, but it might produce people in the country, he said, were very much uneasiness. Our present system of arming at alarmed at seeing bodies of troops marching about, home; our suspension of intercourse with France; and from the assessments lately made they were our dissolution of treaty; our naval and mercan-apprehensive that the expense of them would be tile armaments, by which we take French vessels, are highly favorable to Britain. Take all this away, and we may pronounce it cannot be very pleasing to Great Britain. What I have stated are not my arguments in favor of a continuation of the army; they have no burdensome. The people were not acquainted with the meaning of these things, and therefore their apprehensions were alive to the expense and danger. If there was even a suspension of farther enlistments he thought it might have a good effect; but something was necessary to be done in order to quiet the apprehensions of the people with respect to a standing army and an increase of taxes, which now threatened them. He hoped gentlemen who voted against the resolution would also concur in the necessity of a suspension in the enlistments, and perhaps some other modifications which may be thought necessary to save expense. He should vote against the present resolution, but he hoped to see one adopted to effect a saving some other way. H. OF R. pleted make about 9,300 men, cannot be viewed as in any degree operative on the pending negotiation, for if invasion be really apprehended a much larger force would be requisite. It is true that looking at the army in this view it cannot be deemed very influential; compared to the enemy the force is small. But when you regard the army as part of a general system of defence, when you regard it as indicative of the public spirit, it must have its proportional influence on the councils of Mr. LEE said, if he was to consult his own feel- France; and when you view it as the rallying point ings, or were he to regard momentary popularity, of our militia, in case of invasion, 14,000 well discihe should certainly remain silent, or support the plined, well appointed troops would not be found resolution on the table. But there were seasons an inconsiderable obstruction, seconded as they when, situated as he was, silence would be censu- would be by proper reinforcements of the militia, rable, and a regard to personal considerations crimi- to any invading foe, however vast its resources. nal; this was, in his judgment, one of those sea- It was justly observed, by my friend from Virsons. He must therefore claim the indulgence ginia, that the change in the councils of France of the Committee, for a few moments, while he towards America could only be ascribed to her should explain the reasons which governed his manly preparations of defence, in consequence decision. For his own part he wished the state of of her failure in attempts to adjust amicably exthe resolution had been decided yesterday, as it isting differences. To what other cause can this was placed in a fair and plain point of view by the change be placed; will gentlemen show us? This honorable member who moved it, and by his hon-being the fact, I pray you, Mr. Chairman, to conorable friend who rose first in reply. Although sider what will be the probable effect on our premuch additional argument had been since prof- sent effort to restore peace, should the resolution fered to the Committee, still the real ground on on the table be now adopted. It goes not only which the question rested was narrow, and ought to manifest a shameful mutability in our counnever to be forgotten. It was simply this, shall we, cils, but tends to impress an opinion of fiscal defor the sake of a small saving, break in on our sys- bility in our nation, which, if true, would entem of defence, uninformed as we are of the pend- courage aggression, and invite an attack even on ing negotiation for peace, or continue to adhere our independence. to our defensive system, until we know with certainty what we may expect on the subject of peace? The honorable member from Delaware had, with much ability and eloquence, pressed some of the observations made by his colleague yesterday, and added considerably to the range of argument against the resolution. It would certainly, therefore, have been useless consumption of the time of the Committee to have risen on the present occasion, had not the remarks which fell just now from the honorable member from Pennsylvania demanded attention. He would confine himself to those remarks chiefly, and hoped to be able to show their irrelevancy. Suppose that paper, adopted by Congress, should reach Paris in the very moment when the Ministers of each nation were engaged in the formation of a treaty of peace, what would be the probable effect? Would it not imbolden the enemy, and depress your Envoys? Would it not lead to a submission, on secondary points at least, and thus produce sacrifices which may materially injure the commerce or other interests of the American people? Should we run this risk for the saving of $134,000, especially when, should peace not be concluded, we should be brought into considerable pecuniary loss by giving up the troops already raised? When our Envoys left their native shores they left a people fixed in their resolution to maintain their rights, disregarding loss of money or risk of life. They left a Government settled in its measures of preparation, and pursuing stedfastly the adopted system of defence. Let no change interrupting this proper conduct be introduced, for baneful must be its effects on the councils of our foe and on the spirit of ourselves. The gentleman began by stating that the effect of the resolution was not clearly understood, for that it would not affect the original army, which last year had been considerably augmented, but would only affect the additional regiments now raising; that, should the motion prevail, we should be left with an army of 5,400 men, besides the corps of marines, which, in his opinion, was adequate to any probable demand. I agree that the The honorable member who introduced the regentleman is correct in his conclusion of the effect solution candidly declared that, was he sure of sucof the resolution, but insist that however gentle-cess in our pending negotiation for peace, he would men have heretofore misconceived the same, he cannot be induced from this correction of the effect of the resolution to relinquish his opposition to it; for the more you reduce the saving to be produced, of course the more you diminish the influence of the chief argument used by most of the friends of the resolution. not have troubled the House with a business little in that event, and the cause of some irritation. The same sentiment has been repeated by the gentleman from Pennsylvania. Here, indeed, Mr. Chairman, I cannot but express my surprise. If I understand the gentleman (peace not restored) still he would dismiss the additional army. We The gentleman asserts confidently that the addi- are in a state of actual war, our property seized tion of the twenty-two regiments, which when com- I and confiscated when taken, our seamen when captured imprisoned; and yet, in this state of actual war, if our Envoys return, the object of their mission unfulfilled, our country is to be deprived of the greater part of its military force! On what ground rests counsel like this? I will not impute opinions delivered here to improper motives, but I must be permitted to assert that advice so strange excites suspicions truly alarming. The honorable member has attempted to turn an argument used by my honorable friend in support of the resolution-that is a hazardous experiment, and on the present occasion certainly ineffectual. Suppose the case before mentioned to take effect when France and Great Britain shall, with the rest of Europe, be in a state of peace. America has no alliance with Great Britain. The invasion of this country on the part of France will not be an object claiming the interposition of its rival potentate. What may not force and intrigue united accomplish? If not a conquest of part, the invasion may terminate in an ascendency in the American councils, so far as to unite France and America in all future operations. Thus will France produce an object to her all important, and certainly such an object, for the reasons before mentioned, is worthy of the risk, expense, and trouble of invasion. JANUARY, 1800. we are assured of peace we must hold both, and I doubt not we shall hold both. But we come now to the point of pressure. The honorable member has given us a statement of our income and our outgoings-nine millions annual revenue; fifteen millions expenditure annually; a deficit of six millions. Agreed; make it eight if he pleases; it is a serious business, but still it is nothing compared to our national resources, or the stake at issue. We have the consolation to know that our money is raised upon an equal system of taxation, that it is honestly disbursed, and that the people's Government apply it to the people's service, and for their good only. Talk not to us, then, about the expense of any measure, with a view to destroy a measure in itself proper and necessary; especially in a contest on the successful termination of which hangs the most important rights. We are a great, free, and powerful nation, and no gentleman can put his finger on any act of the American people fixing on them the imputation of niggardness. Whenever money is wanting for the public good, it will be readily given. In my native State (a State which I profoundly respect and truly love, much as I differ politically with its Legislature) the taxes were raised 25 per cent. at one dash-no difficulty attended their collection. I trust the American people value and respect their Government as much as the people of any State can their State Government; and I argue, therefore, that the whole, for the purposes of the whole, will furnish money with as much alacrity as do a part for the purposes of a part. But it seems, at all events, regular troops are not necessary: militia, of themselves, are an adequate defence. This I deny; and much as I wish Í to see our militia placed on a respectable footing, much as I count on their aid whenever danger approaches, yet I never can be brought to trust the defence of the country solely to them. The ex- But, says the honorable member, this is the properience of the last war justifies the opinion. Look per season to dismiss the army, for should it not at the battle of Long Island-braver men on the be done until peace is made with France, it never part of America were never brought into action, will be done; amity with France will beget hosbut vain was their courage. The best blood of tility with Great Britain. This is possible, but I America was prodigally and ineffectually expend- hope not probable. Was it so, it certainly furnishes ed during the war, for want of the aid to be derived a strong argument against the resolution. We from discipline and skill. See what the same sort should want the army to repel British aggression. of men did at the close of the war, when properly It is to us of no importance, as to the principle, trained. The battle of the Eutaws is a distin- what nation becomes our foe. All I wish is, to guished example of the effect of discipline on the avoid cause of war with any; this done, it is American soldiery. But really it is trifling with enough for us to know that America has an enemy: the Committee to press farther this truth; the his- its name or color will not change my fixed resolve, tory of man, from the beginning of the world to which is to defend my country against any and this day, throughout, maintains the folly of placing every enemy, by true and adequate preparations. the defence of a nation on what we call militia The honorable member contends that the twelve only: economy too forbids it. But, because we regiments form no part of the original system of firmly maintain this truth, insinuations go forth defence, and therefore may be dismissed without inculcating a belief that we are inimical to the mil-breaking at all on that system. He himself voted itia, and friendly to a standing army. This is untrue and unwarranted by our declarations. We hold no such sentiments. We wish for the best and cheapest defence, and that we believe to consist of an adequate regular force, calculated for the occasion, and dismissed as soon as the object is answered; to be seconded by seasonable reinforcements from the militia. But, says the honorable member, let us reduce the army, and use the saving in augmentation of the navy. I very much respect this last establishment; I prefer it, and will always be ready to cherish and invigorate it, but not now, in the way suggested, nor at the expense of the army. Until for the twelve regiments, and never considered them as a feature in the system we wish to hold inviolate. Yet the same gentleman tells us that the provisional army did form a part of the defensive system but being believed by himself and others to be unconstitutional, they substituted in its place the twelve regiments. Certainly the thing substituted must be viewed as was the thing whose place it assumed: of course the twelve regiments are properly considered as part of the system of defence, and the honorable member by his own showing is bound to unite with us in holding safe this substituted additional force. Again, the proximity of St. Domingo to our Southern States, |