insuring safety (b). But the law casts upon the shipowner the duty of using reasonable care to ensure that his ship, when she sails and while she is under way, is in a condition in which she may be navigated with safety to other ships. If she damages another ship in consequence of the giving way or inefficiency of her gear or equipment, a primâ facie case of negligence arises. The presumption of negligence may, however, be rebutted by showing that the defect was latent, that reasonable care was in fact used to put and keep her in good condition, or that the giving way of the gear was due to stress of weather or other unavoidable cause (c). In these cases the principle of Scott v. London and St. Katherine's Dock Co. (d) applies. It was there held that "where the thing" (goods suspended over the pavement, which fell and injured the plaintiff) " is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." In Moffatt v. Bateman (e), it was held that the principle of Scott v. London and St. Katherine's Dock Co. did not enable a person, who was injured by being thrown out of a vehicle, to recover damages without affirmative proof of negligence on the part of the defendant. "There is nothing more usual than for accidents to happen (b) Infra, p. 72. (c) See p. 11, above. (d) 3 H. & C. 596; Byrne v. Boodle, 2 H. & C. 722; 33 L. J. Ex. 13. Of the former case Willes, J., said (L. R. 2 C. P. 11): "There the defendants had in their possession, and under their control, something which was dangerous unless reasonable precautions were taken to prevent injury to third persons.' It would seem that these remarks apply to the owners of ships. (e) L. R. 3 P. C. 115; Manzoni v. Douglas, 6 Q. B. D. 145, is a very similar case. The question as to what is prima facie proof of negligence was much discussed in that case, and also in Kearney v. London, Brighton and South Coast Rail. Co., L. R. 5 Q. B. 411; ib. 6 Q. B. 759; 39 L. J. Q. B. 200; ib. 40 Q. B. 285; Daniel v. Metropolitan Rail. Co., L. R. 3 C. P. 216; ib. 591; ib. 5 H. L. 45. in driving without any want of care or skill on the part of the driver"; and therefore no primâ facie presumption of negligence having been raised (this was the opinion of the Privy Council), it was held that affirmative evidence of negligence was necessary. In this case the kingbolt of the carriage, being defective, had broken, whereupon the horses bolted, and the plaintiff was thrown out. It was proved that the carriage was examined by a blacksmith every three months; and that the defendant, the owner, had not himself examined it before starting on the day of the accident. It was held that there was no negligence on the part of the owner in this respect. tween a ship and another under way at anchor. A vessel under way in the daytime, or on a clear night, Collision bewhich runs into another at anchor or stationary in the water is prima facie in fault. And although a ship is brought up in an improper place, another running into her may be held in fault. "It is the bounden duty of a vessel under way, whether the vessel at anchor be properly or improperly anchored, to avoid, if it be possible, with safety to herself, any collision whatever" (f). In The Indus (g), a case of collision between a steamship under way and a lightship, the only evidence on behalf of the lightship being that the collision happened without negligence on her part, it was suggested on behalf of the steamship that that evidence was consistent, inter alia, with a case of inevitable accident, and that the collision might have been caused by her steam-steering gear failing to act; but, in the absence of evidence that this actually occurred, it was held by the Court of Appeal that there was a primâ facie case of negligence against the steamship which had not been displaced, and accordingly that she was in fault. Even if a ship is brought up in the fairway of a public navigable channel, so as to create a nuisance, a vessel which (f) Per Dr. Lushington in The Batavier, 2 W. Rob. 407; The Dura, 1 Pritch. Ad. Dig. 3rd ed. 289; The Marcia Tribou, 2 Sprague, 17; Hay v. Le Neve, 2 Shaw's (Scotch) App. (g) 12 P. D. 46. by ordinary care could have passed clear will be held in fault for a collision with her (h). It would seem that a vessel being launched and going into collision with another at anchor in the wake of the launching ways must be in fault. But in The Cachapool (1), where the ship at anchor had obstinately refused to be towed out of the way, she was held to be solely to blame. Where a sailing ship was lost with all hands in a collision with a steamship, the steamship was held in fault upon the facts stated in her own pleadings, and with no further proof on the part of the sailing ship than the evidence of a person on board a third ship who had seen the sailing ship's lights burning some time before the collision (). It is not enough to prove that the other ship omitted to do something that would have prevented the collision, or that she did something without which the collision would not have occurred. It must be proved that the omission or act complained of was negligent. If the plaintiff ship has herself infringed the Regulations, or has been guilty of negligence which might have contributed to the collision, the burden is on her to show that the collision was not caused entirely by her own fault. Burden of When one ship alleges want of lights or of a proper proving facts look out, or insufficient moorings, or any such negligence peculiarly in the knowledge on board the other as it is impossible or difficult for her to charged. prove by direct evidence, the burden is on the latter, as it is peculiarly in her power, to prove that her lights were sufficient, or that there was no such negligence (7). "The of the person (h) This seems to follow from the decision in Mayor, &c. of Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Q. B. 339. As to the right to bring up in a public navigable channel, see Anonymous Case, 1 Campb. 516, note. As to the liability for damages caused by an unlawful obstruction of a highway on land, see Harris v. Mobbs, 3 Ex. D. 268; Wilkins v. Day, 12 Q. B. D. 110. (i) 7 P. D. 217. (k) The Aleppo, 35 L. J. Ad. 9. (1) The Swanland, 2 Sp. E. & A. 107; The John Harley and The William Tell, 13 L. T. Ñ. S. 413. burden of proof should under all circumstances be thrown on those who have a peculiar knowledge of the subject and peculiar means of proving it which do not belong to the other party" (m). where the not herself in collision. A ship that negligently compels another to alter her Ship neglicourse, and to go into collision with a third ship, or to put ing loss to gently causherself ashore, and thereby suffer damage, is liable, both another at law and in Admiralty, to the injured ship, and also to wrongdoer is the third ship, if she suffers loss; and not the less so because she is not herself in collision (n). Many of the innumerable acts and omissions which cause Specific acts collision have been the subject of decision in the courts of negligence. with reference to the question of negligence. Infringement of the Regulations for preventing collisions at sea, carelessness, want of look out, and disregard of the practice of seamen, and of the ordinary rules of seamanship, are amongst the most frequent instances of negligence causing collision. The cases dealing with specific acts of negligence, both infringement of the Regulations for preventing collisions at sea, and neglect of the ordinary practice of seamen, are considered in a subsequent Chapter (Chapter XIV.); the cases as to the ordinary practice of seamen being collected under Art. 24, which expressly refers to the necessity of observing such rules of seamanship. (m) The Swanland, 2 Sp. A. & E. 107, 109. (n) The Sisters, 1 P. D. 117; The Industrie, L. R. 3 A. & E. 303; CHAPTER II. STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF FAULT. Ir has been already stated that under certain circumstances an arbitrary rule of law requires the courts to hold a ship in fault for collision, although no negligence on her part contributing to the collision is proved. And it will be seen below that this rule applies, not only where negligence is not proved, but where it did not exist, and where those in charge of the ship were, as regards negligence, absolutely free from blame. The circumstances which bring this stringent, not to say harsh, enactment into operation, are as follows:-First, where, on the part of the ship sued, there has been an infringement of any of the Statutory Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, which might by possibility have contributed to the collision; and, secondly, where the ship sued did not stand by to assist the other with which she had been in collision. The decisions upon the first of these enactments are so much more numerous and important than those illustrating the second, that it will be convenient to reverse the order in which they occur in the statute (36 & 37 Vict. c. 85, ss. 16, 17), and to consider the section of the Act (sect. 17) relating to infringement of the Regulations before that (sect. 16) which deals with failure to stand by. By 36 & 37 Vict. c. 85, s. 17, it is enacted as follows: "If, in any case of collision, it is proved to the Court before which the case is tried that any of the Regulations for preventing collision contained in or made under the Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1873, has been infringed, the ship by |