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(without obligation) to expand the existing canal or to build a sea-level canal are essential to U.S. agreement to a new treaty, with the exact conditions to accompany these rights to be determined by negotiation. The U.S. is willing to provide greater economic benefits from the canal from Panama and release unneeded land areas, again with the exact terms to be developed by negotiation.

5. Panama has expressed willingness to negotiate arrangements for continued US control and defense of the existing canal though it remains to be seen what they mean by this. Panama has not indicated its specific views on the acceptable duration of a new treaty. Panama is determined to terminate current US treaty rights “as if sovereign” and extend the jurisdiction of the Government of Panama into what is now the Canal Zone. The 1967 draft treaties would have terminated US jurisdiction in the canal area (but not control and defense of canal operations) with the construction of a sea-level canal. While the United States is now prepared to negotiate for the reduction in the extent of US jurisdiction in the canal area, it remains to be determined whether a mutually acceptable compromise can be worked out between US and Panamanian objectives in this area.

6. In the area of economic benefits Panama has indicated intent to seek a greater direct payment than it now receives ($1.93 million annually), the opening of the present Canal Zone to Panamanian commercial enterprise, increased employment of Panamanian citizens, and increased use of Panamanian products and services in the canal operation. All of these points were agreed upon in 1967, and the US remains willing to negotiate new arrangements along similar lines, provided they do not hazard US control of canal operations, the continuation of reasonable toll levels, and the continued financial viability of the canal enterprise.

7. Renewal of violence in Panama, possibly more extensive than experienced in 1964, might be unavoidable if the treaty objectives considered by the Panamanian people to be reasonable and just are not substantially achieved. While the U.S. has no intention of yielding control and defense of the canal to the threat of violence, it is certainly in the US interest in Panama, in Latin America, and worldwide again to demonstrate, as in 1967, our willingness to make adjustments in our treaty reationship with Panama that do not significantly weaken the United States' rights to control and defend the canal.

8. It is our intent to show Latin America and the world that the United States as a great power can develop a fair and mutually acceptable treaty relationship with a nation as small as Panama. Such a treaty must, therefore, be founded upon common interests and mutual benefits.

9. The Provisional Government Junta of Panama has expressed intent to ratify a new treaty by plebicite to ensure that it is acceptable to the Panamanian people.

10. The negotiators for the United States are Ambassador Robert B. Anderson, former Seretary of the Treasury and Secretary of the Navy. Ambassador Anderson is chief negotiator. His deputy is Ambassador John C. Mundt, formerly a senior vice president of Lone Star Industries and presently on leave from the State of Washington as State Director for Community College Education.

The Panamanian negotiators are Ambassador Jose Antonio de la Ossa (Panamanian Ambassador to the United States), Carlos Lopez Guevara, and Fernando Manfredo.




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Committee : Foreign Relations.
Subject: Panama Canal.

Whereas, under the 1903 Treaty with Panama, the United States obtained the grant in perpetuity of the use, occupation, and control of the Canal Zone territory with all sovereign rights, power, and authority to the entire exclusion of the exercise by Panama of any such sovereign rights, power, or authority as well as the ownership of all privately held land and property in the Zone by purchase from individual owners; and

Whereas, the United States has an overriding national security interest in maintaining undiluted control over the Canal Zone and Canal and its treaties with Great Britain and Colombia for the efficient operation of the Canal; and

Whereas, the United States Government is currently engaged in negotiations with the government of Panama to grant greater rights to Panama both in the Canal Zone and with respect to the Canal itself without authorization of the Congress, which will diminish, if not absolutely abrogate, the present U.S. treaty-based sovereignty and ownership of the Zone; and

Whereas, these negotiations are being utilized by the U.S. Government in an effort to persuade Panama to agree to the construction of a "sea-level" canal eventually to replace the present canal, and by the Panamanian government in an attempt to gain sovereign control and jurisdiction over the Canal Zone and effective control over the operation of the Canal itself; and

Whereas, Similar concessional negotiations by the U.S. in 1967 resulted in three draft treaties that were frustrated by the will of the Congress of the United States because they would have gravely weakened U.S. control over the Canal and the Canal Zone; and

Whereas, The American people have consistently opposed further concessions to any Panamanian government that would further weaken U.S. control; and

Whereas, The American Legion believes that a treaty or contract is a solemn obligation binding on the parties and has consistently opposed the abrogation, modification, or weakening of the treaty of 1903 by which the rights of the United States thereunder would be weakened, limited, or surrended, the United States having fully performed its obligations under such treaty since its adoption : Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, By the American Legion in National Convention assembled in Houston, Texas, August 31-September 1, 2, 1971, that the Legion reiterates its uncompromising opposition to any new treaties or executive agreements with Panama that would in any way reduce our indispensable control over the Panama Canal or the Panama Canol Zone: And be it further

Resolved, That the American Legion opposes the construction of a new "sealevel" canal, as advocated by the recently completed study of the Atlantic-Pacific Canal Study Commission as needlessly expensive, diplomatically hazardous, ecologically dangerous, and subject to the irresponsible control of a weak Panamanian government: And be it finally

Resolved, That the American Legion reiterates its strong support for resuming the modernization of the present Panama Canal as provided in the Third Locks-Terminal Lake plan advocated by so many Members of Congress.

Mr. FASCELL. You may proceed extemporaneously or as you wish.



Mr. Floon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I must say that I extend to you, sir, and to your subcommittee, my compliments and the compliments of the people who feel as I do on this question, because certainly you have not been derelict and certainly we do not expect any chairman to give more attention to a subject than you and your subcommittee have given to this one.

As you say, I have a lengthy statement, and you have now placed that in the record. With the statement will be attached a memorial to the Congress from the Committee for Continued U.S. Control of the Panama Canal, and a very interesting and typical Department of State memo to the Members of Congress dated September 20, 1971. In the very best tradition of the State Department, because they had so many inquiries from Members about this thing, they finally got around to doing something. The "something” I put in, because my words could not possibly explain how they handled this subject there. Their own letter speaks for itself eloquently. Also, a resolution of the American Legion in support of our position.

Mr. FASCELL. Without objection, the documents referred to will also be included in the record.

Mr. Flood. I have here, Mr. Chairman, several editions of the Panama American, an English-language paper published in Panama. Keeping in mind your introductory remarks, just to show you what the temper and the atmosphere is in that area, I hold in my hand an issue of the Panama American for Thursday, May 20, 1971. Here is the scare headline: "Sovereignty or Death”—I read that in my best Shakespearean tradition.

Mr. F ASCELL. You did very well.

Mr. FLOOD. “ Sovereignty or Death' becoming the new byword in Panama.

Just to show you how fantastic this thing is becoming, I have as well several other editions of this paper in which they are analyzing U.S. unilateral interpretations and impositions suffered by the young Republic of Panama. I would like just to include the headlines, not the entire matter.

The three referred to are here. These simply go to show what is deliberately being done there. It is not casual. It has been going on for quite some time, as you know. Those are merely physical exhibits of what we are confronted with. That is in the Republic, not in the zone.

(The material follows:)

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[The Panama American, Thursday, May 29, 1971) " "SOVEREIGNTY OR DEATH' BECOMING NEW BYWORD IN PANAMA"

[The Panama American, Tuesday, August 17, 1971)



[The Panama American, Tuesday, August 10, 1971)


Mr. Flood. Mr. Chairman, as you know, as a former member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs when I first came here in 1945, Sol Bloom was chairman, and I wound up on this very subcommittee that you chair. My interest continues in this phase.

Then when the Department of Defense was created, we created the Appropriations Subcommittee for the Department of Defense, and I have been on that subcommittee since it was created at the end of the war. Hemispheric defense was one of my assignments in that jurisdiction. Of course, hemispheric defense automatically brings in the canal, because I use the phrase that the canal is the jugular vein of Western Hemispheric defense. So, again I get into the act, you see.

I am happy to be with you on this vital interoceanic canal question. It is a subject of world importance now. I mentioned to you before, there lies the body of an American in the Kremlin walls. In 1918, it was he who suggested that one of the prime things for the Soviet was to be sure that they controlled all international canal communications—Suez. Viola ! That is theirs. The Suez Canal, the Dardanelles, the Straits of Bosporus, the Java Straits, the Kiel in Germany, the Danube River, and, of course, the Panama Canal.

With Cuba, just a stone's throw away, under the Soviet influence, it follows like night follows day how important this whole problem becomes.

As you see, I have been studying canal history. As you know, I have made numerous addresses on this thing in and out of Congress. I hold in my hand House Document No. 474, 89th Congress, 2d session. "Isthmian Canal Policy Questions” is the title. The subtitle is, “Panama, Panama Canal, Panama Canal Zone, Modernization, New Canal, Selected Addresses by Representative Daniel J. Flood of Pennsylvania."

There have been many great leaders of our Nation down through the years since the inception of this problem. I have in mind Rear Adm. John G. Walker. I use these men because people forget and do not really know. John Bassett Moore. Those names come back to you. They come back to your father. Secretary of State John Hay, and, of course, Secretary of War and later President William Howard Taft, John F. Stevens. George W. Goethals, the great general. And, above all, President Theodore Roosevelt.

Because many of my colleagues have asked me what is the explanation for my longtime interest in interoceanic canal problems, especially this one, I wish to say that during my boyhood in Hazelton, Pa., ex-President Roosevelt used to be an occasional house guest of my Grandfather McCarthy. He spent many hours describing the Canal Zone, how it was acquired, and his problems in launching the construction of the Panama Canal.

He used this as comparable in geopolitical significance to the Lcuisiana Purchase. He used that analogy frequently.

My grandfather was a great Democrat until Teddy Roosevelt set up the Bull Moose Party, and then McCarthy became a great bull mooser. It goes down that way through the years.

The Panama Canal enterprise consists of two inseparable parts: First, the canal itself; and, second, its absolutely necessary protective frame, the Canal Zone territory.

The two great canal issues before this Nation, before you, sir, Mr. Chairman, and, of course, that means the Nation, are the transcendent key issue of retaining of United States undiluted—I use the emphasis deliberately—undiluted sovereignty over the Canal Zone, and the important project of modernization of the existing canal by the construction of a third set of larger locks for larger vessels adapted to include the principles of the strongly supported terminal lake plan.

I will not go into detail on this. The record shows it. I have testified about this plan before. This was developed in the Panama Canal organization as a result of our World War II experience. Heavens knows, you remember the canal then. You remember after V-E Day we had a division at Colon, one in the canal, and one en route in the Atlantic, headed toward Japan in case we made an invasion. Even you fellows can recall that. A pretty handy piece of water.

All other issues, however important, are irrelevant to what we are here for today, and should not be allowed to confuse or further delay to page

proper consideration of these two pertinent ones to which I have just referred. There are a million things you can talk about day and night.

Unfortunately, the handling of the two principal issues that I have mentioned have been greatly complicated by radical Panamanian attacks on the United States Mr. Chairman, I mean radical-sovereignty over the Canal Zone and the exhumation of the corpse of the old controversy over types of canal-high level lake-lock versus sea level tidal-lock, as you have run into in recent years.

If I had time today, what a story on that sea level thing. Because of prime importance of the question of sovereignty, a knowledge of the history of its evolution is essential for reaching—you people in this committee a wise decision. I devote three-quarters of this presentation today, which you have placed in the record, to this very subject. This is a “must." While it breaks my heart to turn over like this, I go

32. I do not think you are old enough to remember the song, but when I was a kid the song was “The Rosary.” “The hours I spent with thee, dear heart.” Now I turn to page 32, and that breaks my heart.

Why not surrender to Colombia rather than Panama! Somebody says, "Are you drinking, Flood? Colombia ! What have they to do with it? We are talking about Panama."

These wonderful pages that I just turned over have outlined the reasons why, so I won't do that now.

In response to the officialdom in our own Government, they are desperate. These people are determined, and certain personalities in the other body-I cannot understand why—to destroy the 1903 treaty and surrender our just rights and, yes, power-is that a bad word? You know very well, Mr. Chairman, and I know frem defense, regardless of all the sovereignty and the vested rights in such in the Western Hemisphere, if, God forbid, a foreign power would step foot on 1 square inch of the entire Western Hemisphere, the entire hemisphere would have ended. There is no book on that. Ycu know it and I know it. East or West. Let's don't kid the troops. The power and authority at Panama and, I say, Colombia. Until Nov. 3, 1903, Colombia was the sovereign of the Isthmus, the whole Isthmus, instead of Panama.

Any surrender of the Canal Zone and canal is unthinkable for the reasons we have been into; but if any surrender should be madeI am not saying this facetiously. I am a lawyer. So are you. Let's take a look at the record. If any surrender should be made, it should be made legally to Colombia, of which Panama was once a province, not to Panama.

They will drop dead when they hear that one.

You mentioned in your introductory remarks, Mr. Chairman, the jurisdiction of the Senate vis-a-vis the ratification of a treaty. Of course, that is so. A treaty constitutionally ratified by the Senate. The historic reason and the academic reasons for the vesting in the Senate of the sole and exclusive power for ratification of treaties no longer exists. The reasons are obsolete. Communications and the Lord knows what all. Any more than the House elected for 2 years. That is an anachronism. It is ridiculous, the House of Representatives for 2 years. We have been trying to change that since long before I got here.

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