OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

FEBRUARY 4, 1899.

INTRODUCTION.

It will presumably be admitted that the important question with regard to the Outbreak of Hostilities, February 4, 1899, is not, who fired the first shot, but who was responsible for the conditions that made it evident to every observer weeks before the clash came that a single shot might bring on war. The strained situation is illustrated in the following letter* from a soldier, written December 24, 1898 :" Have been very busy recently, as there have been almost daily (and senseless) alarms that the insurgents were going to make an attack. At this writing I believe it only a matter of time when there will be a clash, for the two armies' outposts are within a mile or two of each other, and a single shot from either side would precipitate a general engagement."

The situation may be briefly explained as follows: We believed that the Philippine Archipelago was and ought to be ours, and we were moving to take possession as rapidly as possible. The Filipinos, or at least Aguinaldo's government and followers, believed that the country was theirs and they resented every effort on our part to occupy it. We considered it ours through cession from Spain and right of conquest. They claimed that Spain no longer held possession of the country and therefore had no right to cede it to us; moreover, that by right of conquest we were entitled only to temporary occupation of Manila. We wished to extend our sovereignty throughout the Archipelago with all possible dispatch. They desired independence, or at least a protec

* Printed on page 1534 of the Congressional Record for the 55th Congress, 2d Session.

TESTIMONY BEFORE PARIS COMMISSION.

7

torate which, while securing them from foreign aggression, should leave them control of their internal affairs.

While a discussion of the justice of either position does not come within the limits of the present inquiry, it is important to remember that from the first a minority in this country urged that the Filipinos were entitled to a promise of ultimate independence, and that a resolution of Congress, similar to that passed in the case of Cuba, would avert all occasion for war. This course having been rejected by our country, the question arises, did the assertion of United States sovereignty render war inevitable?

How Widespread was the Desire for Independence?

The testimony before the Paris Commissioners was practically unanimous to the effect that the number of Filipinos who wanted to rule their own country was exceedingly small, and that while Aguinaldo would be opposed to American rule he would not have an extensive backing. No evidence of a contrary nature is reported. The following extracts from cables sent from Paris to Washington give the substance of the information on this point gained by the Commission:

[MAJOR BOURNS.] "Thinks if a few ambitious insurgent chieftains could be disposed of, masses of natives could be managed by the United States."*

"Natives do not desire independence. Present rebellion represents only half of one per centum of inhabitants. Only 30,000 rebels."+

"Natives could not resist 5,000 troops."

"The United States might have conflicts with the church, but not with the people."§

Senate Document 148, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., page 18. Major Bourns' views are, according to General Merritt, entitled to a great deal of weight.

Ibid., page 19. Statement of Belgian consul, to whose opinion much weight was attached.

"General Merritt thinks that if the United States attempted to take possession of Luzon or all the groups as a colony, Aguinaldo and his immediate followers would resist it, but his forces are divided, and his opposition would not amount to anything."*

As late as October 19, General Otis cabled from Manila: "Do not anticipate trouble with insurgents."†

On the other hand, Paymaster Wilcox and Cadet Leonard R. Sargent of the United States Navy, who with Admiral Dewey's permission travelled extensively throughout Luzon during October and November, 1898, reported conditions in the interior greatly at variance with the evidence before the Treaty Commissioners. In the official report of their journey they say the natives "all declare they will accept nothing short of independence, and that they unite in asserting "whatever our government may have done for them it has not gained the right to annex them." §

The report further states, "The Philippine Government has an organized military force in every province we have visited."||

“There are rifles enough for all, principally Remingtons, but many Mausers." ||

"Colonel Tirona claimed that 200,000 men from all the islands could be put on the field well armed, and several other officers have independently given the same figures."||

Whatever may have been the extent of the desire for independence in the early months of insurgent rule, it is certain that before the outbreak the feeling had spread far. General Otis, who, in October had anticipated no trouble, reports that in January "the mass of the people were intoxicated with the cry for independence." ¶

* Senate Document 148, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., page 20. Statement of General Merritt.

+ Ibid., page 29.

Senate Document 66, 56th Cong. Ist. Sess., page 42.

§ Ibid.

Ibid., page 43. For fuller extracts see Pamphlet III. of this series.

¶ Otis Report for 1899, page 164.

DESIRE FOR INDEPENDENCE.

9

He states that "Even the women of Cavite province, in a document numerously signed by them, gave me to understand that after all the men were killed off, they were prepared to shed their patriotic blood for the liberty and independence of their country."

Even in Iloilo, the chief city of the Visayan group, 300 miles from the capital of the Philippine Government at Malolos, the people professed to be bound to support the revolutionary government by the "sacred and natural bonds of blood, language, uses, customs, ideas, sacrifices,"† and acted in accordance with these professions.

Could Conciliation Have Avoided War?

Whether the loyalty which the Filipinos professed for their government in its early stages would have continued, is a question that must remain forever unanswered. No doubt most Americans believe that left to themselves the Filipinos would soon have lapsed into anarchy, while a few maintain that with temporary assistance in international affairs they would have developed a government better suited to their peculiar needs than we can ever give them. Still others who are familiar with the Filipinos and kindred races believe that their aspiration for an independent national existence was not deep rooted, that had we adopted an affectionate, admiring tone to their leaders, had we recognized their government and approved of it, we could soon have made their government our government, could have been as sovereign as we pleased, and had the people with us.‡

Whatever view one may hold, it must be admitted that if we

* Otis Report for 1899, page 70.

+ Senate Document 208, 56th Cong. 1st Sess., page 55. See also Pamphlet VI. of this series.

On this point see letters of Sir Andrew Clarke and Sir Frank Swettenham, Appendix A to this Pamphlet.

were to establish our sovereignty by peaceful methods it was essential to win the confidence and affection of the Filipinos. This fact was recognized by President McKinley, who said in his cablegram of December 21, 1898, "Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines." Whether the rank and file of our army with whom the Filipinos came in constant contact were inspired with the same desire is open to doubt.* We are told that when our troops first landed they were met with the greeting which translated means, "American and Filipino equal." We are also told that that salutation ceased to be heard after a little time.

It seems clear, however, that the insurgent leaders could, to some extent, control their followers, and that had we won the good will of the leaders themselves the mass of the people would have trusted us. It is, of course, possible, that the leaders were so bent upon the one thing we were unwilling to grant them that conciliation was out of the question; it does not appear, however, that any very reasonable efforts at conciliation were made, or any great tact or understanding shown.

There is every indication that the Filipinos were prepared, at first, to treat us as friends and liberators. General Anderson tells the following interesting story: †

"The prevailing sentiment of the Filipinos towards us can be shown by one incident.

"About the middle of July the insurgent leaders in Cavite invited a number of our army and navy officers to a banquet. There was some post-prandial speech-making, the substance of the Filipino talk being that they wished to be annexed but not conquered. One of our officers in reply assured them that we had not come to make them slaves, but to make them free men. A singular scene followed. All the Filipinos rose

* In this connection see testimony of Generals Otis and Anderson and Mr. John Foreman, printed in Pampblet V. of this series.

† North American Review for February, 1900, page 277.