INSURGENTS THOUGHT OUR SOLDIERS COWARDS. 21

the lack of such act, in the near future at all events. Persistent attempts were made to provoke our soldiers to fire. The insurgents were insolent to our guards and made persistent and continuous efforts to push them back, and advance the insurgent lines farther into the city of Manila. It was a long and trying period of insult and abuse heaped upon our soldiers, with constant submission as the only means of avoiding an open rupture. The Filipinos had concluded that our soldiers were cowards and boasted openly that they were afraid of them. Rumors were always prevalent that our army would be attacked at once. With great tact and patience the commanding general had held his forces in check, and he now made a final effort to preserve the peace by appointing a commission to meet a similar body appointed by Aguinaldo and to 'confer with regard to the situation of affairs and to arrive at a mutual understanding of the intent, purposes, aims, and desires of the Filipino people and of the people of the United States.' Six sessions were held, the last occurring on January 29, six days before the outbreak of hostilities. substantial results were obtained, the Filipino commissioners being either unable or unwilling to give any definite statements of the 'intent, purpose and aims of their people.' At the close of the last session they were given full assurances that no hostile act would be inaugurated by the United States troops.

No

"The critical moment had now arrived. Aguinaldo secretly ordered the Filipinos who were friendly to him to seek refuge outside of the city. The Nebraska regiment at that time was in camp on the east line at Santa Mesa, and was guarding its front. For days before the memorable 4th of February, 1899, the outposts in front of the regiment had been openly menaced and assaulted by insurgent soldiers: they were attempting to push our outposts back and advance their line. They made light of our sentinels and persistently ignored their orders.

"On the evening of the 4th of February, an insurgent officer came to the front with a detail of men, and attempted to pass the guard on the San Juan Bridge, our guard being

stationed at the west end of the bridge. The Nebraska sentinel drove them back without firing, but a few minutes before nine o'clock that evening a large body of insurgent troops made an advance on the South Dakota outposts, which fell back rather than fire. About the same time the insurgents came in force to the east end of the San Juan bridge, in front of the Nebraska regiment. For several nights prior thereto, a lieutenant in the insurgent army had been coming regularly to our outpost No. 2, of the Nebraska Regiment, and attempting to force the outpost back and insisting on posting his guard within the Nebraska lines and at this time and in the darkness he again appeared with a detail of about six men and approached Private Grayson, of Company D, First Nebraska Volunteers, the sentinel on duty at Outpost No. 2. He after halting them three times without effect, fired, killing the lieutenant, whose men returned the fire, and then retreated. Immediately rockets were sent up by the Filipinos, and they commenced firing all along the line.

"The story of the actual fighting has often been told by military men who were engaged in it, and we do not deem it necessary to give a description of it here. It is known of all men that immediately after the first shot the insurgents opened fire all along their line, and continued to fire until about midnight; and about four o'clock on the morning of February 5th the insurgents again opened fire all around the city and kept it up until the Americans charged them and drove them with great slaughter out of their trenches.

"After the landing of our troops, Aguinaldo made up his mind that it would be necessary to fight the Americans, and after the making of the treaty of peace at Paris, this determination was strengthened. He did not openly declare that he intended to fight the Americans, but he excited everybody, and especially the military men, by claiming independence, and it is doubtful whether he had the power to check or control the army at the time the hostilities broke out. Deplorable as war is, the one in which we are now engaged was unavoidable by us. We were attacked by a bold, adven

FORCE MUST BE MET WITH FORCE.

23

turous and enthusiastic army. No alternative was left us except ignominious retreat. It is not to be conceived of that any American would have sanctioned the surrender of Manila to the insurgents. Our obligations to other nations, and to the friendly Filipinos, and to ourselves and our flag, demanded that force should be met with force. Whatever the future of the Philippines may be, there is no course open to us now except the prosecution of the war until the insurgents are reduced to submission. The commission is of the opinion that there has been no time since the destruction of the Spanish squadron by Admiral Dewey when it was possible to withdraw our forces from the islands either with honor to ourselves or with safety to the inhabitants."

3. Account of John Foreman, F. R. G. S.*

"In December, 1898, the Treaty of Peace between America and Spain was signed in Paris, and Article 9 says: The United States Congress will decide, in due course, all that concerns the civil rights and political status of the natives who inhabit the ceded territories.' The question of the treaty ratification was hotly debated in Washington. A week before the vote was taken it seemed doubtful whether the necessary two-thirds majority would uphold the Treaty. It is a noticeable coincidence that just when the Republican party was straining every nerve to secure the two or three wavering votes, the first shots were exchanged between a native and an American outpost in the suburbs of Manila. Each side insists that the other opened hostilities, and, if the Filipinos were the aggressors, it is very remarkable that the American troops should have been so well prepared for an unforeseen event as to be able to immediately and simultaneously attack, in full force, all the native outposts for miles around the capital. This occurred on the 4th of February,

* The National Review, September, 1900, page 54.

1899, and the Americans continued the slaughter the next day, particularly in the parish of Paco, where they inflicted on the natives a loss of 400 killed. The news being at once cabled to Washington had the desired effect of drawing the doubtful votes to the Government. side, and the treaty was ratified by the two-thirds majority on the 10th of the same month.

"Thenceforth the Filipinos were dubbed rebels, and the American policy of conquest was inaugurated under the new name of Benevolent assimilation.""

4. Account of Frederic H. Sawyer.*

"I do not know which party was the aggressor on February 4th, 1899, each swears that it was the other. The cui bono test cuts both ways, for whilst it appears that the attack on Manila secured two doubtful votes in the Senate for the ratification of the Treaty whereby the Philippines were bought from Spain, on the other hand, Aguinaldo may have felt it necessary to prove to America that the Philippines would fight rather than bow their necks to the Yankee yoke. So that both parties may have had an interest in beginning hostilities."

* The Inhabitants of the Philippines, page 113. The author was for fourteen years a resident of the Philippines.

III. STATEMENTS OF OUR COMMANDING

OFFICERS.

1. Account of General Otis.

"The battle of Manila, which commenced at half past 8 o'clock on the evening of February 4, continued until 5 the next evening. Its details were fully reported on April 6 last, and it is not necessary to present them anew. I insert a short extract from that report to show the determination of the insurgents to provoke conflict:

"During the entire month of January they labored incessantly to strongly intrench their lines and place their artillery in position,† and boasted freely of their intentions to soon drive the American forces out of Manila. On the night of February 2d, they sent in a strong detachment to draw the fire of our outpost, which took up a position immediately in front of and within a few yards of the same. The outpost was strengthened by a few of our men who silently bore their taunts and abuse the entire night. This was reported to me by General MacArthur, whom I directed to communicate with the officer in command of the insurgent troops concerned. His prepared letter was shown to me and approved, and the reply received (both papers found in General MacArthur's accompanying report) was all that could be desired. However, the agreement was ignored by the insurgents and on the evening of February 4th, another demonstration was made on one of our small outposts which occupied a retired position at least 150 yards within the line which had been mutually agreed upon an insurgent approaching the picket and refusing to halt or answer when

* Otis report for 1899, page 96.

†The remainder of this sentence is filled in from the detailed account of April 6, Report of Secretary of War for 1899, Part 2, page 365.

See page 29 below.