ment. His success was not in the least astonishing, as after the various islands had driven out the few remaining and discouraged soldiers of their openly declared enemy, they naturally turned to Luzon for some form of central government, the islands of the south being well aware of their inability to maintain successful separate and distinct political establishments. The crude one in process of formation in central Luzon offered itself through the visiting agents and was accepted in part (notwithstanding race animosities and divergent business interests), and very probably because no other alternative was offered. The eight months of opportunity given the ambitious Tagalo by the hold on Spain, which the United States maintained, was sufficient also for him to send his troops and designing men into the distant provinces, and hold the unarmed natives in subjection while he imposed military authority; and thus, in December, 1898, we find in northern and southeastern Luzon, in Mindoro, Samar, Leyte, Panay, and even on the coast of Mindanao and in some of the smaller islands, the aggressive Tagalo, present in person, and, whether civilian or soldier, supreme in authority. The success which attended the political efforts of Aguinaldo and his close associates and gave them such sudden and unexpected power was not calculated to induce them to accept subordinate positions in a re-established government, and the original premeditated intention to control supremely at least a portion of the Filipino people, had become firmly fixed. The cry for liberty and independence (really license and despotism, under their governing methods) and the vile aspersions of the motives of the United States, which they have widely circulated, have served them to stir up distrust and fear of the American among the people to a considerable extent, especially those of Tagalo origin. Then the pretext that the United States was about to substitute itself for Spain, continuing all her former governing abuses, including the imposed authority of the hated friar, was resorted to and had its effect on the ignorant masses. Whatever action the United States might now

PROCLAMATIONS OF OTIS AND AGUINALDO.

45

take, except to immediately withdraw its authority and subject the people to anarchy and the European vast property interest in these islands to destruction, could be so tortured as to support this pretext. It was eagerly waited for by the now irresponsible band of conspirators at Malolos, few of whom had anything to lose and everything to gain by inciting hostility. The United States' proclamation, issued on the 4th of January, offered them the first opportunity, and was the opportunity which they desired. No sooner was it published than it brought out a virtual declaration of war from, in this instance at least, the wretchedly advised President Aguinaldo, who, on January 5, issued the following." (See Appendix B, page 70.)

In this proclamation Aguinaldo outlines his version of events from May 1, 1898, vehemently protesting against the policy pursued by our government. He sums up the insurgents' various concessions of military positions; denounces Admiral Dewey for seizing the Filipino launches, and in particular protests against the Iloilo expedition, which, he says, was sent, "with the purpose of acquiring for themselves the title of conquerers of that portion of the Philippine Islands occupied by my government."

The proclamation closes: "My government cannot remain indifferent in view of such a violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by a nation which has arrogated to itself the title, champion of oppressed nations. Thus it is that my government is disposed to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible possession of the Visaya Islands. I denounce these acts before the world, in order that the conscience of mankind may pronounce its infallible verdict as to who are the true oppressors of nations and the tormentors of human kind. Upon their heads be all the blood that is shed."

The later events are recorded in the extracts given below:

General Otis's Comment on Aguinaldo's Proclamations. *

"The unmistakable intention of Aguinaldo, as shown in these proclamations, taken in connection with the well-known fact that what remains of his congress was subservient to Mabini's dictation, was ample notice to the troops to prepare for hostile demonstrations on the part of the insurgent army. Greater precautionary measures were directed and taken in the way of re-distributing organizations throughout the city, in advancing and strengthening (though still far within our own mutually conceded military lines) our posts of observation, and for the quick response of the men if summoned for defensive action. Otherwise no change in the conduct, condition, or temper of the troops was observable. So quietly were these precautions effected that Filipino citizens, noticing the apparent indifference of our men, warned me repeatedly of the danger to be apprehended from a sudden, simultaneous attack of the insurgents within and without the city, and were quietly informed that we did not anticipate any great difficulty. Another very noticeable proof of premeditated intent on the part of the insurgents was perceived in the excitement manifested by the natives and their removal in large numbers from the city. All avenues of exit were filled with vehicles transporting families and household effects to surrounding villages. The railroad properties were taxed to their utmost capacity in carrying the fleeing inhabitants to the north within the protection of the established insurgent military lines. Aguinaldo, by written communications and messages, invited his old-time friends to send their families to Malolos, where their safety was assured, but Hongkong was considered a more secure retreat and was taken advantage of. A carefully prepared estimate showed that 40,000 of the inhabitants of the city departed within the period of fifteen days."

Otis Report, page 79.

TACT AND KINDNESS MOST ESSENTIAL.

47

Cable to General Otis from Washington.

"Early in the month I had cabled the authorities at Washington that open hostilities at Iloilo meant war throughout the islands, and that I had cautioned General Miller and the troops at Iloilo Harbor; and on the ninth instant I received a joint despatch signed by the Secretaries of the Army and Navy and addressed to Admiral Dewey and myself, conveying the instructions and suggestions of the President, which were in part as follows:

Your

"Am most desirous that conflict should be avoided. statement that a conflict at Iloilo or at any other southern ports means war in all the islands increases that desire. Such conflict would be most unfortunate considering the present, and might have results unfavorably affecting the future. Glad you did not permit Miller to bring on hostilities. Time given the insurgents cannot injure us, and must weaken and discourage them. They will see our benevolent purposes and recognize that before we can give them good government our sovereignty must be conceded and unquestioned. Tact and kindness most essential at this time.† . . . We accepted the Philippines from high duty in the interests of their inhabitants, and for humanity and civilization. Our sacrifices were made with this humane motive. We desire to improve the condition of the inhabitants, seeking their peace, liberty, and pursuit of their highest good. . . . . Will send commissioners if you think desirable to co-operate with you both in your delicate task. They cannot leave here for two weeks or reach Manila for two months. . . . If possible to hasten repatriation of Spanish soldiers before the treaty is ratified it will be done. . . . Hope good counsel will prevail among the inhabitants, and that you will find means to avoid bloodshed and restore tranquillity to that unhappy island. How is the health of Miller's command?"

*Otis Report, page 79.

+ In every case omissions follow Report.

General Otis's Reply.*

"When this despatch was shown to Admiral Dewey he immediately remarked that he had recommended a commission, and desiring to be in accord with him, I cabled as follows:

"MANILA, P. I., Fanuary 10, 1899.

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Washington.

"Have conferred with Admiral Dewey. We think commissioners of tact and discretion could do excellent work here. Great difficulty is that leaders cannot control ignorant classes. Health of Miller's command good.

"I also cabled:

"Our troops well in hand and confident that we can meet emergencies. Long conference last night and concessions asked, but insurgents have no definite idea of what they Further conference to be held. If peace kept for a few days more, immediate danger will have passed.

want.

"The injunctions of his Excellency, the President of the United States, to exert ourselves to preserve the peace, had an excellent effect upon the command. Officers and men, confident of their ability to successfully meet the declared enemy, were restless under the restraints which had been imposed and were eager to avenge insults received. Now they submit very quietly to the taunts and aggressive demonstrations of the members of the insurgent army who continue to throng the streets of the business portions of the city."

Insurgent Appeal for Joint Commission.*

Subsequent to January 5, and before the President's mssage had been received, I was approached by influential Filipino gentlemen (through an agent, an American citizen,

* Otis Report, page 80.