NO FORCIBLE MEASURES TO BE USED. 39 General Otis further states, "Conditions are so complicated that these headquarters do not feel at liberty to give positive instructions for your guidance, and they will be sought from Washington, which as soon as received will be transmitted to you." The instructions from Washington received January 21 were as follows: "The President desires no forcible measures to be used for the present in collecting customs duties at Iloilo."] Further Word From General Miller.* "Still General Miller was greatly dissatisfied with his surroundings. He could not perform military service, nor could he conduct business affairs. He was kept watching and waiting under very unpleasant circumstances, which grew more irksome every passing day. On February 3, the day previous to the opening of actual hostilities at Manila, he wrote: "HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPs, "THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, "Department of the Pacific, Eighth Army Corps. "SIR: I have the honor to report military situation here unchanged. The insurgents are reported to be placing another gun in position. This is outside and near the entrance to the fort, bearing on our ships. "The insurgents in town are to-day having a little trouble. Two companies in the main barracks demanded some pay and better food, and threatened to take up their arms and go back into the country if they were not paid. The row is not yet settled. Some $15,000-export and import duty have been received in the collector's office, and I presume the troops want part of that. * Otis Report, page 87. 'Reports from the southern islands, Negros and Cebu, are to the effect that those people realize that they cannot succeed with an independent government and want us to take possession. "I still feel that this place - Iloilo - ought to be captured. Such a step would deprive the insurgents of large receipts from customs, cripple their means to pay soldiers, and arouse the people favorable to us in the southern islands to express more freely their true sentiments. I am well satisfied that a large proportion of the inhabitants of Panay, Negros, and Cebu are favorable to our occupation at once. "A large proportion of the supplies for the Iloilo people come from the American steamers from Manila, a trade which is carried on through the collector of the port of Manila with the insurgents at Iloilo. Is there no way to stop this trade? Cutting off supplies in this way will help to bring these people to terms. I can't understand how such a business can be carried on against the best good of our country. "Very respectfully, "M. P. MILler, Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding." [NOTE: On February 4th, the day after the above letter from General Miller, came the outbreak of hostilities at Manila, followed two days later by the ratification of the Treaty of Peace in Congress. Thus the two difficulties in the way of the capture of Iloilo were almost simultaneously removed. General Otis says: "The territory was no longer Spain's, but we still hesitated to take decisive action for fear of provoking the insurgents, or really giving them the excuse to attack us which they desired. Now this last obstacle had been removed by their determined onslaughts on Manila, and it was very important for over-mastering political reasons to take possession of these southern ports through force or otherwise as circumstances might demand. Notwithstanding our military Otis Report, page 103. strength at Manila was so limited that we could not pursue into the interior the fleeing enemy, we knew our ability to worst him should he appear anywhere in our vicinity, and concluded that exigencies compelled us to clear up the field which we were confronting at Iloilo." On February 8th, General Otis, having obtained permission from Washington to take Iloilo, instructed General Miller to proceed as soon as practicable. The city was bombarded on February 11th, by the Baltimore and Petrel of the United States Navy. The insurgents retired before the landing of our troops, firing the city as they retreated.] 42 FILIPINOS ACQUIRE UNFAVORABLE OPINION OF AMERICANS. PART II. STRAINED RELATIONS IN MANILA, INTRODUCTION. The situation in Manila, which General Otis described December 30, 1898, as requiring delicate manipulation, had daily grown more strained. On January 4 General Otis published an amended form of the President's cablegram, already issued by General Miller in its original form. "Aguinaldo," says General Otis,* "met the proclamation by a counter one, in which he indignantly protested against the claim of sovereignty by the United States in the islands, which really had been conquered from the Spaniards through the blood and treasure of his countrymen, and abused me for my assumption of the title of military governor. Even the women of Cavite province, in a document numerously signed by them, gave me to understand that, after all the men were killed, they were prepared to shed their patriotic blood for the liberty and independence of their country. The efforts made by Aguinaldo and his assistants made a decided impression on the inhabitants of Luzon outside of Manila, who acquired an unfavorable opinion, to say the least, of an American citizen, whom, of course, few of them had ever seen. The insurgent army was especially affected by this tirade of abuse of Americans, but agreeably so, as it had met and conquered the soldiers of Spain, and only awaited an opportunity to demonstrate its invincibility in war with the United States troops cooped up in Manila, and whom it had commenced to insult and charge with cowardice." * Otis Report, page 70. EFFORTS TO SECURE RECOGNITION. General Otis continues: 43 "From August, 1898, to the time the treaty of Paris came from the representatives of the contracting Governments, the insurgents had maintained their military lines around Manila on the plea that they desired to be prepared to meet the soldiers of Spain should she return to her late possessions. As soon as the result of the treaty negotiations became known, the dishonesty of that plea became fully apparent. Then the crisis in the insurgent government was at hand. Aguinaldo and his able adviser, Mabini, a man who had furnished the brains for the radical element, and who, in fact, was the government, proposed to transfer the declaration of open hostilities from Spain to the United States. This the conservative members of the cabinet and congress would not countenance, and the result was their withdrawal. Mabini was able to form a new cabinet with himself as Dictator, and to dominate the remaining members of congress. Independence was the cry, and the extermination of the Americans the determination. They then sought an excuse to inaugurate hostilities, but the United States had kept strictly within its legal rights and had simply performed its international obligations. Repeated efforts were made to secure some mark of recognition for their government from the. American authorities, some of which appeared to be quite cunningly devised. I was addressed by so-called ministers of state on diplomatic subjects, and was visited by accredited members of the Malolos government. The various foreign consuls resident in Manila were officially informed by this government of its proceedings and furnished with copies of its so-called decrees. Never since the time Aguinaldo returned to Cavite, in May of 1898, and placed himself under the masterful spirit of Mabini, had he the slightest intention to accept the kind offices and assistance of the United States, except as they might be employed to hold Spain throttled while he worked the scheme of self-aggrandize * Otis Report, page 75. |