or instance, the Filipinos were ordered not to attempt to take Manila by assault, to haul down their republican flag in the bay, to evacuate one point after another, to give up their trenches to the American troops, to abstain from co-operating against the Spaniards the day Manila was taken, and (under threat of force) to remove their outposts farther and farther away from the city. When Manila, which they themselves might have captured, fell into the hands of their socalled allies, the gates were closed against them. The Philippine Republic' proclaimed by Aguinaldo held its congress at Malolos (in the province of Bulacan, a few miles from Manila), a ministry was formed, laws were passed, taxes were collected, local presidents were appointed in the provinces, and decrees were issued, but the whole proceedings as well as the existence of the titular native government were ignored by the Americans. But notwithstanding these and many other snubs, they still clung, during five months (between August, 1898, and February, 1899), to the vain delusion that their independence would be secured through the medium of American intervention. It was merely a hope in which they received repeated encouragement from several United States officials in the far East, but, in reality, at no time up to the present has there existed any formal and binding compact between the titular Philippine Republic (or Philippine representatives) and the Republic of the United States."

[NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, FEBRUARY, 1900, PAGE 275.]

From "Our Rule in the Philippines," by Brig.-Gen. Thomas M. Anderson, U. S. A., late Major-General, U. S. V., in command of the First Expeditionary Land Force from the United States to the Philippine Islands.

"At that time [July, 1898] the insurgent Filipinos had driven the Spanish soldiers within the defences of Manila, and had them completely invested on the land side by light field works, which they held with about fourteen thousand men. They were poorly armed and equipped, yet, as they had defeated the Spaniards in a number of fights in the field, and had taken four thousand prisoners, it may be asserted in the vernacular of the camp that they had the morale on them.' The Manila garrison was so demoralized at that time and so incomplete was their line of defence that I believe it would have been possible, by coming to an understanding with Aguinaldo, to have carried their advance works by storm and to have captured all of the city, except the walled city or the old Spanish town. Under existing orders we could not have struck a bargain with the Filipinos, as our Government did not recognize the authority of Aguinaldo as constituting a de facto

government; and, if Manila had been taken with his co-operation, it would have been his capture as much as ours. We could not have held so large a city with so small a force, and, it would, therefore, have been practically under Filipino control.

"On the 1st of July, 1898, I called on Aguinaldo with Admiral Dewey. He asked me at once whether The United States of the North' either had recognized or would recognize his government — I am not quite sure as to the form of his question, whether it was 'had' or 'would.' In either form it was embarrassing. My orders were, in substance, to effect a landing, establish a base, not to go beyond the zone of naval co-operation, to consult Admiral Dewey, and to wait for Merritt. Aguinaldo had proclaimed his government only a few days before (June 28), and Admiral Dewey had no instructions as to that assumption. The facts as to the situation, then, I believe to be these: Consul Williams states in one of his letters to the State Department that several thousand Tagals were in open insurrection before our declaration of war with Spain. I do not know as to the number, yet I believe that statement has foundation in fact. Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman, and Williams did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so, probably inferring this from their acts rather than their statements. If an incipient rebellion was already in progress, what could be inferred from the fact that Aguinaldo and thirteen other banished Tagals were brought down on a naval vessel and landed in Cavite? Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition, as I did subsequently at his request. They were permitted to gather up a lot of arms which the Spaniards had thrown into the bay; and, with four thousand rifles taken from Spanish prisoners and two thousand purchased in Hongkong, they proceeded to organize three brigades and also to arm a small steamer they had captured. I was the first to tell Admiral Dewey that there was any disposition on the part of the American people to hold the Philippines, if they were captured. The current of opinion was setting that way when the first expeditionary force left San Francisco, but this the Admiral had no reason to surmise. But to return to our interview with Aguinaldo.

"I told him I was acting only in a military capacity; that I had no authority to recognize his government; that we had come to whip the Spaniards and that, if we were successful, the indirect result would be to free them from Spanish tyranny. I added that as we were fighting a common enemy, I hoped we would get along am cably together. He did not seem pleased with this answer. The fact is he hoped and expected to take Manila with Admiral Dewey's assistance, and he was bitterly disappointed when our soldiers landed at Cavite."

[PAGE 277.]

"A few days thereafter, he made an official call, coming with cabinet and staff and a band of music. On that occasion he handed me an elaborate schedule for an autonomous government which he had received from some Filipinos in Manila, with a statement that they had reason to believe that Spain would grant them such a form of government. With this was an open letter addressed to the Filipino people from Pedro Alexandre Paterno, advising them to put their trust in Spain rather than America. The day before, two German officers had called on Aguinaldo, and I believed they had brought him these papers. I asked him if the scheme was agreeable to him. He did not answer but asked if we, the North Americans, as he called us, intended to hold the Philippines as dependencies. I said I could not answer that, but that in one hundred and twenty years we had established no colonies. He then made this remarkable statement: I have studied attentively the Constitution of the United States, and I find in it no authority for colonies and I have no fear.'

"It may seem that my answer was somewhat evasive, but I was at the time trying to contract with the Filipinos for horses, carts, fuel, and forage. We soon found that Aguinaldo had forbidden his people to sell us anything without his permission. We then informed him that we would have to resort to requisitions. This brought him to terms, and he sent his brother-in-law to us with the assurance that he would give us all possible assistance in obtaining supplies. The depot quartermaster then employed the brother-in-law, and after that we had no further trouble on that score.

"The prevailing sentiment of the Filipinos toward us can be shown by one incident:

"About the middle of July the insurgent leaders in Cavite invited a number of our army and navy officers to a banquet. There was some postprandial speech-making, the substance of the Filipino talk being that they wished to be annexed, but not conquered. One of our officers in reply assured them that we had not come to make them slaves, but to make them free men. A singular scene followed. All the Filipinos rose to their feet, and Buencameno, taking his wineglass in his hand, said: 'We wish to be baptized in that sentiment.' Then he and the rest poured the wine from their glasses over their heads."

I. CONSULAR CORRESPONDENCE.

[NOTE. The consular letters are put first, not because they are the most important part of the evidence, but because upon them is oftenest based the assertion that promises were made to Aguinaldo. Indeed, on the question of the importance of these letters it is well to bear in mind the words of Senator Lodge (page 21 of his speech of March 7, 1900) :— "That loosely-written and wholly unauthorized letters were sent him [Aguinaldo] by some of our consuls I well know, but when or by what code of international law, or where in the Constitution or the laws of the United States is it set down that the letter of a consul, who is not a diplomatic officer, and has no authority to speak for his government, constitutes a recognition of another government?"

The letters, referred to by Senator Lodge, written by the consuls to Aguinaldo, are not given below, as these letters are inaccessible to us. We quote the letters sent to Washington by the consuls, reporting their negotiations with Aguinaldo. It will be noticed that each one asserts that he has made no pledges.]

1. CORRESPONDENCE OF E. SPENCER PRATT, U. S. CONSUL AT SINGAPORE.

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGES 341-346.]

Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

"No. 212.]

“SIR,

"[Confidential.]

"CONSULATE-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

"Singapore, April 28, 1898.

I have the honor to report that I sent you on the 27th instant, and confirmed in my dispatch No. 211 of that date, a telegram, which, deciphered, read as follows:

"SECRETARY OF STATE, Washington:

"General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with Dewey co-operation insurgents Manila.

PRATT.

"The facts are these: On the evening of Saturday, the 23d instant, I was confidentially informed of the arrival here, incognito, of the supreme leader of the Philippine insurgents, General Emilio Aguinaldo, by Mr. H. W. Bray, an English gentleman of high standing, who, after fifteen years' residence as a merchant and a planter in the Philippines, had been compelled by the disturbed condition of things resulting from Spanish misrule, to abandon his property and leave there, and from whom I had previously obtained much valuable infor

mation for Commodore Dewey regarding fortifications, coal deposits, etc., at different points in the islands.

"Being aware of the great prestige of General Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that no one, either at home or abroad, could exert over them the same influence and control that he could, I determined at once to see him, and, at my request, a secret interview was accordingly arranged for the following morning, Sunday, the 24th, in which, besides General Aguinaldo, were only present the General's trusted advisers and Mr. Bray, who acted as interpreter.

"At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo the state of and the object sought to be obtained by the present insurrectionary movement, which, though absent from the Philippines, he was still directing, I took it upon myself, whilst explaining that I had no authority to speak for the Government, to point out the damage of continuing independent action at this stage; and, having convinced him of the expediency of co-operation with our fleet, then at Hongkong, and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed thither and confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should the latter so desire, I telegraphed the Commodore the same day, as follows, through our consulate-general at Hongkong:

"Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong; arrange with Commodore for general co-operation insurgents Manila if desired. Telegraph. PRATT.

"The Commodore's reply reading thus:

"Tell Aguinaldo come as soon as possible.

DEWEY.

"I received it late that night, and at once communicated to General Aguinaldo, who, with his aide-de-camp and private secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting off by British steamer Malacca, which left here on Tuesday, the 26th.

"Just previous to his departure, I had a second and last interview with General Aguinaldo, the particulars of which I shall give you by next mail.

"The General impressed me as a man of intelligence, ability, and courage, and worthy the confidence that has been placed in him.

"I think that in arranging for his direct co-operation with the commander of our forces, I have prevented possible conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering the Philippines.

"If this course of mine meets with the Government's approval, as I trust it may, I shall be fully satisfied; to Mr. Bray, however, I consider there is due some special recognition for most valuable services rendered.

"How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to decide. "I have, etc. E. SPENCER PRATT, "United States Consul-General."