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brance: -If the mind recover the idea by laborious search, it is recollection:-If it be long attentively considered, it is contemplation:-When ideas float in the mind without regard, we call it (from the poverty of our language) by the French word, reverie:-When we notice ideas so as to register them in the memory it is attention:-When the mind considers an idea with such earnestness as to disregard the solicitation of all other ideas, we call it intention, or study.Sleep, without dreaming, is rest from all these :-and the having of ideas in the mind (while the outward senses are stopped, so as not to receive outward objects with their usual quickness,) suggested by no external object, or known occasion, nor under the conduct of the understanding, is called dreaming:—may not dreaming with the eyes open be what we call ecstacy?

I have only given some few examples of this sort of ideas, and, and the mode of acquiring them; by which we see that the states of the mind in thinking are very different, from mere observation to extreme intention. This difference of intention and remission of the mind in thinking, every one, I think, must experience in sleep you find the mind out of the reach of those motions made on the organs of sense; but in this retirement, it often retains a more loose and incoherent manner of thinking, called dreaming. I would hence conclude, since the mind can sensibly put on several degrees of thinking, at several times,

that thinking is the action and not the essence of the soul. For the operations of agents will easily admit of degrees; but the essences of things are not con ceived capable of any such variation.

CHAP. XX.

OF THE MODES OF PLEASURE AND PAIN.

OF the simple Ideas which we receive from sensation and reflection, pain and pleasure are two very considerable ones.—

The thoughts or perceptions of the mind, like the sensations of the body, exist sometimes simply, unaccompanied with either pleasure or pain. These like other simple ideas cannot be described, nor their names defined.

Things are good or evil only in reference to pleasure and pain. We call good, whatever increases pleasure, or diminishes pain :-and evil, whatever encreases pain, or diminishes pleasure.--By pleasure and pain I must be understood to mean of body or mind, as they are commonly distinguished; though in truth they be only different constitutions of the

mind, occasioned by bodily sensations, or mental perceptions.

Pleasure and pain, and their causes good and evil, are the hinges on which our passions turn: by observing their operations in us, we may form the ideas of our passions.

The idea of Love is a reflection on the thought of that delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce.

Hatred is the thought of the pain which any present or absent thing is apt to produce.

Desire is the uneasiness felt on the absence of any thing, whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it.-We may remark, by the bye, that the chief if not only spur to human industry is uneasiness: for where the absence of a proposed good creates no pain or endeavour after it, there is no desire of it, only a bare velleity, that is such a degree of desire as produces no exertion.

Joy is that delight occasioned by the possession or expectation of a good.

Sorrow is that uneasiness caused by a good lost, or an evil present.

Hope is that pleasure produced by the prospect of future enjoyment.

Fear is the pain produced by the thought of a future evil.

Despair is the thought of the unattainableness

of any good; sometimes producing pain, sometimes indolence.

Anger is the uneasiness of the mind on the receiving of an injury, with a present purpose of

revenge.

Envy is an uneasiness of the mind caused by the consideration of a good we desire, obtained by one whom we think not deserving of preference.

These two last mentioned passions envy and anger, not being caused by pain or pleasure simply in themselves, but implying a mixed consideration of ourselves and others, are not found in all men, because estimations of merit or purposes of revenge are wanting in them.-All the rest, terminated purely in pleasure and pain, are universal. We love, desire, rejoice and hope, only in respect of pleasure; we hate, fear, and grieve, only in respect of pain ultimately thus, we extend our hatred usually to the subject (if a voluntary agent) which has caused us pain; because the fear it leaves is a constant pain: but we do not so constantly love what has done us good; because pleasure does not operate so strongly on us as pain, and we are not so apt to expect the recurrence of a good.

Most of the passious commonly produce visible changes in the body; but these not being always sensible, make no necessary part of the idea of each. passion for shame, an uneasiness of the mind on

the thought of something unbecoming, or which will lessen the esteem of others for us, does not always produce blushing.-I do not intend this as a discourse on the passions, but only to shew how these modes of pleasure and pain result from various considerations of good and evil,

CHAP. XXI.

OF POWER.

THE idea of power is got by observing the altera

tion of simple ideas in external things, and the constant change of ideas in the human mind; concluding that for the future by the same ways like agents will produce like changes in the same things: thus we say, fire has a power to melt gold; and gold has a power to be melted: where the power we consider is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas : for we can only observe an alteration in any thing, by perceiving the change of its sensible ideas.

Power is twofold, as able to make, or able to receive any change: the first may be called active, the second passive power.-Perhaps matter may be wholly destitute of active power, as God is above all passive power; and the intermediate state of created spirits may be the only one capable of both.

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