CHAP. XI.

OF THE REMEDIES OF THF FOREGOING IMPERFECTIONS AND ABUSES.

WHOEVER should attempt to reform the languages of the world, or even that of his own country, would render himself ridiculous; because men will not use their words constantly in the same sense, nor talk of those things only about which they have clear and distinct ideas :-whoever would do this, must prevail on them to be very knowing or very silent.

But though the Market and Exchange must be left to their own way of talking, those who pretend to search for and maintain the Truth should think themselves bound to study perspicuity and strictness in their language. Language being the great conduit whereby men convey their discoveries and reasonings to one another, whoever makes an ill use of it (though he does not corrupt the Fountains of Knowledge, which are in things themselves) does as much as in him lies to break or stop the pipes whereby it is distributed to the publick use and advantage of mankind.

That subtlety, which has been so much admired, consisting mostly in the illusory use of obscure terms, is only fit to make men more conceited in their igno

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rance, and more obstinate in their errors. The learning of disputation consists in the vain ostentation of sounds. When I see a controversialist strip all his terms of ambiguity and obscurity, I shall think him a champion for knowledge, truth, and peace, and not the slave of vain-glory, ambition, or a party.

To remedy the defects of speech, the first rule I would give is, To use no word without a signification, no name without an idea for which we make it stand. 2dly, To be careful that our ideas be clear, distinct, and determinate, that is, comprising a precise collection of simple ideas: In the names of substances, something more is required than barely determinate ideas;-they must be conformable to things as they exist. 3dly, we must attend to propriety; that is, we must apply our words, as nearly as possible, to those ideas which common use has annexed them to. 4thly, when the signification of words is vague, or the advancement of knowledge requires signs for new ideas, we ought to declare the meaning we affix to them.

The meaning of words may be made known in three ways:-1st, as the name of a simple idea cannot be explained by definition, we must find a synonymous term, or name the subject wherein it is to be found, or present the archetype to the senses. -2dly, Mixed modes, being mostly arbitrary combinations of ideas, without reference to any arche

types, and the ideas that compose them being exactly known, may be perfectly defined. Upon this ground, I think that morality is capable of demonstration, as well as mathematicks.-3dly, the signification of the names of substances is in many cases best explained both by shewing the archetype and by giving a definition. The characteristic marks, or principal sensible qualities of things, are the chief ingredients of our specific ideas, and therefore form the most observable unvarying part in our definitions of their names: now these leading qualities can hardly be made known but by shewing their archetypes: but because many of the simple ideas that compose our specific ideas of substances are powers not obvious to the senses in the ordinary appearance of bodies, an enumeration of them will better explain the meaning of the name than the actual presence of the archetype: for he, that to the yellow colour of gold shall add the ideas of ductility, fusibility, &c. from my enumeration of them, will have a perfecter idea of it than he could derive from it's obvious qualities only.

The whole extent of our knowledge or imagination reaches not beyond our own ideas, limited to our ways of perception. Spirits, separate from bodies, have no doubt a knowledge much more perfect than ours; though the manner of acquiring it exceeds our conceptions. Definitions serve well enough to

explain the names of substances, as standing for our ideas, but not as standing for the things themselves : for to define the names of things rightly, natural history must be enquired into, that their properties may be carefully examined. A vocabulary, where these words were explained by little draughts and prints, would teach the signification of many terms much better than all the large and laborious comments of learned critics. Toga, Tunica, Pallium, are easily translated gown, coat, and cloak; but we have thereby no more true ideas of the fashion of those habits among the Romans than we have of the faces of the tailors who made them.

The fifth Rule to be observed, is to use words constantly in the same sense. Were this to be done, many great volumes, swollen with ambiguous words, would shrink into a very narrow compass; and many works of the Philosophers as well as Poets might be contained in a nutshell. But after all, the provision of words is so scanty, compared with the variety of our ideas, that words must sometimes be varied a little in their sense: and it will be sufficient, in cases where the import of the discourse does not lead candid and intelligent readers into the true meaning, that the writer explain his own meaning.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

OF KWLEDGE IN GENERAL.

SINCE the mind a contemplate no other immediate objects than its ows ideas, it is evident that our knowledge is only converent about them. Knowledge then seems to be thing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. To know that white is not black, is bo to perceive that these two ideas do not agree: be assured that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is only to perceive the inseparable agreement between the three angles of a triangle and two right ones.

This agreement is of founds:-1. Identity or Diversity. 2. Relation. 3. Co-tence, or necessary connexion. 4. Real Existence.

The first act of the mind is so to perceive its ideas as to observe their difference, and know that one is