"On Manning the Navy." To the proceedings of that Commission, of which I was a member, and its results, I shall refer in the following Chapter at greater length than I might otherwise have done, for, although there had been various inquiries, by order of the Admiralty, or with the sanction of Parliament, it was the first Royal Commission specially appointed to investigate the subject of Manning and Reserves.

MANNING COMMISSION OF 1859.

CHAPTER III.

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THE object of the Royal Commission of 1859 was "to inquire into the best means of Manning the Navy, and in what manner, and under what arrangements, seamen may be readily obtained for such purpose either during peace or in case of sudden emergency of war; and as to the way in which the valuable services of the Mercantile Marine and the seafaring population of the United Kingdom may be rendered more readily and willingly available when required for the Naval Service."

This Commission, of which Lord Hardwicke was chairman, examined a great many witnesses, nearly all of whom were eminently qualified to render advice, and, after duly considering the evidence, made various recommendations.

Reviewing with care the different branches of the service, even to its most minute details, and the requirements of the Navy in peace and war, the Commissioners were of opinion, that while there was little or no difficulty in obtaining the requisite number of men for the ordinary wants of Her Majesty's Naval Service, there were few or no reliable means for increasing that number; and that this country should have a Reserve of 60,000 men for an emergency, all of whom could be made available within a few months after the declaration of war. Consequently, the Commissioners recommended the creation of a new Reserve Force, to be drawn from the merchant service, which they styled Royal Naval Volunteers (since known

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as the Royal Naval Reserve), to consist of 20,000 men, "who will never be long absent from the ports from which they hail;" and their number the Commissioners thought could be easily obtained from the coasting and shortvoyage trades, embracing the trades to North America, the Baltic, and Mediterranean.

The inducements for men to join the proposed force were to be (1) a payment at short periods; (2) a pension at the age of 50 to 55; (3) payment for time spent in practice; (4) admission to the Coastguard; and (5) participation in the benefits of Greenwich Hospital. That is to say, each man was to receive a retaining fee of £5 per annum, and the State was also to contribute a further sum of £1 per annum, which would secure to those men who continued in the service "a pension of not less than £12 at the age of 50, of £15 at from 52 to 53, and £18 at 55." When at drill, which they were required to be for one month each year, they were to receive the same scale of pay, and other allowances, as the seamen engaged in the Navy, besides the other advantages just named.

The Commissioners were of opinion "that no great reliance could be placed upon the Naval Coast Volunteers for manning the fleet in case of emergency," arising from the fact that they were "not seamen in the true acceptation of the term, but boatmen, fishermen, and along-shore men," and more especially as they could not, by the articles of their agreement, be called upon to serve at a greater distance than 100 leagues from our shores; nevertheless, as they were "tolerable gunners, and would be useful for coast defence or for service in port," the Commissioners, strange to say, thought it would be advisable to increase this force to 10,000 men.

The Royal Naval Reserve has materially superseded the prior Reserve, known as the Naval Coast Volunteers, which it was found included men in every trade and profession, except that for which they were retained, and

many of whom were of no trade or profession whatever, having no regular place of abode except the county gaol or local prison, where they were too frequently found when their period for drill-muster arrived.

The Commissioners further recommend that the Coastguard should be increased to 12,000 men; that the reliefs of seamen in the home ports should not be less than 4,000; that 6,000 marines should be embodied on shore, ready for service afloat, and that it was advisable to have a further Reserve of 5,000 short-service pensioners belonging to that valuable corps, as well as 3,000 short-service seamen pensioners-men who had retired after ten years' service on a pension of 6d. per day, thus constituting a Reserve Force of 60,000 men at the estimated annual cost of £598,821.* Though the result, if not the object, of all commissions seems to be to increase expenditure, I should not have objected to even this large addition to our Naval Estimates; nor would it have been too much to pay, even if it did no more than afford relief from the panics which prevail, to a greater or less extent, at every rumour of

war. But while agreeing with my colleagues in many of their recommendations, I felt that their scheme was based upon precarious foundations, and that it was not "really fitted to effect their object."* More reliable means, and "measures of a more rigorous and decided character" appeared to me to be necessary: (1) I thought that my colleagues did not sufficiently realise the fact, that steam had entirely changed the mode in which naval warfare would in future be conducted; (2) that as we were essentially a maritime people, and as our chief safeguard lay in our superiority at sea, I thought that a larger proportion of our military force should "consist of men competent to serve either afloat or on shore, who should, in fact, be a sort of naval militia, trained to the management of guns and to some of the more essential parts of a seaman's duty;" (3) that by garrisoning our sea-ports with men thus trained, we should have a very powerful and efficient reserve of gunners for our ships, whose places on shore could, on the emergency of war, be filled with either soldiers or militia, and their places in turn, in the inland towns, filled by the Volunteers. Thus while utilising to great advantage the services of that large and spirited force, we should not require to retain so many seamen in reserve, and (4) that the reserve of seamen from the Merchant Service which they proposed would not be easily obtainable unless we invited their officers to enrol in the Reserve, and would be of little service unless we had a sufficient number of competent men to command them.

The last is the only one of my suggestions which has been carried into effect. Although this portion of the scheme has proved unsatisfactory from the fact that these officers seldom attend drill, and have not made themselves efficient in their duties, I felt that, however great the

*See "Letter from W. S. Lindsay to the Earl of Hardwicke: Remarks Appended to the Report of the Commissioners," 1859.