member needs is that he shall not be called to account by any power outside of the legislature for what he says at a meeting of the legislature. The legislature itself may discipline him for improper conduct or language at its meeting, but no outside power should be able to punish him. This was provided for in the Maryland constitution of 1776, as in the statute of William and Mary, and, after passing through five or six documents, the provision appeared in the Constitution. It is one of the few provisions that can be traced directly to the forms of the British government.

"That in every general free assembly every respective member hath liberty of speech." (Concessions of West Jersey, 1669.) "That freedom of speech and debates, or proceedings in the Legislature, ought not to be impeached in any other court or judicature." (Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776.)

"Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Congress."' (Articles of Confederation, 1778.)

"Freedom of debate and speech shall be allowed in Congress, nor shall anything done in Congress be impeached or questioned out of it." (Drayton's Articles of Confederation, 1778.)

"The freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate, in either house of the legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action or complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever." (Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.)

The above provision from the Massachusetts constitution of 1780 is repeated in the New Hampshire constitution of 1784. The Vermont constitution of 1786 repeats the provision given above from the Massachusetts constitution of 1780. "Freedom of speech and debate in the Legislature shall not be impeached, or questioned, in any place out of it." (Pinckney's Plan, 1787.)

"For any speech or debate in either house, they [senators and representatives] shall not be questioned in any other place." (The Constitution.)

7. PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST.

The colonial charters and constitutions contained no provision protecting a member of the legislature from arrest. It seems to have been assumed that the privilege existed as a matter of course; but in at least one instance it was violated.

In 1705, Biles, a member of the Pennsylvania assembly, was arrested during the session of the assembly for speaking contemptuously of the governor. He pleaded his privilege as a member, but the court overruled the plea. The assembly passed a resolution condemning the sheriff and judges for violating the privilege of the house, and the governor thereupon called the assembly before him and, after addressing them in a most abusive speech, adjourned them. There seems to have been no definite settlement of the question on this occasion, but the general opinion was probably in favor of the existence of the privilege, for the constitutions of 1776 are usually silent about it.

"The members of Congress shall be protected in their persons from arrests and imprisonments during the time of their going to and from, and attendance on, Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace." (Articles of Confederation, 1778.)

"The delegates shall be protected in their persons from arrests and imprisonments, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace." (Drayton's Articles of Confederation, 1778.)

"And no member of the house of representatives shall be arrested, or held to bail on mesne process, during his going unto,

returning from, or his attending the general assembly." (Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.)

The above provision from the Massachusetts constitution of 1780 is repeated in the New Hampshire constitution of 1784.

"The members of both houses shall, in all cases, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be free from arrest during their attendance on Congress, and in going to and returning from it." (Pinckney's Plan, 1787.)

"They [senators and representatives] shall in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in going to and returning from the same." (The Constitution.)

8. MONEY-BILLS.

The principle that bills for raising money from the people should originate in that part of the legislature which most fully represented the people-in England the House of Commons-was familiar to the colonists, and it may be admitted that their ideas on this subject were taken directly from the forms of the British government.

None of the colonial charters or constitutions contained any clause specially securing this right, but the colonists always insisted that it belonged to them in all their legislative bodies as a matter of course because they were free-born Englishmen. In Pennsylvania, especially, they contended for it against their proprietors and deputy-governors with the greatest persistency, and insisted on the right in its fullest extent,—namely, that money-bills should not only originate in the lower house of assembly, but should also be either accepted or rejected by the council or upper house without any attempt to amend them. Some of the constitutions of 1776

adopted this extreme view, which was modified in the National Constitution by allowing the Senate to propose amendments, as in the case of other bills.

"That all bills, resolves, or votes for raising, levying, and collecting money originate in the house of representatives." (New Hampshire Constitution of 1776.)

"All money-bills for the support of government shall originate in the general assembly, and shall not be altered or amended by the legislative council, but may be rejected by them." (South Carolina Constitution of 1776.)

"All laws shall originate in the house of delegates, to be approved of or rejected by the senate, or to be amended with the consent of the house of delegates; except money-bills, which in no instance shall be altered by the senate, but wholly approved or rejected." (Virginia Constitution of 1776.)

"That the council shall not prepare or alter any money-bill, which shall be the privilege of the assembly." (New Jersey Constitution of 1776.)

"All money-bills for the support of government shall originate in the house of assembly, and may be altered, amended, or rejected by the legislative council." (Delaware Constitution of 1776.)

"The house of delegates may originate all money-bills." (Maryland Constitution of 1776.)

Excepting bills and resolves levying and granting money or other property of the State, which shall originate in the house of representatives only, and be concurred or non-concurred in whole by the senate." (Rejected Constitution of Massachusetts of 1778.)

"That all money-bills for the support of the government shall originate in the house of representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by the senate, but may be rejected by them." (South Carolina Constitution of 1778.)

"And all acts, resolves, or votes, except grants of money, lands, or other things, may originate in either house; but such

grants shall originate in the house of representatives only." (Rejected Constitution of New Hampshire of 1778.)

"All money-bills shall originate in the house of representatives; but the senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills." (Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.)

The above provision from the Massachusetts constitution of 1780 is repeated in the New Hampshire constitution of 1784. "All money-bills of every kind shall originate in the house of delegates, and shall not be altered by the senate." (Pinckney's

Plan, 1787.)

"All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of representatives; but the senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills."' (The Constitution.)

9. ADJOURNMENT OF CONGRESS.

The adjournment of a legislative body, either of its own volition or by the action of a king or governor, is a function requiring very careful regulation, because the power to adjourn may be the bulwark of a people's liberties or the means of inflicting the greatest tyranny upon them.

If a king or a governor may keep an assembly sitting as long as he pleases, or dismiss them when he pleases, he has the means of wearing out their patience, forcing them to pass the legislation he wants, or preventing them from passing any legislation. On the other hand, a legislature may sit too long and become a public menace, or, if it consists of two branches, one may adjourn in order to defeat the intentions of the other.

It may also be very important, under certain circumstances, for a legislature to have the power of sitting indefinitely. At the time of the Revolution, a party in the Pennsylvania legislature, wishing to destroy the