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the other, in respect to any of the great departments of government. When the limit is ascertained and fixed, all perplexity and confusion disappear. Each is sovereign and independent in its sphere of action, and exempt from the interference or control of the other, either in the means employed or functions exercised; and influenced by a public and patriotic spirit on both sides, a conflict of authority need not occur or be feared.

Judgment of the court below is reversed.

SUPREME COURT.

PAUL D. HAGUE agt. DANIEL W. POWERS.

The congress of the United States has power to authorize the issue of treasury notes to circulate as money.

It has also power to make such treasury notes lawful money and a legal tender in payment of public and private debts.

Therefore, the act of congress passed February 25, 1862, authorizing the issue of treasury notes to the amount of $150,000,000, and declaring that such notes "shall be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States, except duties on imports and interest on bonds and notes of the United States," is not in conflict with the constitution of the United States, but is a constitutional, valid law.

Argued at seventh district general term, Rochester, March, 1863; decided at general term April, 1863.

Present-Hon. E. DARWIN SMITH, THOMAS A. JOHNSON and HENRY WELLES, Justices.

PAUL D. HAGUE, plaintiff, and Daniel W. Powers, defendant, both citizens of the state of New York, being parties to a question of difference, have agreed upon this case, containing the facts upon which the controversy depends, and submit the same to the supreme court of the state of New York, under section 372 of the Code of Procedure.

The facts are these: The defendant is a banker in the city of Rochester, and as such, was indebted to the plaintiff

Hague agt. Powers.

in the sum of one hundred and thirty dollars, for so much lawful money of the United States, deposited with him prior to February, 1862, payable upon demand. The plaintiff heretofore, and since the 25th day of February, 1862, duly demanded of the defendant payment of said debt. The defendant then and there tendered to the plaintiff thirteen certain United States treasury notes, known as "legal tender notes," of uniform description, for ten dollars each, in payment of said demand.

The plaintiff refused to receive said notes, upon the ground that the act of congress of February 25th, 1862, under which the notes were issued and declared a legal tender, is not warranted by the constitution, and insisted on being paid in gold or silver coin; and the defendant refused to pay otherwise than in such notes, claiming that the same were lawful money of the United States, or a legal tender.

At the time of such demand and tender, the notes aforesaid would purchase, in the markets of this state, eightyseven dollars of gold or silver coin of the United States, and no more; which relative market rates have been and are fluctuating from day to day.

E. PESHINE SMITH and T. C. MONTGOMERY, counsel for plaintiff.

G. F. DANFORTH and W. F. COGSWELL, counsel for defendant.

E. DARWIN SMITH, P. J. The question presented for our decision in this case is-whether the act of congress, passed February 25th, 1862, authorizing the issue of treasury notes to the amount of $150,000,000, and declaring that such notes "shall be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States, except duties on imports and interest on bonds and notes of the United States," is a constitutional and valid law. The whole provision is as follows:

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"That the secretary of the treasury is hereby authorized to issue, on the credit of the United States, one hundred and fifty millions of dollars, of United States notes, not bearing interest, payable to bearer at the treasury of the United States, and of such denominations as he may deem expedient, not less than five dollars each; provided that such notes herein authorized shall be receivable in payment of taxes, interest, duties, debts and demands of every kind due to the United States, except duties on imports, and of all claims and demands against the United States of every kind whatsoever, except for interest upon bonds and notes, which shall be paid in coin, and shall also be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States, except duties on imports and interest as aforesaid."

The case states that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $130, for money deposited with him prior to February, 1862, and the plaintiff demanded paymant of such debt. That the plaintiff tendered to him thirteen so-called legal tender notes, of uniform description, for ten dollars each, in payment of such deposit, which was refused upon the ground that the said act of congress under which the notes are issued and declared a legal tender, is not warranted by the constitution, and insisted upon being paid in gold or silver coin; “and that the defendant refused to pay otherwise than in such notes, claiming that the same were lawful money of the United States, or a legal tender."

It is impossible for us to approach the examination and discussion of the questions arising upon this submission without a deep sense of their great magnitude, and of the very serious interests and consequences, public and private, involved in their ultimate decision. Perhaps in no single. action questions of equal, certainly none of greater importance, were ever submitted to a judicial tribunal in this or any other country.

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It is, however, a source of some gratification and relief to us that the responsibility for their final decision will devolve upon others, and that we shall probably do nothing more than contribute something to the discussion which they will be likely to undergo in their progress to the tribunal constituted for the final determination of all questions arising under the constitution of the United States.

We are called upon to declare the act of congress of February 25th, 1862, above mentioned, unconstitutional. The consideration of this question requires us to give a construction to the constitution of the United States, or to several of its provisions.

Under our system of government, it is the province and duty of the judiciary, when properly called upon so to do, to bring all acts of congress and of the state legislatures to the test of the constitution, and to declare all laws invalid which are clearly and palpably in conflict with the fundamental law. But the presumption is in favor of the validity of all acts of the legislature, whether state or national, and the courts should only declare acts unconstitutional when they are clearly so, beyond all reasonable doubt. This is the settled rule. (Fletcher agt. Peck, 6 Cranch, 128; Ogden agt. Saunders, 12 Wheat., 29; 24 Barb., 466; 14 Mass., 345.) The chief questions for examination resolve themselves into two leading points of inquiry:

1st. Has congress the power to authorize the issue of treasury notes to circulate as money?

2d. If such power exists in congress, can it make such treasury notes lawful money, and a legal tender in payment of public and private debts?

Before proceeding to the discussion of these questions, it is important to determine the principles of interpretation which should be applied in the construction of the constitution of the United States. That constitution was framed and designed for the establishment of a NATIONAL GOVERN

MENT.

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The confederacy of the revolution, after four or five years of peace, had proved a failure. It was found entirely inadequate for the purpose for which it was formed, when the pressure of war was withdrawn from the colonies, and the people turned their attention to the arts of peace, and began to develop the enterprise and resources of the country.

The convention which met in Philadelphia in 1787, to revise the articles of confederation, were deeply impressed with a sense of their utter insufficiency, and after some discussion, exhibiting their defects, as its first deliberate act, after its organization, resolved "that a national government ought to be established, consisting of a SUPREME LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE and JUDICIARY."

After this the convention proceeded to devise and frame the present constitution, except the few supplementary sections afterwards added upon the recommendation of the state conventions or legislatures. The constitution, upon its face, was designed to be, and is, a great FUNDAMENTAL CHARTER OF GOVERNMENT. It provides for an organization of government to be possessed of the chief attributes of sovereignty and supremacy. The constitution was to be, and is, the supreme law of the land, and all the powers exercised under it, executive, legislative and judicial, within their appropriate sphere, were, and are, sovereign and paramount. The character of the provisions enumerated and granted in the constitution, all tend to the conclusion that it was the purpose of its authors to make of the American people one nation. The power of making treaties, of declaring war and making peace, of imposing taxes for the national defence and general welfare, of enacting uniform laws for naturalization and bankruptcy, and the provision that the citizens of one state should have equal rights and privileges in all others, and that allegiance should be due to the general government, and all officers, state and