Opinion of the Court. 293 U.S. sons. See Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 370, and cases cited. In Martin v. State, 24 Tex. 61, 68, this was held in respect of a criminal statute, notwithstanding the general rule that such statutes are to be construed strictly. The statute there penalized the false making or fraudulent alteration of a public record when done "with intent that any person be defrauded." The state supreme court held that the state was to be taken as a "person" within the meaning of the statute, and one who made the entry with intent to defraud the state violated the statute. The Texas decision was expressly followed by this court in Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, 517, where it was held that the word "person" used in the statute there under consideration would include the United States " as a body politic and corporate." Blackstone, writing on the rights of persons (1 Bl. 123) says: "Persons also are divided by the law into either natural persons, or artificial. Natural persons are such as the God of nature formed us; artificial are such as are created and devised by human laws for the purposes of society and government, which are called corporations or bodies politic." While it cannot be said that the United States, in its corporate capacity as an artificial person, has a bodily presence in any place, it is not unreasonable to hold that in the eye of the law, it has a residence, and especially so when a contrary holding would defeat the evident purpose of a statute. This may be in the nature of a legal fiction; but legal fictions have an appropriate place in the administration of the law when they are required by the demands of convenience and justice. Thus, intangible personal property has been held to have a situs at the domicile of the owner, although intangibles ordinarily have no actual situs and the paper evidence of their existence may be elsewhere. First National Bank v. Maine, 284 84 Opinion of the Court. U. S. 312, 328-329. If to carry out the purposes of a statute it be admissible to construe the word "person" as including the United States, it is hard to see why, in like circumstances, it is inadmissible to construe the word "resident" as likewise including the United States. And, finally, if the United States be not a "resident" in respect of interest upon other interest-bearing obligations," it is, of course, not a "resident" in respect of interest upon its bonds held by nonresident aliens and corporations. The interest upon many of these bonds is subject to a super-income tax and to certain other taxes. If it had been intended to make an exemption in respect of such taxes in favor of nonresidents, it is reasonable to suppose that Congress would have said so in explicit terms instead of leaving the fate of taxes upon the large sums thus involved to depend upon the way in which a court might happen to construe the word "resident"-a most unsatisfactory substitute, as the conflicting decisions in this and the next succeeding case bear witness. We cannot assent to the view that Congress has written into the law an exception of such importance in a manner so indirect and casual. In the foregoing discussion, we have not been unmindful of the rule, frequently stated by this court, that taxing are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used," and that doubts are to be resolved against the government and in favor of the taxpayer. The rule is a salutary one, but it does not apply here. The intention of the lawmaker controls in the construction of taxing acts as it does in the construction of other statutes, and that intention is to be ascertained, not by taking the word or clause in question from its setting and viewing it apart, but by considering it in con * As, for example, it did in the Act of March 3, 1919, § 4, c. 100, 40 Stat. 1309, 1311. nection with the context, the general purposes of the statute in which it is found, the occasion and circumstances of its use, and other appropriate tests for the ascertainment of the legislative will. Compare Rein v. Lane, L. R. 2 Q. B. Cases 144, 151. The intention being thus disclosed, it is enough that the word or clause is reasonably susceptible of a meaning consonant therewith, whatever might be its meaning in another and different connection. We are not at liberty to reject the meaning so established and adopt another lying outside the intention of the legislature, simply because the latter would release the taxpayer or bear less heavily against him. To do so would be not to resolve a doubt in his favor, but to say that the statute does not mean what it means. "The rule of strict construction is not violated by permitting the words of a statute to have their full meaning, or the more extended of two meanings. The words are not to be bent one way or the other, but to be taken in the sense which will best manifest the legislative intent. United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385, 396; United States v. Corbett, 215 U. S. 233, 242." Sacramento Nav. Co. v. Salz, 273 U. S. 326, 329. The rule of strict construction applies to penal laws, but such laws are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature; or so applied as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases which those words, in the sense that the legislature has obviously used them, would comprehend. United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95. That view, expressed by Chief Justice Marshall, has since been frequently followed by this court. See, for example, American Fur Co. v. United States, 2 Pet. 358, 367; United States v. Morris, 14 Pet. 464, 475; United States v. Hartwell, supra, 395-6; Donnelley v. United States, 276 U. S. 505, 512. Judgment reversed. Opinion of the Court. BRITISH-AMERICAN TOBACCO CO., LTD., v. HELVERING, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 24. Argued October 11, 1934.-Decided November 5, 1934. Decided upon the authority of Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, ante, p. 84. 69 F. (2d) 528, affirmed. CERTIORARI, 292 U. S. 619, to review a judgment reversing a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals and sustaining the action of the Commissioner in assessing a deficiency of income tax. Mr. John H. Jackson, with whom Messrs. H. H. Shelton and Haig H. Davidian were on the brief, for petitioner. Assistant Solicitor General MacLean, with whom Solicitor General Biggs, Assistant Attorney General Wideman, and Messrs. James W. Morris, John H. McEvers, and W. Marvin Smith were on the brief, for respondent. Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND, announced by the CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a companion case to No. 10, just decided. The facts, although differing in detail, are in substance the same. The same questions are involved. The court below reversed the Board of Tax Appeals for reasons substantially similar to those we have just expressed in No. 10. 69 F. (2d) 528. Upon the authority of No. 10, ante, p. 84, the judgment below is Affirmed. 293 U.S. Argument for Petitioners. BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN & ENGINEMEN ET AL. v. PINKSTON. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. No. 32. Argued October 16, 17, 1934. Decided November 5, 1934. 1. In a suit in equity brought by a widow for the purpose of preserving and protecting her right to future participation in a fund from which she is entitled to receive a pension of so much per month during her lifetime as long as she shall remain unmarried, the amount in controversy, determining the federal court's jurisdiction, is the present value of her interest, calculable from the amount of the monthly payment and her life expectancy. P. 99. 2. The fact that the further payments will cease if the pensioner remarry does not render them contingent or speculative. Thompson v Thompson, 226 U. S. 551. P. 100. 3. The evidence discloses that the pensioner's "expectancy of remarriage" and its effect upon the value of her interest in the fund were subject to actuarial measurement in this case. P. 101. 69 F. (2d) 600, affirmed. CERTIORARI, 292 U. S. 621, to review the reversal of a decree dismissing the bill, for lack of jurisdiction, in a suit by a widow on behalf of herself and of other beneficiaries similarly situated, for an accounting and other equitable relief in respect of a fund established by a labor association for the pensioning of widows of their deceased members. Mr. Thomas Stevenson for petitioners. Future payments depend entirely upon the volition of the beneficiary. The probability of remarriage can not even be conjectured. It is impossible to estimate the present value of such contingent payments. The court below carefully excluded from consideration either the accumulated Pension Fund or the combined claims of all matured certificate holders. Jurisdiction |