nizable by the criminal courts of Kentucky. But the doctrine of this case was antagonized by the report submitted to the Senate by John Quincy Adams, in December, 1807, in the case of Senator John Smith, of Ohio, who, after his election, but not during the session of the Senate, had been, as was alleged, involved in the treasonable conspiracy of Aaron Burr. In this latter case it was held that the power to expel should be used as a means of relieving the body of the presence of corrupt or infamous persons. The report says :

"The power of expelling a member for misconduct results, on the principles of common sense, from the interests of the nation that the high trusts of legislation shall be invested in pure hands. When the trust is elective, it is not to be presumed that the constituent body will commit the deposit to the keeping of worthless characters. But when a man whom his fellow citizens have honored with their confidence on a pledge of a spotless reputation, has degraded himself by the commission of infamous crimes, which become suddenly and unexpectedly revealed to the world, defective indeed would be that institution which should be impotent to discard from its bosom the contagion of such a member; which should have no remedy of amputation to apply until the poison had reached the heart."

§ 522. The question was again raised in the case of Matteson in the 35th Congress. The charges against Mr. Matteson had been preferred in the previous Congress, and a committee of investigation had reported against him, recommending his expulsion. Pending these resolutions he had resigned, having,

however, at the time of his resignation been reelected. When he took his seat in the new Congress by virtue of such re-election, the charges were renewed. A majority of the committee reported adversely to the jurisdiction of the House. In the Report, as well as in the debate, the want of jurisdiction was based upon various grounds, and among them, upon the ground that the offense was committed prior to the election of the accused member. After a long debate the whole subject was laid upon the table, so that it cannot be said that the question was authoritatively determined, one way or the other. Thus the question stood, when the whole controversy came up anew upon the report of the special committee to investigate the alleged Credit Mobilier bribery. This investigation took place in the forty-second Congress, and related chiefly to transactions of members of the fortieth Congress. The report of this case discussed the question at length, and concludes that the power to expel is not limited to those cases where the accused has been guilty of misconduct as a member, and subsequent to his election. From this report we quote as follows:

"It is universally conceded, we believe, that the House has ample jurisdiction to punish or expel a member for an offense committed during his term as a member, though committed during a vacation of Congress and in no way connected with his duties. as a member. Upon what principle is it that such a jurisdiction can be maintained? It must be upon one or both of the following: that the offense shows him to be an unworthy and improper man to be a

member, or that his conduct brings odium and reproach upon the body. But suppose the offense has been committed prior to his election, but comes to light afterward, is the effect upon his own character, or the reproach and disgrace upon the body, if they allow him to remain a member, any the less? We can see no difference in principal in the two cases, and to attempt any would be to create a purely technical and arbitrary distinction, having no just foundation. In our judgment, the time is not at all material, except it be coupled with the further fact that he was re-elected with a knowledge on the part of his constituents of what he had been guilty, and in such event we have given our views of the effect

"It seems to us absurd to say that an election has given a man political absolution for an offense which was unknown to his constituents. If it be urged again, as it has sometimes been, that this view of the power of the House, and the true ground of its proper exercise, may be laid hold of and used improperly, it may be answered that no rule, however narrow and limited, that may be adopted, can prevent it. If two-thirds of the House shall see fit to expel a man because they do not like his political or religious principles, or without any reason at all, they have the power, and there is no remedy except by appeal to the people. Such exercise of the power would be wrongful, and violative of the principles of the Constitution, but we see no encouragement of such wrong in the views we hold.

"It is the duty of each House to exercise its rightful functions upon appropriate occasions, and to trust that those who come after them will be no less faith

ful to duty, and no less jealous for the rights of free popular representation than themselves. It will be quite time enough to square other cases with right reason and principle, when they arise. Perhaps the best way to prevent them, will be to maintain strictly public integrity and public honor in all cases as they present themselves. Nor do we imagine that the people of the United States will charge their servants with invading their privileges, when they confine themselves to the preservation of a standard of official integrity which the common instincts of humanity recognize as essential to all social order and good government."

§ 523. Precisely the opposite doctrine was, however, maintained in a report made to the House, from the committee on the judiciary, by Mr. Butler, of Mass., and which was submitted within a few days after that of the Credit Mobilier investigating committee just quoted from. (Cong. Globe, Third Session, 42d. Congress, part 3, page 1651.) The question now under consideration, entered very largely into the debate upon the report of the Credit Mobilier investigating committee, and at the close of that debate Mr. Sargeant of California offered a substitute for the pending resolutions, which substitute proposed to change the punishment of the accused members from expulsion, to condemnation and censure. This substitute consisted of two resolutions, and the following preamble:

"Whereas, by the report of the special committee herein, it appears that the acts charged as offenses against members of this House, in connection with the Credit Mobilier of America, occurred more

than five years ago, and long before the election of such persons to this Congress, two elections by the people having intervened, and whereas grave doubts exist as to the rightful exercise by this House of its power to expel a member for offenses committed by such member long before his election thereto, and not connected with such election. Therefore," &c. The resolutions of condemnation and censure, following this preamble, were first voted upon and were adopted by the House. A separate vote was then taken on the adoption of the preamble, and it was lost by a vote of ninety-eight yeas to one hundred and thirteen nays. (See Globe, third session, 42d Congress, pages 1830 to 1835.) Thus the House decided to sustain the doctrine contended for by the special committee, and against the doctrine laid down in the above mentioned report from the committee on the judiciary. It may, therefore, be said that the House has fairly decided the question, and has held that a member may be expelled or punished for offenses committed prior to his election, especially if those offenses were unknown to his constituents at the time of his election. It will of course occur to every one that this is a power which should be exercised with great circumspection, and moderation, and with a due regard to the rights both of constituencies and of individual members of Congress.

§ 524. It is very clear that either House of Congress possesses the power to punish for contempt of its authority. In this respect and for this purpose each House is a court, and exercises judicial functions. The power to punish for contempt of course includes