State registry laws, to the sending of a Representative to the Congress of the United States, who is not clothed with the authority which a true expression of the popular will would give; and that is all.” It would indeed be a strange anomaly if the government of the United States could be obliged to look upon commission of frauds and crimes perpetrated for the purpose of putting into the halls of Congress men who have no right there, and who owe their seats to corruption, and yet remain powerless to prevent or punish it. If it be said that it is the exclusive prerogative of the States to punish election frauds, whether committed in the effort to elect State officers simply, or members of the National legislature, or Presidential electors, the answer is, that the States have the power, but not the exclusive power, to punish frauds appertaining to the election of federal officers. The power to punish such frauds against itself belongs to the United States Government, and is nothing more nor less than the power of self protection.

§ 310. The House of Representatives of the United States will not grant to a sitting member whose seat is contested, an extension of time in which to take testimony, unless it appear that he has not by the use of great diligence, been able to procure his testimony within the time allowed by the law. The reason for this rule is thus stated in the report of the Committee of Elections, in the case of Giddings vs. Clark, in the 42d Congress.

"It must be borne in mind that the party now asking an extension is the sitting member. He is now, and has been during a large part of the term, exer

cising the functions and receiving the emoluments of the office in question. In a litigation of this charac ter the thing in controversy grows daily less, and does not, as in most ordinary law suits, remain intact to be recovered by the successful party in the end. In this particular case the extension asked for would be very nearly equivalent to a final decision of the case in favor of the sitting member upon the merits. We are now near the close of the second session of the Congress. If the parties are to be sent back to Texas to take further testimony, of course no further action can be taken until the opening of the third and last session, which is of but ninety days' duration, and would be necessarily far spent before a final decision could be reached. It does not follow from these considerations that a sitting member can in no case be allowed an extension after the time allowed by law for taking testimony expires, but your committee think it does follow that no such extension should ever be granted to a sitting member, unless it clearly appears that by the exercise of great diligence he has been unable to procure his testimony, and that he is able, if an extension be granted, to obtain such material evidence as will establish his right to the seat, or that by reason of the fault or misconduct of the contestant he has been unable to prepare his case."

§ 311. In a contested election case in Congress an application by the sitting member for an extension of time to take testimony, made after the time allowed by law for taking testimony has expired, and after the term of office contested for has well nigh expired, it is necessary, in addition to showing great

diligence, to state on oath the names of the witness es whose testimony is desired, and the particular facts which can be proven by them. And the affidavits of such witnesses themselves should be produced, or a sufficient reason given for failing to produce them. Ibid. (See same report (See same report for discussion as to what constitutes the proper degree of diligence in such a case.)

§ 312. Where the statute makes it a misdemeanor for any officer of elections to place any number or mark upon the ballot of a voter, but does not declare that ballots so marked or numbered by such officer, shall be rejected the true rule is to receive and count them. To reject such ballots would be to establish a rule under which an officer of election could destroy the effect of a ballot cast in good faith by a legal voter, by placing a number or mark upon it. For a full consideration and discussion of this point, see the cases of McKenzie vs. Braxton, and Giddings vs. Clark, in the 42d Congress. The report in the latter case says:

By reference to the statute here referred to, it will be seen that it is made a misdemeanor for any judge of election to place any number or mark upon the ticket of any voter; but it is not declared that the vote of a legally qualified voter shall be rejected because his ballot is marked by the judges. We should not be inclined to put a construction upon this statute which would enable an officer of election to destroy the effect of a ballot cast in good faith by a legal voter, by placing a number or mark upon it. A ballot may be thus marked or numbered without the knowledge or consent of the voter, and it would

be manifestly unjust that he should, in this way, be deprived of his vote."

'We think it plain that, inasmuch as the statute affixes a penalty for marking a ballot, and does not expressly declare that a marked ballot shall be thrown out, the board erred in rejecting the vote of this county upon this ground."

§ 313. The House of Representatives of the United States, in construing a State law, will follow the construction given it by the authorities of the State, whose duty it is to construe and execute it. Where a given construction has been adopted and acted upon by the State authorities, the federal government should abide by and follow it. It was so held by the House of Representatives of the United States, in the matter of the election of Representative from the State of Tennessee. (42d Congress.) The report of the committee has this language:

"It is a well established and most salutary rule, that where the proper authorities of the State government have given a construction to their own constitution or statutes, that construction will be followed by the Federal authorities. This rule is absolutely necessary to the harmonious working of our complex governments, State and National, and your committee are not disposed to be the first to depart from it."

And in the case of Birch vs. Van Horn, (2 Bartlett, 205,) the House refused to go into an inquiry as to the validity of the new constitution of Missouri, upon the ground that it had been recognized

as valid by the people, and by all the departments of the State government.

§ 314. The officers authorized to take testimony in contested election cases, in the House of Representatives, derive their authority from the act of Congress, and not from State laws. Hence the Mayor of a city may take such testimony outside of the limits of the city of which he is Mayor, although by the State law he has no power to administer an oath elsewhere than within such city. (Washburn vs. Voorhies, 2 Bartlett, 54.)

§ 315. In Wisconsin it is held that the complaint in a contested election case, brought in the Courts of that State, is sufficient, if it states the number of votes in favor of the defendant which were illegally polled, without specifying the names of the persons by whom such illegal votes were cast. (Doerflinger vs. Helmantel, 21 Wis., 566.) And this is in accordance with the general tenor of judicial decisions in this country.

§ 316. A contested election case, whatever the form of the proceeding may be, is in its essence a proceeding in which the people-the constituencyare primarily and principally interested. It is not a suit for the adjudication and settlement of private rights simply. It follows that the parties to the record cannot, by stipulation or otherwise, discontinue or compromise a case of this character without the consent and approval of the court or tribunal trying it. Nor should such consent ever be given, unless the Court giving it is sufficiently advised to be able to say that it is for the interest of the public to do so. (Mann vs. Cassiday, 1 Brewster, 43. Peo