as to permit the same thing to be done to corrupt voters at a regular election. The buying and selling of votes, or of influence at a nominating convention or election, is quite as injurious to the public, and quite as abhorrent to the law, as the same corrupt practices when employed to influence an election provided for by statute. The too common practice of providing liquors to be used to influence voters in a convention, primary election, or regular legal election, is a practice which the law will not tolerate. A contract made for such a purpose is utterly void. [Strasberger vs. Burk, 13 Am. Law Reg. (N.S.) 607. Nichols vs. Mudgett, 22 Vt., 546. Duke vs. Ashbee, 11 Iredell, 112. And upon the general question of the invalidity of contracts made in violation of the established policy of the law, see Spaulding vs. Preston, (21st Vermont Reports, 9.)

§ 193. In Nichols vs. Mudgett, supra, the following were the facts: The defendant being opposed to plaintiff, who was a candidate for town representative, the parties agreed that the former should use his influence for the plaintiff's election, and do what he could for that purpose, and that, if the plaintiff was elected, that should be a satisfaction of his claim. Nothing was specifically said about the defendants voting for the plaintiff, but he did vote for him, and would not have done so, nor favored his election, but for this agreement. The plaintiff was elected. Held, that the agreement was void, and constituted no bar to a recovery upon the demand. And in Meachem vs. Dow, 32 Vt., 721, it was held, that a note given in consideration of the payee's agreement to resign a public office in favor of the ma

ker, and to use influence in favor of the latter's appointment as his successor, was void, in the hands of the payee. An agreement between two voters to "pair off" and both abstain from voting is void, and the officers of the election cannot refuse to receive the vote of one of the two, on account of such an agreement.

§ 194. The chief reason for the general adoption of the ballot in this country is, that it affords the voter the means of preserving the secrecy of his vote. And this enables him to vote independently and freely, without being subject to be overawed, intimidated, or in any manner controlled by others, or to any ill will or persecution, on account of his vote. The secret ballot is justly regarded as an important and valuable safeguard for the protection of the voter, and particularly the humble citizen against the influence which wealth and station may be supposed to exercise. And it is for this reason that the privacy is held not to be limited to the moment of depositing the ballot, but is sacredly guarded by the law for all time unless the voter himself shall voluntarily divulge it. (People vs. Pease, 27 N. Y., 81.)

§ 195. All devices by which the secrecy of the ballot is destroyed by means of colored paper used for ballots, or by other similar means, are exceedingly reprehensible, and whether expressly prohibited by statute or not, should be discountenanced by all good citizens. Judge Cooley, in his admirable work on Constitutional Limitations, expresses the opinion that in as much as the voter himself cannot be compelled to disclose for whom he voted, it is but reasonable to conclude that "others who may acci

dentily, or by trick or artifice, have acquired knowledge on the subject, should not be allowed to testify to such knowledge, or to give any information in the courts upon the subject. "Public policy," he declares, "requires that the veil of secrecy should be impenetrable, unless the voter himself voluntarily determines to lift it. His ballot is absolutely privileged, and to allow evidence of its contents, when he has not waived the privilege, is to encourage trickery and fraud, and would in effect establish this remarkable anomaly, that while the law, from motives of public policy, establishes the secret ballot with a view to conceal the electors action, it at the same time encourages a system of espionage, by means of which the veil of secrecy may be penetrated, and the voters action disclosed to the public." (p. 506 and 507.)

§ 196. The case of People vs. Cicote, (16 Mich., 283,) is cited to sustain the views just expressed. At the same time the author concedes that in lgislative bodies it has been held that when a voter refuses to disclose for whom he voted, evidence is admissible of the general reputation of the political character of the voter, and as to the party to which he belonged at the time of the election, but the hope is expressed that this rule of evidence will not be adopted by the courts. In practice it will be found that it can in general only be important to prove the contents of a ballot deposited in the box by a person claiming the right to vote, for one or the other of the foilowing purposes.

ballot

1. When it is alleged that the person casting such was not a legal voter, and for the pupose of excluding it.

2. When it is deemed important to show how many good votes were cast for a particular candidate at a given poll, for the purpose of impeaching the return and showing that such candidate has not been allowed all the votes cast for him.

When the object is to exclude the ballot as cast by a person not qualified to vote, as we have elsewhere seen, it is necessary to show first that the ballot was illegal. This being done, the person who cast it may be compelled to answer as to its contents, or if he cannot be found or fails to remember the contents of such illegal ballot may be shown by circumstances. If the object is to show how many good votes a particular candidate has received, for the purpose of impeaching the return, it is to be presumed that the voters who cast such votes will as a general rule not object to giving testimony, because the evidence is sought as a means of protecting their rights and defeating an alleged fraud by reason of which their votes have not been honestly counted and returned. But if any voter under these circumstances should refuse to waive his privilege and testify as to the contents of his ballot, and should object to his secret being divulged by any other witness, his refusal and objection must prevail, unless he has himself at the time of voting, voluntarily made public his ballot, and its contents, in which case such contents may be proven by the testimony of those persons to whom they were voluntarily communicated.

§ 197. In the absence of any statutory provision expressly requiring more, a plurality of the votes cast will elect. It is only in cases where the statute so provides, that a majority of all the votes cast, is

necessary to the choice of an officer. In this country where candidates may be numerous, and the votes of the electors divided among a number of different persons, to require a majority to elect, would be to prevent a choice in very many cases; hence it is that a majority is seldom required in a popular election. (Augustin vs. Eggleston, 12 La., An. 366. Cooley's Const. Lim., 619-620.) In those States, where a majority is required to elect, (and such is the requirement in Vermont, and perhaps in a few other States,) provision is made by statute for a second election, in case there is no choice at the first.

§ 198. A statute of Pennsylvania provides that upon the petition of at least five citizens of the county, stating under oath, that frauds are apprehended in any election district of such county, the Court of Common Pleas may appoint two judicious, sober, and intelligent citizens of the county to act as overseers of said election; said overseers to have the right to be present with the officers of the election, during the whole time the same is held, the votes counted and the returns made out, and signed by the election officers. They are to keep a list of voters if they see proper, to challenge voters, and generally to aid in preventing or detecting frauds. The statute further provides, that if the officers of the election "shall refuse to permit said overseers to be present and perform their duties as aforesaid, or if they shall be driven away from the polls by violence or intimidation, all the votes polled at such election district may be rejected by any tribunal trying a contest under said election." In re Duffy,