with two separate places of holding an election, the functions of the election officers of the old district are destroyed, and they cannot act in either of the the new districts into which the old one is divided. It would be otherwise if part of an old district was formed into a new one, and if provision was only made for the new one. That would not annihilate the old district, but only change its boundaries. The forming of one old district into two complete new ones, does annihilate the old, and it is well settled, that the official functions of local officers fall with the political annihilation of the locality for which they were chosen or appointed. [Penn. Dist. Election Case, Brightley's Election Cases, 617. North Whitehall vs. South Whitehall, 3 S. & R. 121.]

§ 91. It is, as we have already seen, well settled that the acts of public officers within the sphere of their duties, must be presumed to be correct, until the contrary is shown. [Goggin vs. Gilmer, 1 Bartlett, 70. Giddings vs. Clark, 42d Congress.] If, therefore, the law allows the officers of the election, upon the happening of certain contingencies, to adjourn the election for one or more days,-if it be shown that they did in fact adjourn-it will be presumed that the adjournment was proper. And so, if the law empowers a board of returning officers to revise the returns, and it appears that they have exercised such authority, their action must stand until shown to have been wrong. Further illustrations of this rule are not necessary, as it is well settled and generally understood.

In Goggin vs. Gilmer, [supra] it was further held, and very properly, that where the officers of the

election were authorized in case of inclement weather, the rise of water courses by rain, or the assembling of a body of voters too great to be accommodated in one day, to adjourn the election for not more than three days,—and where there was such an adjournment, even if the officers were mistaken as to the happening of any of these contingencies, the election should not be declared illegal and void in the absence of fraud. The officers of the election in such a case are the judges of the necessity for an adjournment, and their decision upon that point, in the absence of fraud is final. The power of adjournment in such cases is discretionary with the offi. cers of election, and an honest error in its exercise is not fatal to the election.

§ 92. This is unquestionably the sound doctrine, notwithstanding a contrary decision in one of the earlier cases, from the same State. (Basset vs. Bailey, Cl. & H. 254.) In this latter case the committee went into inquiry as to whether in point of fact the contingency did or did not happen on which rested the authority of the sheriff to adjourn the election, and finding that in their opinion it did not happen, they ruled that the adjournment was illegal and rendered the subsequent proceedings illegal. The case, however, did not turn upon this question, and for this reason, perhaps, it was not more carefully considered. A similar question arose in the case of Trigg vs. Preston, [Cl. & H., 78,] and it was there held that an adjournment of an election by the sheriff under a statute giving him discretionary power to adjourn, in case of rain, was presumed to be a valid adjournment.

has

§ 93. A canvassing board having once counted the votes, and declared the result according to law, no power or authority to make a recount. When this duty is once fully performed, it is performed once and forever, and cannot be repeated. [Borven vs. Hixon, 45 Mo., 350, Gooding vs. Wilson 42d Congress.] In the former case the Court say suppose that it could be renewed-that the canvass of one day could be repeated the next, and counter certificates be issued to different contestants as new light or influence was brought to bear upon the mind of the clerk would render the whole proceeding a farce." And in the latter case the report of the committee has this language:

"To

"On examination of precedents, it does not appear

that

this House favors the setting aside of official and formal counts, made with all the safeguards required by law, on evidence only of subsequent informal and inofficial counts, without such safeguards. No instance was cited at the hearing where the per

son

entitled by the official count was deprived of his seat by a subsequent unofficial count. On principle it would seem that if such a thing were, in the absence of fraud in the official count, in any case admissible, it should be permitted only when the ballot boxes had been so kept as to be conclusive of the identity of the ballots, and when the subsequent count was made with safeguards equivalent to those provided by law. In the absence of either of these conditions, the proof, as mere matter of fact, and without reference to statutory rules, would be less reliable, and therefore insufficient."

And see also Hadley vs. City of Albany, 33 N.Y.

603. Hartt vs. Harvey, 32 Barb., 55. Ramsay vs. Calaway, 15 La. An. 464. Chrisman vs. Anderson,

1 Bartlett, 328. State vs. Dunniworth, 21 Ohio, 216.

§ 94. In Minnesota, it has been held, in accordance with the principle just stated, that if the board of canvassers, after canvassing the votes, adjourn without day, their power in the premises is at an end, and they cannot re-assemble, neither can a court, by mandamus, compel them to re-assemble or give them any power in case of their so doing. (Clark vs. Buchanan, 2 Minn., 346.)

§ 95. If a voter, upon being challenged and questioned, admits that he has not been naturalized, or, that his naturalization certificate was issued by some court which the judges know had no jurisdiction of that subject, they may well decline to administer the oath, or to accept the vote. But the judges have no right, in California, to require the production of the certificate of naturalization. [People vs. Gordon, 5 Cal., 235.] And a similar rule prevails in most of the States.

upon the

§ 96. In Kline vs. Myers, (1 Bartlett, 574,) the house refused to order a recount of ballots request of the contestant. One reason was, that the contestant did not offer evidence sufficient to show even presumptively that the original count was erroneous or fraudulent. But another reason was the great danger of attempting to set aside the official count by a re-opening of the boxes, and a recount of the ballots, months after the election. And And upon this latter point the committee, in their report, say: "To adopt a rule that the ballot boxes should be opened upon the mere request of the defeated can

didate, would occasion more fraud than it could possibly expose. The number of ballot boxes in each congressional district is seldom less than fifty, and often more than two hundred. They are usually left in the care of a magistrate or some township officer, by whom they are deposited in no safer place than an upper shelf in a public office. The opportunities of tampering with the boxes thus scattered through the district, would be abundant, and if it was known in advance that a second count could be had without discrediting the first, the temptations to do so would be strong. It makes no difference in settling the rule that in this particular case the votes have been carefully guarded by the Mayor and Recorder, under a special law for the city of Philadelphia. The fact would only strengthen the confidence in the result of a recount in this case, but does not show the propriety of establishing a general rule, authorizing a recount whenever asked. It should be remembered that the fact sought is not what the ballot boxes contain six months or a year after the election, but what they did contain after the last vote was deposited on the day of the election. Certainly an impartial, accurate and public count then by the sworn officers would be better evidence of that fact than any subsequent count not more impartial, and not presuming to be more accurate than the first, and after boxes have long been exposed to the tampering of dishonest partisans."

§ 97. By a statute of Massachusetts "the Mayor and Aldermen and Clerk of each city" are required forthwith after an election to examine the returns from each ward, and if any error appears therein,