think it, but I think it because it is, and could not think it, if it were not. Whatever then I think exists, and independent of me. If I think an external world, then is there an external world; the finite, then is there the finite; the infinite, then is there the infinite; God, then God is.

This is no forced result. It is asserted when we assert that every thought contains an object, and that the object is in all cases not me. But if we accept this result, we are saved no little labor. The passage from the subjective to the objective ceases to be that long, circuitous way commonly imagined, and the great problem which has vexed philosophers in all ages, is found to be no problem at all.

The great problem with philosophers has always been to establish the objective validity of our knowledge; that is, the existence of the not me. We are conscious of our own feelings, beliefs, and convictions; but is there anything out of us, and independent of us, to respond to these subjective affections? How know I that God and nature are not mere modes or affections of my subjective life? How know I that aught exists beside this subject which I call myself? and how know I that the outward universe, with all its wondrous beauty and variety, is anything more than myself projected, or taken as my own object?

Here is the problem which has always in some form or other tormented the metaphysicians; and yet this is a problem that cannot be solved. There is no passage possible between the subjective and the objective. There is no possible equation between me and not me, by which one may be obtained from the other. It is impossible to conclude from my own existence to that of another. There is here no room for logic. Logic can operate only on data previously assumed or established; and it never does and never can operate with only a single factor. Unity multiplied by unity gives unity, and nothing more, is as true in logic as in arithmetic, which is only a special application of logic. With the me alone, or with the not me alone, logic can obtain no result. God, man, and nature, instead of being results lo

gically obtained, are in fact the neces sary bases of logic, and must be found, or assumed, before logic can commence its process of demonstrating them.

Nevertheless, the human race has contrived, some way or other, to open relations with the objective world. From the first day of its conscious existence, it has not ceased to believe itself in strict relation with a world out and independent of itself. God and nature have been and are realities to it, as much so as its own existence. Strange! The human race, the savage in his forest, the shepherd on his hillside, the rustic following his plough,all believing what the metaphysicians have hitherto been unable to demonstrate, and what the more sober-minded among them contend cannot be demonstrated! This fact should have induced them to inquire, if, after all, they have not erred in assuming any demonstration to be necessary.

When Dr. Johnson was asked what answer he would use against those who denied the reality of the external universe, he replied by striking his foot against a stone. This reply was not logical, but it was philosophical and just. It recognized this fundamental fact, namely, that I find myself only in opposition to that which is not myself; and directed the inquirer to the simple fact in which originates all faith in external realities. In striking his foot against the stone, Dr. Johnson had as positive evidence that the stone was not himself, and therefore that it was in relation to him, an external reality, as he had that it was he and not another who performed the act of striking his foot against it; or that the act of striking his foot against it was followed by an affection of his sensibility,

The cause of this error of the metaphysicians, in seeking a passage where none can be found, and where none is possible or needed, must be looked for in their assumption of a false point of departure of philosophy. They have supposed that philosophy must begin either with the subject, that is, with the me; or with the object, that is, with the not me. But when we begin with the subject we can never get to the object, as Hume and all the skep

tical philosophers but too easily demonstrate. When we so begin we necessarily end in Idealism. When we begin with the object, the not me, taking our point of sight in God, as do the larger part of theologians, we necessarily end in Pantheism, with Spinoza; or taking our point of sight in nature, the effect, we end necessarily in Atheism with Evhemere and D'Holbach; for it is as impossible to go from the object to the subject, as from the subject to the object.

The true point of departure of philosophy is never in BEING, in the ESSE, DAS REINE SEYN of the Hegelians, whether of the subject or of the object; but in LIFE, which is the manifestation of Being. And in LIFE, according to what we have established, THE SUBJECT AND OBJECT, ME AND NOT ME, ARE

ONE AND INDISSOLUBLE.

To make this still plainer: Kant, in his Critique, has with masterly skill and wonderful exactness, drawn up a complete list of the categories of Reason. His analysis of Reason may be regarded as complete and final. Cousin has followed him, and, with true metaphysical sagacity, reduced these categories to two, the category of SUBSTANCE, and that of CAUSE; or, as I prefer to say, the category of BEING and that of PHENOMENON. Whatever we conceive of, we must conceive of it existing either as being or as phenomenon. Being or substance, in itself, transcends the reach of the human mind we can know it, can conceive of it, only in the phenomenon; or, as M. Cousin would say, only under the category, or relation of cause. I find myself, as we have already seen, only as the subject of the phenomenon; that is, only so far as I do something. In like manner do we know or conceive of nature never only under the relation of cause, only as it manifests, and therefore as that-which-manifests itself, in the phenomenon,-as the object which opposes or resists the subject. God is never seen or conceived of in himself. He is to us only in his DOING, only as cause, or creator; though as wise, holy, good, and all powerful Cause or Creator. The ca tegory of substance is then conceivable only in the category of cause: that is, we know being only as cause, and only

The manifestation of being, that is, being putting itself forth in the phenomenon, is what I term LIFE; and when this life is so intense that the subject recognizes itself as well as that which is not itself, I term the phenomenon, THOUGHT, or apperception. Now Thought, and, as we shall hereafter see, all Life, is the JOINT PRODUCT of both subject and object. I know myself indeed as subject or cause; but never as able to cause or produce without the CONCURRENCE of that which is not myself. In other words, the subject, as we have seen, cannot manifest itself without an object; and the object cannot manifest itself without a subject, which, of course, relatively to it will be object. Now, as the phenomenon is single and indissoluble, and yet the joint product of both subject and object, it follows that both subject and object are, though distinct, one and inseparable in the phenomenon or fact of life. Here, in the phenomenal, in the fact of Life, where only we are able to seize either the subjective world or the objective world, the subject and object are given, not as separate, not one to be obtained from the other, but in an INDISSOLUBLE SYNTHESIS. This is wherefore I call philosophy not the science of BEING, but the science of LIFE; and also wherefore I add to it the epithet, SYNTHETIC.

If metaphysicians had begun in the fact of life, instead of trying to begin with pure being, the ESSE, the REINE SEYN, they would have found, as data already furnished to their hands, both the objective and the subjective; and finding them both in the indestructible synthesis of thought, they would never have conceived the problemThe one being given, how to obtain the other? In point of fact, this problem is really inconceivable, and philosophers have been for ages asking, not so much an unanswerable, as, if we may so speak, an unaskable question; for the one term is never found without the other, or conceived of, save in conjunction with the other. This is what we must mean when we say that we never find ourselves but as the subject of the phenomenon, and never as sub

ject without finding ourselves in conjunction with that which is not our selves, as object.

There has been no error in asserting the existence of God, man, and nature. We are not to arraign the faith of mankind in this three-fold existence, because philosophers have been unable to legitimate it. It needs no legitimating; and we have erred only in attempting to legitimate it. Mankind believe in God, in themselves, and in nature, for the best of all possible reasons, BECAUSE THEY THINK THEM, AND CANNOT THINK WITHOUT THINKING THEM. Here is the whole mystery of the matter. The profoundest philosophy can add nothing to this, and take nothing from it. All that philosophy is called upon to do in relation to it, is simply by reflection to place the fact that the me alone is incapable of generating a single phenomenon, in a light so clear that none can mistake it.

thought the demonstration in question essential to a scientific belief, while the latter stoutly maintained, but without showing any great reason for so maintaining, that it was not.

There is much misconception about this matter of proving or demonstrating. Nothing is more absurd than to conclude that whatever cannot be proved true, must therefore be regarded as false. That which is less evident, is proved by that which is more evident. But when the fact alleged is of itself of the highest degree of evidence we can have, it is incapable of proof. What is more evident than the circular appearance of the sun? Yet how can I prove to myself or to another, that the sun appears to me of a circular form? But facts of this kind need no proof. EVERY FACT IS INCAPABLE OF PROOF JUST IN PROPORTION TO ITS CERTAINTY. A proposition is demonstrated by being resolved into another proposition more ultimate, or by being shown to be involved in another proposition held to be true. But when the proposition is itself ultimate, when there is no proposition more ultimate into which it can be resolved, or from which it can be obtained, it is, and must needs be, incapable of demonstration. But then it needs no demonstration. It is certain of itself, and one of the grounds of certainty in regard to other propositions. Now, the ground we assume is that both the me and the not me are ultimate, and both being found in the same phenomenon as the essential conditions of its production, are incapable of demonstration or of proof, but are sufficiently evident without either.

THE subject and object cannot meet in the fact of life without generating a result. Their shock one against the other cannot take place without an echo. This echo adds another to the elements of thought. Thought may therefore be defined to be a phenomenon with three indestructible elements, all equally essential to its production; no one of which can be abstracted without destroying thought and the possibility of thought.

These three elements are, 1. SUBJECT; 2. OBJECT; 3. FORM. The Subject is always ME; the Object always NOT ME; the Form is the NOTION, or what the subject notes, in the act of thinking, of both subject and object.

Subject and object are the bases of thought, and necessarily precede the phenomenon. The subject must exist before it can think, the object before it can be thought. Neither then is pro

duced by thought. Both do and must remain in themselves what they are, be the notion the mind takes of them, or the Form of the thought, what it may. The subject generates neither, nor determines the office of either in the generation of thought, for it cannot think without including both as the necessary conditions on which it thinks.

But with the FORM of the thought, or Notion, it is altogether different. This is the product of the subject; not indeed of the subject alone, as free, voluntary cause; but of the subject acting in conjunction with the object. It is the view which the subject takes of both itself and the object, and according to the conditions of thought cannot be produced without the presence, and so to speak, cooperation of the object or not me. But the intelligence that notes, views, or perceives, is the subject exclusively. The conjunction of subject and object can generate thought only on condition that the subject is intelligent. In thought there is always intelligence; as we have seen, always direct perception of the object, and a reflected perception of the subject. This intelligence is the subject. The form of the thought, being the notion which the subject takes of both subject and object, is therefore the product of the intelligence of the subject, only of the subject displaying itself in conjunction with the object.

The subject taking note of both subject and object, in the fact of life, is called the fact of consciousness. Consciousness is myself perceiving that which is not myself, and recognizing myself as the agent perceiving. It is not one thing to perceive, and another to be conscious. It is not correct to say that I am conscious of my perceptions. Consciousness is not a phenomenon separate or even distinguishable from perception, unless it be in the fact that it marks a certain degree or intenseness of perception. Both perception and consciousness are the subject displaying itself in conjunction with the object; both are maifestations of one and the same intelligent subject. In every fact of consciousness I perceive; though I am not conscious in every fact of perception. But those perceptions in which I am not conscious, differ from

those in which I am, that is, from my thoughts or apperceptions, only in being feebler, more confused, less marked or distinct. They, in like manner as thought, imply both subject and object, but in them the subject perceives the object, without any reflected perception of itself as the percipient agent. Not seeing itself in those perceptions, the subject is unable to give them form, or to note distinctly what they reveal of either subject or object. Add another degree of perception, render the perception sufficiently vivid and distinct to be what I call thought or apperception, and it is instantly clothed with a form; the mind notes, marks or distinguishes both itself and the object. It follows from this that the Form or Notion is merely that higher degree of intelligence which includes in one view both subject and object, and therefore is identical with the fact of consciousness.

The Form of the thought, or notion, is often taken for the whole of the phenomenon. Thought is indeed impossible without form, and where there is no notion of either subject or object, or of both, there is no thought; but if the form, or the notion, were the whole phenomenon, thought would be a mere empty form, a notion where nothing is noted. Locke called the form of the thought or notion, Idea, which would have been well enough, if he had not made ideas a sort of intermediary between the subject and the object. Locke does not teach that we perceive the object, but an idea or notion of the object. This was his fundamental error. We perceive the object itself, never a notion of it, for the notion, instead of being the immediate object of the perception, is simply what, in perceiving, we note of the subject and the object of perception, the form which by virtue of our intelligence we are able to give to the perception.

In the fact of consciousness, or under the form of the thought, are always, as has been said over and over again, both me and not me. Then under the form of every thought, even the simplest, the feeblest, lies always absolute truth. Me and not me, these two certainly embrace all reality. These both are essential to the production of the least conceivable thought. All reality lies

then under every notion as its conditions. God, man, and nature, all three conspire to produce each one of our thoughts, and each one of our thoughts reflects them all three. Without the combined activity of them all, no thought, nor even possibility of thought. How wonderful a creation then is thought! Of what inconceivable grandeur! Before it the wise stand in awe, or bow down and revere as before the transparent symbol of the Almighty.

But, if absolute truth enters into every thought as its basis, is essential to its production, yet no more of this truth is expressed by the form of the thought than comes within the scope of the intelligence of the subject. This intelligence, in the case of all beings but One, is and must be limited. Man is an intelligence, or else he could not think; but he is a finite intelligence. His light is a true light, as far as it is bright; but it is feeble and dim. It shines only a little way into the darkness, and even that little way merely as a sudden flash, permitting us to see that there are objects there, but vanishing too soon to enable us to see what they are. It cannot enlighten all reality. It can enlighten only that side of reality which is turned towards us; that turned from us it throws into shade. The smaller body can never illumine at once all sides of the larger body. Man, therefore, cannot comprehend the infinity which lies at the bottom of his thoughts. Always then must his NOTIONS, or views of that infinity, partake of his own feebleness, and be inadequate, dim, and partial.

With these dim, inadequate, partial, one-sided views, man constructs, and must construct, his systems of religion, morals, and politics. Compelled by the necessities of his nature, to con

clude from the luminous to the dark, from the known to the unknown, the certain to the uncertain, error is the inevitable consequence, and his systems reared with honestest intention, and infinite pains, can be, even while they stand, little else than monuments to the wide disparity there is, and ever must be, between his ambition and his strength.

But this, while it may well humble pride, and check theoretic presumption, need not alarm or dishearten the inquirer. Thought, owing to the finiteness of the human intelligence, is always inadequate, and therefore has and must have its face of error; but since it necessarily includes under its form both the ME and NOT ME, and therefore the infinite, the absolute, it must also have always its face of truth.

Man, moreover, as will hereafter be demonstrated, is a progressive being. He stands indeed on the borders of a universe of darkness, hoping, trembling, half-longing, half-fearing to plunge in; and never will that universe wholly disappear; but it shall ever recoil from his glance, and leave a larger and a larger space within the circumference of his vision. Nature as a whole, and in its parts, is in a state of uninterrupted progress. Man goes on with it, and by its aid. His faculties are continually enlarging, by the successive growth of ages, and his whole being becomes elevated and expanded, enabling him to penetrate farther and yet farther into the darkness, to enlighten a larger and a larger portion of the infinite, and to give to his thoughts clearer and more adequate forms. The face of truth is thus ever becoming broader and more radiant, while that of error is continually diminishing.

I AM revealed to myself only as the subject of an act; that is, as agent or actor. We find ourselves only in acting, and only so far forth as we act. To act is to cause, create, or produce. The ME, then, since it acts, must be a cause, a creative or productive Force.

If a cause, it must be a real, substantive being. That which is not, cannot act. In order to do, it is necessary to be. Being necessarily precedes Doing; but it is only in Doing that Being is made known. In recognizing myself to be active, I necessarily recognize