retrench all but the power to know; and the Egoists, the Fichteans, retrench all but the activity. Every system of philosophy constructed in this way, on the hypothesis that the primitive fact of consciousness is a simple fact, the product of a single faculty of the soul, acting independently of the other two, is necessarily false, for its basis is a fact, not of life, but of death.

We cannot avoid remarking, by the way, that we are unable to account for the fact that M. Cousin, entitled to a high rank among the most eminent philosophers of any age or nation, while he recognizes the complexity of the primitive fact of consciousness, and even makes it the basis of what he improperly calls Eclecticism, should yet countenance the division of the mental phenomena into three classes, corresponding very nearly to the division proposed by Dr. Schmucker. It is a singular inconsequence, and one which has led him and his readers into some grave errors. No man can more distinctly assert the primitive synthesis of the phenomenon of actual life; nay, we are aware of no one before him who has stated it at all; it is of the most vital importance in his system; and yet he seems perpetually, when analyz ing and classifying the mental phenomena, to have forgotten it. Is this, owing to the fact that from his admiration of Proclus, he was led, without due reflection, to call his philosophy Eclecticism? Has this name misled himself, as it has others? Be this as it may, we regret that he has ever done himself the wrong to call his philosophy Eclecticism, from the Greek, signifying to choose or select, and, therefore, implying that it is made up of selections from other systems. In consequence of his adopting this name, the public believe, and in spite of all explanations will continue to believe, this to be the actual character of his philosophy; yet nothing is farther from the truth. His philosophy is really and truly synthetic, as it should be, founded on the primitive synthesis we have pointed out in the mental phenomenon itself. If he had always remembered this, he would never, it seems to us, have given the sanction of his authority to the attempted decomposition of the primitive fact, against which, even in his own name, we protest.

Nevertheless, if M. Cousin divides

three

the mental phenomena into classes, corresponding to the three fundamental faculties of the soul,— activity, intelligence, and sensibility,he takes care always to tell us that this division never takes place in actual life, for the mental phenomenon is always a product of the joint and simultaneous action of all the faculties. M. Leroux, therefore, in his very acute, able, ingenious, and instructive Réfutation de l'Eclecticisme, a work to which we have been largely indebted in the composition of this article, has been wrong to accuse M. Cousin of overlooking this primitive synthesis, and to reason against his system as if it were a system of mere Eclecticism. M. Leroux is not more synthetic in his own system than is M. Cousin. On this point both, in fact, adopt the same philosophy, for both belong to the nineteenth century, which demands a synthetic philosophy, and requires the philosopher to cease "murdering to dissect," to cease his fruitless efforts to decompose what is already ultimate, and to find out the primitive synthesis of actual life, and to make that the basis of a system of science which shall possess at once life, unity, and catholicity.

No doubt the mental phenomena vary among themselves. Every phenomenon is, indeed, the joint product of all the faculties, acting at once in the unity and multiplicity of the ME; but in some of the phenomena one faculty, without excluding the others, predominates, and in others another. How this can be, perhaps philosophy is not in a condition to explain. Perhaps at bottom the power to do, the power to know, and the power to feel, are one and the same, and all force, in proportion to the quantity of being in the subject of which it is affirmed, is essentially sentient and percipient— that all beings, the minutest even, in proportion to the quantity of their being, are active, percipient, and sentient beings, as Leibnitz teaches in his "Monadology," and as seems to us to be taught in the Proem to St. John's Gospel. But be this as it may, our phenomena differ among themselves, and by virtue of the differing degrees in which one or another of the faculties predominates in their production.

Also, men themselves differ one from another, in the same way. In some

the faculty to act-activity, seems predominant, in others the faculty to know; in others still, the sensibility. This fact has given rise to the St. Simonian classification of mankind into three classes: 1. Men of Action-les Industriels; 2. Men of Science-les Savans; 3. Men of Art-les Artistes. M. Leroux, in his work entitled L'Humanité, thinks this classification was well known to the ancients, and that he finds it in the Bereshith of the Hebrews, concealed in the names Cain, Abel, and Seth, in the first series, and Shem, Ham, and Japhet, in the second; and it is worthy of note, that the meaning of these names in the original seems to afford no little support to his conjecture; and, moreover, we should always expect to find in a book given by divine inspiration, the profoundest philosophy. But without assuming to decide whether M. Leroux is correct or not, this much we may assert, that the classification is not without foundation. Men, if born with equal-which is questionable-are born with different capacities. No training can make every boy a poet, a painter, a musician, a mathematician, an expert handicraftsman, or a successful merchant. There is a class who of choice would be and by nature are fitted to be, active business men, traders, manufacturers, mechanics, cultivators of the earth; another class, whose great want is to know, who would spend their life in investigating, in acquiring and communicating knowledge; and still another class, who are of a plastic nature, whose souls are alive to the Beautiful; who contemplate truth, goodness, holiness, always under the aspect of beauty, of which they become impassioned, and which they seek to embody in song, melody, picture, statue, column, or dome. This distinction of men into three general classes, should be recognized in all our educational provisions, and our statesmen should be unwearied in their efforts so to perfect our social arrangements, as to suffer each one in life to fall into the class to which he naturally belongs, to pursue the calling for which he has a natural aptitude, and to receive according to his CAPACITY and his WORKS.

We would proceed further in the examination of the details of Dr. Schmucker's system, but it could serve

no purpose, save to give us an occasion of expressing our own views on the points concerned, in opposition; and this we shall have, hereafter, a more fitting opportunity to do, in reviewing several other philosophical works which we intend to bring, seriatim, to the notice of the readers of the Democratic Review. We have found already as much fault with Dr. Schmucker as we are willing to find with any one man, and we could do nothing but continue to find fault were we to proceed. If his work had been on any other subject, we should not have felt ourselves called upon to notice its errors; for we could have safely trusted to the good sense of the people at large to correct it; but works on metaphysical science are precisely the works to which the good sense of the people is the least capable of administering the necessary correctives. They must be examined and judged by persons whose habits, tastes, and studies have in some sort qualified them to judge wisely and correctly. We have no disrespect for Dr. Schmucker, but his work is precisely one of that kind which seems to us, from its size, its method, and its apparent simplicity, likely to take with the public. We have felt, therefore, that it was our duty to warn our countrymen against making it, as the author has designed it, a text-book in our colleges and academies. The author himself, of whom we know nothing but what this book tells us, we hold to be a very estimable man; and we doubt not that if he had written the Institutes of the Christian Religion, instead of the Elements of a new system of Mental Philosophy, we should have approved his work-at least have had no serious objections to urge against it; for, in the preparation of such a work he would have studied the Bible still more than the phenomena of his own mind; and he who studies diligently and prayerfully the Bible, we may add, will be as little likely, after all, to err in his philosophy as in his theology. The New Testament is the best manual of philosophy we are acquainted with.

The space we have appropriated to the subject of this book, and that which we propose for some time to come to devote to it, we cannot believe misapplied. The taste for philosophical studies in this country is evidently on the increase; and we are preparing to

become really a philosophical people. "Young America," the America of the nineteenth century, is not fuller of life than of thought. Thousands of young hearts all over the country are gushing out with love of truth and humanity. Thousands of young minds, with a maturity beyond their years, are buckling on the harness, eager to go forth to investigate, to explore Providence, man, and nature, and to win glorious laurels, in their battles with darkness and error. God's blessing on these noble young hearts, and brave young minds! Something will come of their efforts. We as a people are becoming more thoughtful, more profound; are acquiring a rich and varied experience; and we cannot fail to create a literature as much in advance of all the literatures of the most admired nations of ancient or modern times, as our political institutions are in advance of the old world, where the millions are still pressed to the earth by the overwhelming weight of kings, hierarchies, and nobilities. We are becoming an earnest people, feeling that we are to live, toil, suffer, die-if need be-for the growth of universal humanity ; that it is ours to take the initiative in the new school of science which is to be instituted for the world, and to formula the new thought that is to rule the future. We are THE PEOPLE OF THE FUTURE, and to us the scholars of all nations must ere long look. This is our high destiny. We are not, then, warring against our destiny in seeking to engage our countrymen in the study of the profoundest subjects, and in calling upon them to grapple with the gravest problems of science. There is for us no time to trifle, and we have no thought to waste on what is frivolous and ephemeral. We must be great, grand, solemn. We rejoice in this increased attention to philosophical subjects; in all these new works on philosophy issuing from our teeming press; in the philosophical essays which are beginning to make so large a part of our periodical literature. All augurs well, and is significant of good. We are evidently preparing ourselves for the high mission which God has given us as a people, and unless we strive hard to fail, we shall ere long be found in the front rank of the nations, our faces

and our step onward, and still onward towards the True, the Beautiful, and the Good.

In conclusion, dropping the official "we," the writer must be allowed to say a word or two directly to the readers of this Journal, for his relation to them, which commences with this article, is to be somewhat peculiar. It is neither that of editor, nor yet of an ordinary contributor. Through the generous confidence of the Editor, I am permitted to speak in these pages as freely as if they were my own, on my own responsibility, exempt from the usual editorial revision and control. Nobody, then, but myself is to be implicated, should I be so unfortunate, or so fortunate, as to advance notions the public may agree to denounce as heretical. My own name will be annexed to my contributions, and what I write must be taken precisely as if it had appeared in the Journal which I have myself conducted for the last five years.

I must also be permitted to say, that in this article I have wished to do something more than criticize Dr. Schmucker's work. I have designed my essay as a general introduction to all that I may hereafter contribute to these pages, and also as a not inappropriate introduction to philosophical studies in general, and the nature, method, design, and leading principles of what should be understood by the term philosophy. I have crowded the article more than I could wish, and have been quite too dogmatical; for here, as elsewhere, I appear always under the disadvantage of being presumed to be heretical on all points on which I am silent, or on which I do not expressly avow orthodox doctrines; and I have wished to give my views in advance on as many points as possible, that the public might see at once the general spirit and direction of my philosophy. This was necessary, so that I might enter on this new field of labor with as little prejudice, from presumed past delinquencies, as possible. Hereafter I shall conceal myself behind my subject; yet I hope not so effectually but that a strong personal interest may grow up between the writer and his readers, to be shaken by no adverse winds, but to outlast all the controversies of the day, and to bloom eternally in the heavens.