ganized into the regular departments, with physical means operating on individuals), to be sanctioned by the people of the States, acting in their original and sovereign character, was contained in the letters of James Madison to Thomas Jefferson of the nineteenth of March; to Governor Randolph of the eighth of April; and to General Washington of the sixteenth of April, 1787." The two former of these letters are published, for the first time, in the present collection. The third was not inserted by Mr. Madison in this work, but is found in Sparks's edition of the Writings of Washington. The letter to Randolph of the eighth of April, which is the one that more immediately suggested the substance of the Virginia plan, indicates distinctly the three leading points presented in the Resolutions, viz., the substitution of a national Government, organized with executive, legislative, and judiciary departments, instead of the existing confederation of independent States; the proportional vote of the States in both branches of the national Legislature, instead of the equal vote, allowed in the Congress of the Confederation; and the negative by the national Government on the acts of the States, to be exercised through the legislative departments as well as the judiciary.

In regard to the first and second of these points, Mr. Madison remarks in the letter to Randolph, above alluded to, that "he holds it for a fundamental point, that an individual independence of the States is utterly irreconcilable with the idea of an aggregate sovereignty. "I think," says he, "at the same time, that a consolidation of the States into one single republic is not more unattainable, than it would be expedient. Let it be tried then, whether any middle ground can be taken, which will at once support a due supremacy of the national authority, and leave in force the local authorities, so far as they can be subordinately useful. The first step to be taken is, I think, a change in the principle of representation. According to the present form of the Union, an equality of suffrage, if not just towards the larger members of it, is, at least, safe to them, as the liberty they exercise of rejecting or executing the acts of Congress, is uncontrollable by the nominal sovereign

ty of Congress. Under a system which would operate without the intervention of the States, the case would be materially altered. A vote from Delaware would have the same effect as one from Massachusetts or Virginia." Let it have a negative," continues Mr. Madison, "in all cases whatsoever, on the legislative acts of the States, as the King of Great Britain heretofore had. This I conceive to be essential to the least possible abridgment of the State sovereignties. Without such a defensive power, every positive power, that can be given on paper, will be unavailing. It will also give internal stability to the States. There has been no moment since the peace, when the Federal assent would have been given to paper money, &c. Let this national supremacy be extended also to the judiciary department. If the judges in the last resort depend on the States, and are bound by their oaths to them and not the Union, the intention of the law and the interests of the nation may be defeated by the obsequiousness of the tribunals to the policy or prejudices of the States. It seems, at least, essential that an appeal should lie to some national tribunals in all cases which concern foreigners, or inhabitants of other States."

In regard to the proposed negative by the General Government upon the acts of the State Legislatures, Mr. Madison remarks, in the Introduction to the Debates, that "the feature in these letters, which vested in the general authority a negative on the laws of the States, was suggested by the negative in the head of the British empire, which prevented collisions between the parts and the whole, and between the parts themselves. It was supposed, that the substitution of an elective and responsible authority, for an hereditary and irresponsible one, would avoid the appearance even of a departure from republicanism. But, although the subject was so viewed in the convention, and the votes on it were more than equally divided, it was finally and justly abandoned, as, apart from other objections, it was not practicable among so many States, increasing in number, and enacting, each of them, so many laws. Instead of the proposed negative, the objects of it were left as in the Constitution."

In the above remark, "that the votes upon this question were more than once equally divided," Mr. Madison, probably from defect of memory at the time when the Introduction to the Debates was written, has hardly done justice to the favor with which the proposal was received by the Convention. The clause, as it stands in Mr. Randolph's plan, giving authority to the national Legislature to negative all State laws contravening the articles of union, was taken up for the first time on the 31st of May, and agreed to without debate or dissent.' The vote was afterwards reconsidered on motion of Mr. Pinckney, with a view not to an abridgment, but to an extension of the power previously given; and on the 8th of June he proposed, "that a national Legislature should have authority to negative" (not only such State laws, as might, in their opinion, contravene the articles of union and existing treaties, but "all laws which they should judge to be improper." Mr. Madison seconded, and strongly supported the motion, which was also supported in debate by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Dickinson. It was lost by a vote of seven to three; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia being in favor of it; Delaware divided; Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia against it. The vote, which had been taken on the 31st of May, was not, however, at this time altered; and in the report made by Mr. Gorham on the 13th of June, of the proceedings of the committee of the whole on Mr. Randolph's resolutions, the clause stands as originally offered, with no other alteration than the addition, made on motion of Dr. Franklin, when the subject was first considered, of 'existing treaties" after "articles of union." We shall advert to this point again hereafter.

On the same day on which Mr. Randolph presented his resolutions, Mr. Charles Pinckney proposed a plan, in the form of a draft or projet of a complete constitution of government. No copy of this document was taken by Mr. Madison, nor was the original on file among the papers of the Convention, which remained in the custody of Washington and were deposited by him, while President of the United States, in the department of

State. In the year 1819, the journal of the Convention was published by order of Congress under the direction of the department of State, and a copy of the missing paper was, at that time, furnished by Mr. Pinckney himself. It appears, however, that some doubt may be entertained, whether the paper thus furnished, is a correct copy of the one presented to the Convention. Mr. Madison, in a note on the subject, points out several discrepancies between the suggestions made in the plan, and the course taken in debate by the author. The plan, for example, provides, that the members of the House of Representatives shall be chosen by the people, while the author, on the 6th of June, a few days only after the draft was presented and after giving previous notice, opposed that method and recommended an election by the Legislatures of the States. There is an exact coincidence between the language of the plan and that of the Constitution,as adopted, in several passages, in which the language of the Constitution was the result of repeated discussions and amendments, and could not, of course, have been anticipated at the commencement of the proceedings. Mr. Madison conjectures, we think with great probability, that the paper, communicated to the department of State by Mr. Pinckney, was a rough draft, on which the author had interlined a portion of the proceedings of the Convention which was subsequently confounded with the original text. This plan was not directly acted on either in committee of the whole, or in the Convention. It was referred, with the plan of Mr. Patter son, to the "committee of detail," which was appointed on the 24th of July, to report the draft of a Constitu tion upon the basis of the resolutions previously adopted.

There is a general resemblance between the plan proposed by Mr. Pinckney and the Constitution, as adopted, which, with the direct coincidence in language in several passages above al luded to, would render the document curious, if the correctness of the copy could be depended on. The uncertainty that exists on this point, in a great measure deprives it of value. The leading ideas are substantially the same as those contained in the plan of Mr. Randolph. It is, therefore, not

to be regarded as the expression of any political opinion, prevailing in the Convention, distinct from that represented by Randolph's Resolutions, but merely as another draft on substantially the same basis. For this reason, as well as the uncertainty in regard to the correctness of the copy, we deem it unnecessary to insert the document here.

On the 30th of May, the day after these two plans had been offered, the Convention went into committee of the whole on the state of the Union, Mr. Gorham, of Massachusetts, in the chair; and on that day, and several succeeding ones, took up, successively, and acted on the whole of Mr. Randolph's Resolutions. The State-Rights party do not appear at this time to have matured their ideas sufficiently to act upon them with much decision, and the leading points in the Virginia plan were agreed to with little, and, in some cases, with no opposition. On the first day, after a very short discussion, the grand principle which was to serve as the basis for the whole reform-the substitution of a regularly organized national Government for the existing confederacy-was agreed to by a very unanimous vote; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, being in favor of it; Connecticut only against it; New York, divided. On the same day the question of the proportional vote in the national Legislature was taken up, and, on motion of Mr. Madison, seconded by Gouverneur Morris, the principle "being," as the Report says, "generally relished, would have been agreed to," had not a postponement been moved by Mr. Read, of Delaware, on the ground that the delegates from that State were prohibited by positive instructions from agreeing to a change in the rule of suffrage. The subject was accordingly postponed. On the following day, as has been already remarked, the third leading principle, of a negative by the General Government on all acts of the States, inconsistent with the articles of union, " was agreed to without debate or dissent." Thus the basis of the proposed reform was substantially settled on the first day, almost without discussion or difference of opinion; and the debates proceeded with great unanimity for several days on matters of comparatively minor importance, until the

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10th of June, when, on motion of Mr. Patterson, seconded by Mr. Brearley, both of New Jersey, the subject of the mode of suffrage in the Legislature, which had been postponed on motion of Mr. Read, of Delaware, was resumed.

It then appeared that in the interval, which had since elapsed, the StateRights party had matured their ideas, and were prepared to take decided ground. Messrs. Brearley and Patterson both spoke at length in opposition to the plan of a proportional vote; and the latter took the occasion to express himself strongly against the general scheme of a national government, or any material variation from the Articles of the Confederation, “which were," as he said, "the proper basis of all the proceedings." "The commissions under which we acted," he continued, "were not only the measure of our powers; they denoted also the sentiments of the States on the subject of our deliberations. We have no power to go beyond the Federal scheme; and if we had, the people are not ripe for any other. We must follow the people; the people will not follow us.'

The discussion was continued through the day, and resumed on the following one. In the debate of the 11th, Mr. Sherman, of Connecticut, suggested for the first time the plan, which was finally adopted at a later period of the proceedings, though it did not now prevail, of a proportional vote in the House of Representatives, and an equal vote in the Senate. On the same day the proportional vote on the first branch was agreed to on motion of Mr. King, of Massachusetts, seconded by Mr. Wilson, of Pennsylvania, by a vote of seven to three-Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, being in favor of it; New York, New Jersey, and Delaware, against it; and Maryland, divided. The rule of proportion, as it stands in the Constitution, was then adopted, on motion of Messrs. Wilson and Pinckney, by the same vote, with the difference that New York and Maryland now voted in the affirmative, making the numbers nine to two. Mr. Sherman, seconded by Mr. Ellsworth, now proposed his suggestion, of an equality of suffrage in the Senate, in the form of a regular mo

tion, which was negatived by a vote of six to five-New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Delaware, and Maryland, in the affirmative; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, in the negative. It was finally decided, on motion of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Hamilton, by the same vote, that "the right of suffrage in the second branch, or Senate, ought to be according to the same rule, as in the first branch, or House of Representatives." The subject was thus definitely disposed of, and was not resumed till after the Report of the committee of the whole on Randolph's Resolutions, where it stands in the form just stated; viz., "the votes of the States in both branches are to be in proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex, and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three-fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes in each State."

It is curious, considering the change in the relative importance of the several members of the Union, that has since taken place, to find the Empire State identifying herself in interest with her smaller sisters, and sustaining their policy on this, as on most other occasions, throughout the proceedings. Of her three delegates, Hamilton only was national; Yates and Lansing, constituting the majority, and giving in most cases the vote of the State, were ultra State-Rights. When the great question between a national government and a confederacy of States was finally decided against their views, the two last seceded from the Convention. On the 13th of June, Mr. Gorham, from the committee of the whole, reported nineteen resolutions, expressing, with various modifications of minor importance, substantially the principles of the Virginia plan.

The State-Rights party, having now matured their views and taken their ground, appear to have thought the proper time had come for testing their strength in a formal way. On the 14th of June, the day after the presentation of Mr. Gorham's Repor, Mr. Patterson, who acted as their leader, "observed to the Convention," accord

ing to Mr. Madison's Report, "that it was the wish of several deputations, particularly that of New Jersey, that farther time might be allowed them to contemplate the plan reported from the committee of the whole, and to digest one purely federal, and contradistinguished from the reported plan. He said they hoped to have such an one ready by to-morrow to be laid before the Convention: and the Convention adjourned that leisure might be given for the purpose." Accordingly, on the following day, June 15th, Mr. Patterson offered the project in question, which, as the formal expression of one of the two leading opinions which di vided the Convention, we copy entire:

MR. PATTERSON'S RESOLUTIONS.

"1. Resolved, That the Articles of Confederation ought to be so revised, corrected, and enlarged, as to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the

Union.

"2. Resolved, That, in addition to the powers vested in the United States in Congress by the present existing Articles of Confederation, they be authorized to pass acts for raising a revenue, by levying a duty or duties on all goods, or merchandise of foreign growth, or manufacture, imported into the United States, by stamps on paper, vellum, and parchment; and by a postage on all letters or packages passing through the general post-office, to be applied to such federal purposes as they shall deem proper and expedient; to make rules and regulations for the collection thereof; and the same, from time to time, they shall think proper; to pass acts for the regulation of trade and commerce, as well with foreign nations as with each other; provided, that all punishments, fines, forfeitures, and penalties, to be incurred for contravening such acts, rules, and regulations, shall be adjudged by the common law judiciaries of the State, in which any offence, contrary to the true intent and meaning of such acts, rules, and regulations, shall have been committed or perpetrated, with liberty of commencing, in the first instance, all suits and prosecutions for that purpose in the superior common law judiciary of such State; sub

to alter and amend in such manner as

ject, nevertheless, for the correction of all

errors, both in law and fact, in rendering judgment, to an appeal to the Judiciary of the United States.

"3. Resolved, That whenever requisitions shall be necessary, instead of the

rule for making requisitions, mentioned in the Articles of Confederation, the United States in Congress be authorized to make such requisitions in proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex, and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and threefifths of all persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes; that, if such requisitions be not complied with in the time specified therein, to direct the collection thereof in the non-complying States; and for that purpose to devise and pass acts directing and authorizing the same; provided that none of the powers, hereby vested in the United States, in Congress, shall be exercised without the consent of at least States, and in that proportion if the number of confederated States shall be hereafter increased or diminished.

"4. Resolved, That the United States, in Congress, be authorized to elect a Federal Executive, to consist of persons, to continue in office for the term of years; to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase nor diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons composing the Executive at the time of such increase or diminution; to be paid out of the Federal Treasury; to be incapable of holding any other office or appointment during their term of service and for years thereafter; to be ineligible a second time, and removable by Congress on application by a majority of the Executives of the several States; that the Executives, besides their general authority to execute the Federal acts, ought to appoint all Federal officers, not otherwise provided for, and to direct all military operations; provided that none of the persons composing the Federal Executive, shall, on any occasion, take command of any troops, so as personally to conduct any military enterprise, as General, or in any other capacity.

"5. Resolved, That a Federal Judiciary be established, to consist of a supreme tribunal, the judges of which to be appointed by the Executive; to hold their offices during good behavior; to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase nor diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at

the time of such increase or diminution. That the Judiciary so established shall have authority to hear and determine, in the first instance, on all impeachments of Federal officers; and, by way of appeal, in the dernier ressort, in all cases touching the rights of ambassadors; in all cases of

captives from an enemy; in all cases of piracies and felonies on the high seas; in all cases in which foreigners may be interested; in the construction of any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any of the acts for the regulation of trade, or the collection of the Federal revenue; that none of the Judiciary shall be capable of receiving or holding any other office or appointment during their term of service, and for thereafter.

"6. Resolved, That all acts of the United States in Congress, made by virtue and in pursuance of the powers hereby, and by the Articles of Confederation, vested in them, and all treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective States, so far forth as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said States or their citizens, and that the Judiciary of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, anything in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding; and that if any State, or any body of men, in any State, shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the Federal Executive shall be authorized to call forth the powers of the confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to enforce and compel an obedience to such acts, or an observance of such treaties.

"7. Resolved, That the rule for naturalization ought to be the same in every State.

"8. Resolved, That a citizen of one State, committing an offence in another State of the Union, shall be deemed guilty of the same offence, as if it had been committed by a citizen of the State in which the offence was committed."

In a note upon this plan Mr. Madison remarks, "that it had been concerted among the deputations, or members thereof, from Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and perhaps Mr. Martin, from Maryland, who made with them a common cause, though on different principles. Connecticut and New York were against a departure from the principle of the Confederation, wishing rather to add a few new powers to Congress, than to substitute a national government. The States of New Jersey and Delaware were opposed to a national government, because its natives considered a proportional representation of the States as the basis of it. The eagerness displayed by the members opposed to a national government from these differ