The Chancellor to Mallet.-You deny with a great assurance even what is established by the most positive testimony; but that is not as

nation: "Yes, sir, that's true, I took an oath which hinders me from telling the truth, but I have never done anything evil."

A.—I have been in Paris since 1830; there have been many meetings, and many insurrections, during that time. What offence have I been charged with? I was received in 1832. I was not pleased and I retired.

Q.-You had no need of entrenching yourself in your oath. It is when you see that the demonstration of the charges is evident, that you allege your oath in order to escape the necessity of answering; you say you were not at Colombier's and yet it is certain you were there on the morning of the 13th. When the question was discussed whether they should commence the attack or not, Coturin having maintained that they ought not to do so, you broke out in a violent passion against him, and called him a stupid brute.

Mallet (raising his voice)-I never make use of such expressions.

The Chancellor.-I advise you to speak in a more modest tone. You are not in a position to take airs like those you wish to take.

A.-I find myself insulted when they say, I called a man a stupid brute. None but vile persons make use of such expressions.

Among the accused was a Mr. Dupoty, the editor of a paper called the Journal of the People. Circumstances

connected with his prosecution reflect much light upon the course of state trials in France, and upon what the French jurists call moral proofs. Dupoty's journal, from the extreme liberality and republican tendency of its opinions, and himself, from his activity and intrepidity, were obnoxious to the authorities, as calculated to exert a powerful influence over that class of society most easy to excite and most dangerous when excited. It is not uncharitable to suppose, that the law of ficers were willing to seize the first plausible opportunity of arraigning him and of pressing his conviction. The attempt appears to me to have been extremely ill-judged; no fact was proved which showed the slightest connexion between Dupoty and the persons obviously guilty of the attempt at assassination. And this defect, so decisive and fundamental by our laws, is attempted to be supplied by these moral proofs-that is, by the political opinions of Dupoty; by occasional remarks in his journal, violent indeed, but far from recommending insurrection; by his associations; and by some of the previous circumstances of his life. It seems to me that the facility with which prosecutions are instituted in France against the conductors of the press is a great error in the internal policy of the country. Probably three times out of four the parties are acquit ted, and almost always the public sympathy is enlisted in their favor, and the obnoxious article acquires a notoriety and importance which its intrinsic merit would have never given to it. My settled conviction is, that under any government there are very few aberrations of the press which ought to be visited by public prosecutions. If these consist of hard words, they may be safely left for their correction to the good sense of the community; if they state injurious facts, let these be explained, corrected or denied, by means of the same great vehicle of communication, and the truth will finally prevail, with as much certainty and far better effect than if the law were in voked to find a judge or an avenger.

Dupoty conducted himself before the Chamber of Peers with much sangfroid and dignity, never losing his presence of mind, and from time to time evincing great shrewdness in his answers and remarks.

One of the principal moral proofs which were offered in support of the charge against him was a letter which Launois, one of the accused, had addressed to him from the prison, but which never reached Dupoty, having been seized by the agents of the police. In this letter Launois requests Lupoty to take up the defence of the accused in his journal. This is its only object, but in reading it paragraph by paragraph the Chancellor stopped to make his comments and to show its bearing upon Dupoty; and the latter gave his views and explanations, proving that no just induction by which he might be compromitted could be drawn from such circumstances. And he was right upon all just principles of jurisprudence; for the consequences which would result from admitting such testimony, depending solely on the action of one of the parties and tending to convict the other, are too obvious to require examination.

The letter contained the following expression: "This monster maintained before the examining judge that he had been received in my chamber and in my presence, this is a thing which I don't recollect." One would suppose that this sentence was a very harmless one, so far as regards its effect upon the journalist. Not so, however, thought the Chancellor. The manner in which he connects it with the accused is one of the most extraordinary instances of judicial ingenuity, or, I may rather say, of judicial absurdity, which it has ever been my lot to meet. That I may not be accused of perverting the meaning of this high functionary, I will quote verbatim his remarks: "This phrase, more than any other, shows that he who wrote the letter believed that you would easily understand him; and when he said simply received, it is evident that in his opinion you knew what had passed in that chamber, and in what society Launois had been received; otherwise how can you explain the motives that dictated this letter?"

To this shrewd suggestion, Dupoty very justly replies, that this effort on the part of Launois was but an absurdity; that, ignorant of the condition of the press and its duties, he supposed it could take up his defence, and that this might be useful to him.

The Chancellor." I read at the bottom of the letter that was addressed to you these words: We are always

I assure the reader that I obey the poet's injunction, "Nothing extenuate, nor set down aught in malice." I quote the expressions of the Chancellor of France, word for word, and as they are given in the Moniteur, the official journal of the government. The critical acumen which they display is beyond my power of appreciation.

Dupoty replies, that every one who knows the relations of the press with the uneducated portion of the people, knows that there is much looseness of expression in their letters. And he appeals to the examining judge to say if he has not often seen similar expressions which pre-suppose much intimacy between the writers and those to whom the letters are addressed, although they were strangers to one another.

The Chancellor,-continuing his reading, says: "In fine the letter thus terminates: In awaiting a better fortune the time fails me'-although these expressions are less formal than those which precede, they seem yet to indicate a community of situation and sympathy, which is the more remarkable when they see the author of the letter invoke the same future for you and for him."

Dupoty. "I cannot enter into the motives of the writer, all I can affirm is, that there was nothing in common between Launois and me, and that before I had been confronted with him, 1 had never seen him."

I terminate these quotations with the following remarks of Dupoty in answer to a series of questions having reference to almost the whole course of his preceding life; it is impossible to expose more vividly the injustice of this procedure: "I have not strength enough to protest against this manner of proceeding. I have vainly sought, since you commenced this interrogatory, and I cannot find, what relation there can be between the circumstances to which you allude, and which were not called into question at the time they occurred nor since, and the accusa

To appreciate, however, the true character of this examination, as well as the ordinary examinations before the French tribunals, it must be borne in mind that the accused party has the right to shut himself up in what the French jurists call a complete system of dénégation, or denial, or of absolute silence, without thereby occasioning the slightest injury to his case. If he says (and he often does so by the advice of his counsel,) I do not choose to answer, there is an end to the interrogatory, and the trial must proceed upon the proofs which the prosecution may be able to furnish. In the trial to which I have referred, in the Chamber of Peers, all the prisoners were defended by able counsel, and the most unlimited intercourse was permitted between them. The counsel was no doubt satisfied, that the rejoinders of their clients to the questions of the President would not make their cases any worse than if they remained silent. As to Dupoty, he evidently relied upon his own resources, and in the encounter between him and the Chancellor, he proved himself more than a match for that distinguished magistrate. His fate, as well as that of his co-accused, is now in the hands of the Peers, all the proceedings both testimonial and argumentative having terminated. I may be able to announce to the readers of the Democratic Review the result. It is looked to with great anxiety by all rational lovers of good order and of popular liberty.

The present code of jurisprudence in France, both civil and criminal, was the work of a commission of eminent jurists; and after its preparation it was discussed, paragraph by paragraph, in the Council of State, presided over by Napoleon.

The Emperor encouraged the fullest expression of opinion; and the record of the deliberations, which has been published, everywhere bears proof of his sagacity and of the ability of the men by whom he was surrounded. He himself judged and decided, and the result has been the construction of a monument far more honorable and durable than his fame as a conqueror, acquired upon a hundred bloody fields. This code is now the law of France, of Belgium, of Greece, and of the Rhen

ish provinces of Prussia. In Holland, in Lombardy, and in Naples, though it has been modified, it is still the basis of their jurisprudence. Some of its forms of procedure have been recently adopted in Prussia, where a commission is now sitting charged with the duty of preparing a uniform code for the monarchy. The progress it has made is the best proof of its intrinsic merit, and of its adaptation to the existing state of society in Europe. Its provisions are expressed in simple and intelligible language, without that interminable multiplicity of words, that never ending iteration of "said" and "aforesaid," and of the kindred members of that family, which disfigure our statutes, and overlay their meaning in a redundant phraseology. Its divisions follow each other in their natural order, and such was the original perfection of the work, joined also to a desire to avoid that great evil under which we suffer, too much legislation, that very few changes have been introduced. And in the introduction of those which have taken place, an excellent practice has been adopted, not to amend the existing law by a supplementary provision, which often renders it extremely difficult to determine whether a statute is repealed in whole or in part; but to strike out from the code the entire paragraph, and to replace it by another, bearing the same number, and containing the desired amendment, incorporated with what remains of the original provision.

France, for the purpose of justice and police, is divided into eighty-six departments, including the island of Corsica. Each of these departments is divided into arrondissements; the arrondissements into communes, and the communes into cantons. At the head of each department is a high officer, called a préfet, who administers the executive functions under the Minister of the Interior; in each arrondissement is a sous-préfet, in each canton a justice of the peace, and in each commune a mayor. The justice of the peace and the mayors are invested with judicial and police authority.

At the head of the judicial organization of the kingdom is the Court of Cassation, so called from the French word casser, to break, because at its institution it had power only to re

verse the judgments of inferior tribunes. This obvious defect of jurisdiction was the more remarkable from the course which cases submitted to its decision might take, and in fact did often take. If the Court of Cassation judged that the decree of the Cour Royale was erroneous, it annulled it, and then ordered the cause to another court for a rehearing. If on the second trial a judgment similar to the first was rendered, the affair was ended, and the decisions of the two inferior tribunals outweighed the decision of the appellate court. The question of law thus in contest was then laid before the Minister of Justice, and by him carried to the knowledge of the Chambers. Sometimes an act was passed declaratory of the law, and sometimes the uncertainty was suffered to remain perplexing the tribunals, the parties, and the bar. This state of things, however, so incompatible with the unity of the laws, was corrected by an act of the legislature in 1837; and now, if a judgment is reversed by the Court of Cassation, it is still sent to another Cour Royale for a rehearing; but if this court agrees in opinion with its co-ordinate court, the case is then again carried before the appellate judicature, where a solemn session of all the chambers is held, and the judgment rendered. If this judgment is confirmatory of the first, the inferior tribunals are then bound to conform themselves to the decision. Why a much more simple process is not adopted to arrive at the result, than this apparently complicated procedure, I profess my inability to explain. I do not, however, belong to that class of observers who dogmatically condemn all they do not comprehend; and I am disposed to believe there must be some good reason for this seeming anomaly, or the able men who conduct the legislative and judicial departments of the French government would interpose a prompt remedy.

Next in dignity to the Court of Cassation, but out of the circle of the ordinary jurisdiction, is the "Court of Accounts." It is an admirable institution, and I find that public sentiment attributes to its constant surveillance much of the economy, promptitude, and regularity, which prevail in the collection and disbursement of the public revenue of France. Those depreda

tions, resulting from the defaults of fiscal agents, which are so lamentably frequent in our country, are almost unknown here. And I do not find in the most vehement discussions of the Chambers any intimations that accounts have been unjustly allowed by the treasury officers, or the public money diverted from the purposes designated by law. If such events were to happen, it would be the duty of the Court of Accounts-and they would no doubt rigorously fulfil it-to expose and punish the malversation.

Its jurisdiction is divided into two great branches. The first relates to the collecting and disbursing agents of the government. The terms of this proposition sufficiently explain the nature of these functions. The second embraces a branch of the public service which unfortunately has no analogous institution in our country or in England. I say, in England, because if it had existed, we should doubtless have copied it; as we have been pretty close imitators of the legal system of our father-land. That spirit of innovation and improvement, so prominent and powerful in all the other great departments of life, mental and material, wholly fails us when we touch the charmed circle of jurisprudence. The French Court of Accounts supervises the operations of the treasury officers in the allowance and payment of claims against the government. It examines their accuracy, and compares them with the acts of appropriation. Every year all the operations of the treasury for the preceding year are submitted to this court; and it prepares a detailed report, stating the result of its examination of this great branch of service. This report is laid before the Chambers, at the commencement of their session. In France, two legislative acts are necessary in the progress and settlement of accounts. The first makes the appropriations, and the second, which is passed upon the report of the Court of Accounts, at the termination of the operations of a given year, grants the sanction of the legislature to the treasury proceedings. I am certain that the institution of a similar tribunal in the United States, with such modifications as might be demanded by the nature of our institutions, would produce incalculable advantages to the public treasury.

Next to these two sovereign tribunals, in the French judicial hierarchy, are the "Cours Royales." Of these there are twenty-six, each of which embraces several departments within its jurisdiction. courts upon which devolves the adjudication of far the greater portion of the subjects of litigation arising in the community. Its members also hold Courts of Assizes, where persons "put in accusation," or, as we should say, indicted, are tried.

It is this class of

Next come the courts of "Première Instance," of which there is one in each arrondissement, resembling in their general duties our county courts.

Besides these inferior tribunals, there are courts of commerce, sitting in the principal commercial places, with special jurisdiction over all commercial questions. The judges are elected by the persons engaged in trade. The number of these courts is 219.

Last in order are the justices of the peace. They have jurisdiction in civil affairs to the amount of fifty francs, without appeal; and, with the right of appeal, to the amount of 100 francs. They have also summary power in many cases of disputes, relating to fields, fruits, grain, etc., changes of landmarks, reciprocal complaints of masters and servants, and other controversies of a similar nature.

In criminal cases, they can inflict a fine not exceeding fifteen francs, and imprisonment not extending beyond five days. Each justice of the peace has a greffier, or clerk.

The personnel, if I may so speak, of the French courts is entirely different in its composition from that of ours. It is vastly more numerous, and each court is divided into various chambers; which, in fact, become separate tribunals, for all of them are simultaneously engaged in the trial of causes assigned to them, I believe, according to their nature, whether civil or criminal. One chamber of the Court of Cassation is called the Chambre des Requêtes, and its exclusive duty is to examine questions of appeal, and to judge if there is sufficient cause to send them to the proper chamber for decision. If its opinion is adverse to the appellant, there is an end of the matter. If it is favorable, the cause is then carried to the appropriate chamber for final de