comes 'an avowed exponent and protector of the liquor traffic.' Yet for the most part it is accepted in silence. Is this simply through indifference, the traditional American willingness to submit to political manipulation rather than to oppose it, or does courage really fail? So long as the Anti-Saloon League successfully dangles the bugbear of a moral issue before the public conscience, eternally but wrongfully declaring the prohibition issue to be one between right and wrong and not one of social expediency, it is perhaps natural that many should become frightened. Politicians, both large and small, are thus made to seek cover, or, when in extremity, to enter into prohibition servitude as a means of safety and preferment. Then, too, it is so easy to represent that the question lies solely between temperance workers and the liquor interests, for only those directly connected with it would humanly show the same intense zeal as the temperance agitators themselves. As Mr. Fabian Franklin says, "The opinion that nobody is concerned in the matter except the prohibitionists on the one hand, and those who make money out of liquor on the other, is not only false but so monstrously false, that its almost unchallenged currency must be set down as one of the most interesting and instructive of psychological curiosities.'1 But this pronouncement of the attitude of the League toward Congress is of far greater import than in the respects just discussed. To quote Mr. Franklin again: 'A doctrine more dangerous, more subversive of the spirit of representative government than that here laid down concerning the duties of members of Congress in relation to the most solemn responsibility they are ever called upon to discharge, it would be difficult to imagine.' 1 The Unpopular Review, October-December, 1915, p. 296. Nothing less is contemplated than a de facto reversal of the process by which amendments to the Federal Constitution are intended to be made. The provision of the Constitution that the Congress, by a two-thirds vote in both houses, has power to propose amendments to the Constitution, which become effective when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the states, necessarily implies a deliberative act on the part of the Congress and imposes a solemn obligation for the nature of the amendment proposed. The requirement that an amendment must be submitted to the several states for ratification is merely in order that there may be a sufficient check upon any action of the Congress. But the Anti-Saloon League would have the nation's chosen representatives abdicate as a deliberative body, efface personal conviction, and forego their greatest responsibility, so that 'the people of the nation' may determine the question of national prohibition, under threat that he who refuses becomes an 'avowed exponent and protector of the liquor traffic.' The transparent plea is made that 'the people of the nation' through its legislatures should be allowed to decide. In reality this is an appeal for coercion through a minority of the population. For in ratifying a proposed amendment to the Constitution, the votes of the different state legislatures are equal units, no matter how great the disparity of the populations they represent. Thus the four least populous states in the Union would have just as much weight as the four most populous, containing thirty times as many inhabitants. As stated in the first article of this series, a situation might arise in which thirty-six legislatures representing less than one half of the population imposed their will on twelve states representing the majority. Yet we are adjured to 'let the people de cide.' The true implication is, let the rural minorities say how the urban majorities shall live. The expedient lies in passing up the decision to the legislatures, in many of which, however, the large city populations have a smaller proportionate representation than the rural. Logically, if 'the people' are to decide in the sense the Anti-Saloon League would have us interpret its plea, there should be a nation-wide referendum for the guidance of the Congress as well as of the state legislatures. The prophecy is frequently made that national prohibition will become law within ten years. The reasoning behind it is plain: Should Congress submit the national prohibition amendment, a state legislature may act on the question of ratification whenever it sees fit, without any time limit; and naturally every effort would be made to seize upon the right moment for securing a favorable majority. If ratification should fail at the first attempt, a legislature may presumably reverse its action at a subsequent session; but whether a legislature can reverse its act of ratification is dubious and cannot be definitely known until the Supreme Court has passed on the question. Many hold that it cannot. Thus it may be needful only to accumulate during an indefinite period the ratification votes of thirty-six state legislatures, the requisite majority for an acceptance of the amendment; and if ratification once made is irrevocable, any subsequent revulsion of public sentiment-and how rapidly it shifts, the history of the prohibition movement teaches us would be of no avail. The reason for urging the Congress to stand aside and delegate its responsibility to the state is therefore evident, since it foreshadows the clear possibility of the adoption of the most momentous or radical of changes in the organic law being brought about by the vote of the VOL. 117-NO. 4 legislatures of a handful of states previously disinclined to it, at a time when an indefinite number of the states previously favorable to it had experienced a reversal of sentiment on the subject.' If the country should wish to repeal the proposed amendment, it would be necessary to secure a two-thirds majority for repeal in both houses, as well as the consent of three-fourths of the state legislatures. But any thirteen states and there are more than that number in the prohibition column today-would have the power, by refusing their assent, to make repeal impossible, no matter how insistent and sincere the demand for it in the other thirty-five. And a governmental policy fraught with such incalculable consequences, reaching into the very depths of our political and social life, the wellspring of ceaseless strife and of corruption, should be left to chance legislatures in the name of a public opinion which they cannot truly voice! What hypocrisy may lurk behind the phrase, 'Let the people decide'! Is then representative government, as exemplified by the Congress, opposed to the interests of the people because it is a deliberative body, bound by certain rules, forms, and accountability for its actions? There is something humorous in the suggestion that a state legislator, drawn from goodness knows what patch in the hinterland, must possess a better sense of a national policy than he who is charged with specific responsibility for it, and who now is virtually being asked to delegate his authority. III The attitude of the Anti-Saloon League toward government is more clearly revealed through its practices under prohibition. Of later years, perhaps emboldened by many successes, this body undertakes, not only to secure sumptuary legislation but to dictate how it shall be enforced. Under local self-government, the function of making penal acts effective belongs to the established police authorities, coöperating with the proper judicial tribunals. Somehow these usual custodians of order do not seem to meet the exigencies of prohibition, since it is held necessary to create extraordinary police agencies charged with the single duty of enforcing the edict against drink. In Maine, a few years ago, the scandalous inactivity of the sheriffs and the police became too notorious even for that state to endure, and a commission was established with roving powers to visit every part of the commonwealth and supplement or rather supplant the work of the local police forces. Bitter resentment against this interference with local self-government, mixed of course with political considerations, soon put an end to the experiment. Recent prohibition legislation would anticipate all these difficulties. The State of West Virginia wrote into her prohibition law open distrust of existing police powers when she established a prohibition commissioner endowed with authority on a par with that of the state's attorney-general and with the right to appoint a practically unlimited number of deputies to assist him in upholding the new law. This innovation in government has at least been welcomed by place-seekers: West Virginia is overrun by deputies armed with extraordinary power to interfere with personal liberty, as illustrated by their searching the baggage of inoffensive travelers, perhaps through passengers, and haling them before some magistrate upon the discovery of a small quantity of contraband goods, or on pure suspicion. Merely to provide the pay of these deputies has become a notable drain upon the already meagre state treasury; but that is a detail. The core of the situation is what the effect must be upon government when, in order to vindicate a single piece of legislation, it is thought necessary to brand the usual police authorities, chosen by the people or locally appointed, and who are sworn to execute all laws for public safety and welfare, as incapable of trust in the one respect of enforcing prohibition. What a singular travesty on methods of securing community order and decency! Incidentally, what a commentary on the assumption that in West Virginia, for instance, prohibition is backed by an all-pervasive and sound public sentiment! This resort to specially devised agencies for the purpose of compelling obedience to a single law is illustrated in other prohibition states by the appointment of 'state rangers' (Tennessee), and 'liquor deputies,' or whatever fragrant name they may enjoy. The introduction of such elements into the governmental machinery of the state, and their maintenance, self-evidently denote a control of offices in the interest of no other public policy than that of prohibition; for its enforcement, especially in some Southern states where it is attempted, has become the pivot on which the whole scheme of government revolves. In view of the recent rampant criminality in some of the Southern states, one wonders whether their quest of public order and respect for law has no other meaning than enforcement of legislation against drink. Perhaps the most sinister phase of the enforcement work is the pressure brought upon the courts - the undisguised efforts to influence their action in trials for violations of the liquor law. The practice of intimidation of this sort may even be threatened before the prohibition law in a given state goes into effect. For example, in the Portland (Oregon) Journal, December 18, 1915, we read, under the cap 'Superintendent R. P. Hutton of the Anti-Saloon League of Oregon is now making a tour in Eastern Oregon, explaining the prohibition law, telling 'what is in it," and "how to get the good of it." "The proposed law and the proposed officials will secure more results with a bunch to back them, than the best law and the best officials can get if only an unorganized public sentiment is behind them." tion 'Dry League Chief Tours East- judge of the criminal court and find out State,' the following story: why the prohibitory law was not enforced. To be sure, past grand juries had returned several hundred indictments against violators, and many fines and workhouse sentences had been imposed. Still, the judge permitted the self-constituted delegation to appear before the bench, listened meekly to the harangue against his administration of justice, and acceded to the demand that all holders of Federal special-tax certificates as liquor-dealers should be summoned before the open court. In Tennessee, as in many other prohibition states, the possession of such a certificate is prima-facie evidence of a violation of the law. The court surrendered to the mob and issued an order for the holders of these certificates to appear at a given time for further instruction.' In the end the tax certificates were surrendered, not to the court, who had no legal right to receive them, but to the local superintendent of the Anti-Saloon League! And the farce proceeded 'while a large audience sat amazed at the outrageous spectacle.' "That is the burden of Mr. Hutton's message, and he is arranging for organized demonstrations of public backing for enforcement to be made in the court room when the first half-dozen trials come up in each county or in the local community.' The violation of the sanctity of the courts by means of 'organized demonstration' of public backing for enforcement is an expedient borrowed from Southern prohibition states where it has been extensively used. Instances of mobs showing noisy hostility to prisoners on trial for ordinary offenses are fortunately exceedingly rare; and everywhere such offenders would be summarily punished. But in Southern prohibition states it appears to be allowable, not only to exact public pledges from judges and prosecuting officials in regard to the enforcement of prohibition (as to other laws they are presumably to be trusted), but to instruct a judge in open court, ask him to set aside any doubt that may attach to the possible guilt of the defendant and demand that the full penalty of the law shall be imposed. To what length such intimidation of the courts may be carried was shown in Chattanooga, Tennessee, not many years ago. The local superintendent of the Anti-Saloon League served notice through the public press that at a given time he and others would call on the Tennessee, however, is not the only state that has suffered frequent degradation of her criminal courts at the hands of Prohibitionists. Coercive tactics against the courts have been employed also in Georgia, Alabama, and North Carolina-organized demonstrations' for enforcement is the polite name for this species of intimidation. It is easy to blame the judges for cowardice, but it requires a stiff backbone to stand up against onslaughts by those who have it in their power to end one's official career and scruple not at the means. IV To keep perpetual watch on the criminal courts is, however, an irksome occupation and cannot fully meet the needs of enforcement which may be blocked by negligent prosecuting officials, and, moreover, requires the cooperation of other officials, especially that of the municipal authorities in large centres. So the infamous 'ouster' law was invented for the removal of officials whose activities or inactivities have become obnoxious to some people. This instrument of prohibition, manufactured and demanded solely in support of sumptuary law, is revolutionary, since it would substitute courtmade for representative government. Under the 'ouster' act of Tennessee, which prohibitionists elsewhere seem eager to emulate, the prosecuting attorney of the state, or of any city or county, may file a motion in the circuit or criminal courts for the removal of a public official from office for cause; or a suit to the same effect may be entered on the petition of ten citizens. Should the courts sustain the motion, they may remove officials elected by the people and substitute for them men who would be rejected at the polls. This is not fiction but fact. At this writing the cities of Memphis and Nashville are ruled by court-made mayors. The mayor of Memphis, for instance, was removed from office by ouster process, but in the meantime he was reëlected to serve a new term beginning with the present year. The prohibitionists, however, by the aid of the courts succeeded in restraining him from holding the office to which he had been legally chosen, and he is at present replaced, through court order, by a man who has not been elected. A more violent usurpation of the powers and prerogatives which our Constitution has lodged in the hands of the voters has rarely been witnessed. What hold the courts, when thus arraying themselves against the people, can have upon public confidence, it is for the prohibitionists to say, the sponsors of the ouster theory, which was put into practice at their behest, and solely intended as an adjunct in enforcing prohibition. Until its invention, known processes of law were thought sufficient to safeguard the public against inefficient or corrupt government. It is probable that the ouster law will eventually prove its own undoing. When political faction is arrayed against political faction it proves an exceedingly convenient club wherewith those who are out of office may wreak vengeance upon those who are in. In several counties in Tennessee ouster proceedings have been begun against county officials by their political opponents and on the most flimsy pretexts, involving such questions as that of public road-building. Meanwhile, popular government becomes a by-word, and turbulence, strife, and bitterness succeed peaceful order. Over the whole spectacle is written in large letters PROHIBITION. That persons whose ruling idea is to make operative laws directed against one evil may, in their effort, become the spokesmen of essential lawlessness, is an easily understandable mental phenomenon. Accustomed to interfere with the course of justice and with representative government, it is natural that they should lack respect for property when it belongs to the liquor traffic. Therefore they demand its confiscation. In the absence of express provisions in our laws guaranteeing that no man shall be deprived, without compensation, of property rights that have enjoyed legal protection, the question of the legality of confiscation may be purely academic. The economic significance of the interests involved is not the real issue, although, purely from a business point of view, reasonable people may regard apprehensively their prospective obliteration, for the capital involved in the production of liquors consumed in this country ex |