tive germ under the constitutive laws of knowledge. In this germ is its origin. There is no need, for any pur pose of explanation, of supposing anything anterior to it, save, at least, knowing mind and knowable object in interaction. There is no more reason for regarding the idea of quantity to be an a priori principle, than the idea of color or of dress. We perceive a red, a green, a blue; and our cognitive nature of itself builds up from the supplies of continued experience, the germinal percept through the natural processes of reflective thought to the comprehensive abstract idea of color. We perceive a tunic, a robe, a cloak; and we come at length, as pushed forward by the demands of life, through regular movements of thought, to the abstract idea of dress. It would be no more preposterous to talk of an a priori idea of color or of dress as condition of perceiving a red flag or a coat, than to talk of an a priori idea of quantity as a condition of perceiving one and one combined into a single as in the perceptive interaction.

In like manner, we, in the perception of the twofold in the unity of the perceptive act, discern a difference, as well as a sameness or unity. The inner coefficient is different from the outer; there is this and the other. Each of the two has its own distinctive characteristicsin other words, its proper quality. The primal perception contains the germ of this principle of quality. The principle widens with the larger specialization presented in repeated experience. It becomes idea in the way we have indicated, through the maturing processes of the judgment.

These three fundamental ideas-that of unity or identity, quantity, and quality-have been not improperly denominated categories of pure thought. They alike have their origin as germs in the perceptive experience, indeed, as we have shown; they are all, however, given equally in any instance of proper thought; but they attain their characteristic importance and authority only as

they are transformed through the processes of thought from simple germinal percepts into full-lifed ideas-abstract, comprehensive principles, embracing under their sway all objects of human knowledge.

A second relationship is presented to the eye of perception in the perceptive interaction, of a like character in signification with that already indicated. The interaction enters the even flow of a perhaps hitherto self-determined experience, and fixes a critical point, or line, or section in its history. There is a beginning of a new record in that experience. This beginning is as truly within the range of the perceptive eye as any other feature in the interaction. There is equally noticeable an end of the interaction. Moreover there is discernible duration-continuous duration between this beginning and this end. It is obvious that this element, which is most undeniably presented to perception in the interaction, does not belong as an intrinsic attribute or constituent to either of the two factors. No analysis of either can find it in either of them. The Kantian position to this effect--that it does not belong as intrinsic attribute to either, is correct. The fallacy in the argument, that therefore it must be some mysterious, inexplicable, a priori condition of all such experience, is exposed in the light of the truth that every finite object has extrinsic as well as intrinsic attributes. This time-element of duration is an actual, perceptible attribute, belonging to the interaction. as a change; but it is not an intrinsic attribute constituting more or less of the essential nature of either factor to be found by an analysis; it is an extrinsic. The change occurs in time. Duration has a beginning and an end; and beginning and end are limits. But limits imply parts, which parts again imply corresponding wholes. The duration which is revealed in the interaction is, as limited, bordered by other duration, and this by other still, and so on interminably. Duration as limited is part; duration as unlimited is the necessary corresponding whole. Such is time. But the point for us to remark is this, that the idea of time

has its origin as a germ in the perceptive act, and is developed into its maturer form or stage as abstract comprehensive idea in a way precisely analogous to that already indicated in the genesis of the ideas of unity, quantity, and quality."

There is a third relationship presented to view in the perceptive interaction, which is of the profoundest phil. osophical interest and demands our distinct recognition. In this interaction something is recognized as coming from without to the mind within. There is a thither and a hither, a there and a here, verily an outer and an inner, and they have come together. There is motion from without to within, from point or line or section, and there is the interval of extension as of duration. This is not an intrinsic attribute of the external body; no analysis can find it there. It is undeniably present, however. It is an extrinsic attribute; the body is in space. The mind did not originate it; the body does not contain it, but is contained in it. The extension perceived is limited; it is a part, and implies the whole of which it is a part. The part, as part, is finite; the whole, as whole in relation to the part, is infinite. No human experience has ever yet found or presumably ever will find a limit. Space, like time, is, as thus thought out, unbounded, infinite. The idea, however, as the other ideas noticed, had its origin in the perceptive act.

The survey we have taken, however limited or imperfect, of the field of truth opened to our study in our perceptive experience, will suffice, it is believed, to evince that a world of truth lies spread out within the range of our observation-a world of truth most vital to us and most inviting to our earnest exploration. It may suggest perhaps, also, a possible improvement upon the hitherto prevalent method of pursuing mental studies. That method has been rather characteristically a grounding on hypotheses, theories, assumptions, and an expounding of

"See a fuller exposition of the genesis of the ideas of time and space in Day's Mental Science. B.III. c. iv.

mental phenomena out of these assumed generalities or formulas. The philosophy of mind has been in consequence unstable, discordant, unsatisfactory. These assumptions of supposed principles for the purpose of determining and explaining mental phenomena have secured a useful end. They perhaps were necessary, unavoidable, in the weaknesses and totterings of the science in its beginning. But this age of infantile dependence is presumably passed. The sturdy vigor of adolescence now invites philosophy to independence and true self-reliance. Accurate observation and legitimate thought are the two constituents of a sound philosophy, as of any true science. To fact and logic alone let it henceforth look, for its materials and for its constructive skill.

ARTICLE VI.

THE AFFINITY OF SCIENCE FOR CHRIS

TIANITY.

BY THE REV. PROFESSOR G. fredeRICK WRIGHT, D.D., LL.D.,
OBERLIN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

NOTWITHSTANDING all that is said in some quarters about the intolerance and bigotry of the preachers and priests of the Christian religion, it still remains an indisputable fact that science has never found a home outside the nurturing influences of Christianity, and that a controlling belief in the cardinal facts of the Christian reli. gion has in no age spread so rapidly and prevailed so extensively as during the remarkable period of scientific progress which makes pre-eminent the nineteenth century of the Christian era. Taking the United States as a fair example of a field in which science has had an ample scope both for influence and development, we find that, alongside the remarkable strides of science and invention, there has been an equally remarkable reinvigoration of Christian life and activity. Rapid as has been the increase of population since the beginning of the century, the increase of the evangelical church membership has been far more rapid; so that the ratio of church membership to population is now three and one-half times greater than at the beginning of the century. Then it was one to fourteen and one-half; now it is one to four and four-fifths.' Nor is there any apparent deterioration in the quality of the membership. The constancy and devotion of church members to the work of spreading the gospel were never 1 Dorchester, Christianity in the United States, p. 750.