ology. That may now be expeditiously done.

1. I have just shown how the physiological view embraces the perfect humanity and divinity of Christ.

2. It also shows how the quasi personality of the Logos became the full personality of Christ,-it was by taking on the maternal complement of soul.

3. Let it be noted that, in so doing, the physiological theory escapes the burden which christology has borne too long, the psychological anomaly of two complete and distinct natures without two wills; or, if with two wills, then the greater anomaly of two wills without two persons. In other words, the testimony of physiology is also the testimony of psychology.

4. The quantitative effects of the incarnation are thus precisely provided for. As in all other cases, so in this case, the father and the mother determine in some way the powers of the soul which is sprung from their souls. Unless the laws of human propagation were to be broken, the union of elements which went to constitute the one soul of Christ could not but equip him with powers greater than those of a mere man, and in exercise, at least, less than divine.

5, That the father and mother elements in the nature of Christ, instead of being distinct, were complementary, strictly corresponds to the fact that his one soul was served by one brain, and avoids the anomaly, intolerable to physiology, that two distinct natures were constantly active, yet had but one organism to act through. The physiological theory is at least a coherent theory.

6. A large and momentous class of facts thus secures a provision not otherwise afforded: the evidence from the career of our Lord upon earth is all to the effect that his entire personality, and hence both of the natures which entered into it, shared in all he was and did and bore. Neither could act apart from the other, because neither existed in him apart from the other. He might, to be sure, refer to one or to the other side of his nature, as we

do when we say of a friend, "then the father acted," or "then the mother spoke," not at all imagining anything further than that the one factor or the other in our friend was for the moment the more noticeable. Since his natures did not act singly, it came about that, although “God cannot be tempted with evil" (Jas. i. 13), the divine in Christ shared the temptations of the human. "If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread..... and cast thyself down." And because the two natures were not distinct and could not act apart, Jesus replied as men should reply, "Man shall not live by bread alone, ...... thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God." Even the temptation to accept his kingdom from Satan, like the diabolical offer to acknowledge him if he would descend from the cross, was addressed to that Messianic consciousness which had its ground in his consciousness of divinity. How distinctly the writer to the Hebrews intimates the same fact when he tells us that "Jesus, the Son of God,.... was in all points tempted like as we are" (Heb. iv.14, 15), and that he who "taketh hold of the seed of Abraham.... suffered, being tempted" (ii.16-18)! The divine in Christ could suffer, because the human could not even suffer alone. It is not quite certain that the Most High is exempt from all unpleasant feeling. Is he without sensibility? Can sin give him pleasure? Was he not "grieved forty years long" with one generation (Ps. xcv. 10)? Or, if it be impossible for the Deity to experience any but pleasing emotions, if, in fact, he is incapable of all emotion, do we not plainly enough see that, by the limitations which the Logos accepted together with the human element, the theanthropos became susceptible of feeling even pain?

Finally, I may be permitted to suggest, by way of corroboration, an argument derived from the analogy of faith. If the Logos remained distinct from the human in Christ, how imperfect his union with the race which he came to redeem! To the creationist it was a union on the side of

his body alone, for that is the only union that subsists among ourselves. To the traducianist the soul of Christ was not only twofold, but threefold: one element was the Logos, a second element of his soul was the factor provided by Mary, a third was the created factor necessary to secure to Christ a human nature supposed to be wholly distinct from the divine in him. Physiology, on the contrary, permits us to believe that the person of Christ owed. the completeness of its humanity to the Logos, and thus the closest union was formed between our race and the Creator of it; "the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us." The views as to the atonement which the readers of this Review find satisfactory may not require so organic a connection as this between the Logos and our fallen race; but no one, I think, would find it unwelcome; and surely He would not refuse to be regarded as one with us, whom "in all things it behooved to be made like unto his brethren that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining unto God," to make propitiation for the sins of the people" (Heb. 2. 17).

Now the sum of what I have written is this: For the usual reasons I regard the nature of Christ as perfect in divinity; in addition to this, the facts of the New Testament as interpreted by their laws, especially by the laws of physiology and psychology, afford the following conclusions that the Logos was united to elements of a nature so closely akin to his own that Christ was in no respect the monstrous offspring of different species, and therefore his nature, although the Logos formed a part of it, was perfectly human; that, accordingly, the person of Christ comprised two complete but not two numerically distinct natures; that therefore the soul of Christ was precisely like ours in being referable to two parents, and in not containing any additional created elements; that, as with us, his one theanthropic spirit was coordinated to one bodily organism, and throughout the earthly career of Jesus fulfilled for that body the usual offices of a hu

man soul; that, since his two natures were qualitatively the same, there is no question about a confusion of qualities; that the quantity of his powers was precisely characteristic of his origin and nature,-they were seen upon occasion to be boundless, yet in use were always subject to limitations of the human and to the will of God; that the Logos was the basis of the personality of Christ, yet Christ was fully personal only through the incarnation; that, having but one soul, Christ had but one will; that inasmuch as the personal Christ did not even exist apart from either one of his natures, both necessarily had part in all he did or bore; finally, that, since the Logos himself was the father element in the human soul of Christ, a union with our nature by which the Maker, the Upholder, the Ruler, the Final Cause of all became one with us, justifies the saying attributed to Athanasius, "He who created all men from nothing could suffer for all and be their substitute."

VOL. XLVI. NO. 184.

ARTICLE III.

THE BOOK OF ESTHER AND THE PALACE OF

AHASUERUS.'

BY M. DIEULAFOY, TRANSLATED FROM THE REVUE DES ÉTUDES JUIVES BY

FLORENCE OSGOOD.

AN examination of the arguments and criticisms by the partisans and adversaries of the authenticity of the book of Esther does not come within the limits of this lecture. The exegesis of the book forms part of the work which I devote to the excavations at Susa. I will confine myself now to a few fragments of this general study.

One of the fortunate results of the excavations at Susa is the sudden light which has burst from them, illuminating, with the blaze of a new day, a point hotly disputed

1

1 A lecture delivered before the Société des Études Juives, Paris, April,

1888.

[This lecture is translated for the sake of the many new and striking facts discovered by the accomplished author in laying bare the ruins of "Shushan the palace," the scene of Esther's history. M. Dieulafoy has pre-eminent right to speak of Susa, for he has been the most able and successful investigator of its antiquities. He shows us that the author of the book of Esther was minutely exact as to the architectural details of this peculiar royal residence; that the history is naturally but minutely conformed to the peculiarities of the palace destroyed 2,300 years ago; that the minutiae of custom and dress are in exact accordance with the newly discovered bas-reliefs, paintings, etc. But M. Dieulafoy holds, that, with this thorough conscientiousness and honesty, the author has indulged in vain boastings, exaggerated numbers, and has worked “a heavy embroidery on an unyielding canvas." For this mental impossibility M. Dieulafoy offers no proof but his opinion. If the writer of the book of Esther was downright honest and exact in the bulk of his narrative, in all fairness he is to be assumed honest and exact in the rest until some positive proof is brought against him.-H. OSGOOD.]