eat the Passover, is one long-drawn-out discourse around the idea of his near departure, "Now is the Son of man glorified," "Yet a little while I am with you."

Therefore (1) As inserting the Lord's Supper after verse 38, or, as in Revised Harmony, after verse 35, interrupts the body of the after-supper discourse; (2) As the question of Peter (verse 36) like those of Thomas, Philip, and Judas, after wards, are all parts of the familiar aftersupper conversation; (3) As the exclamation of Jesus (verse 31, 32) is all that is necessary to suppose is recorded of Jesus' remarks immediately after the withdrawal of Judas; (4) As it is the most natural and appropriate supposition, that the long after-supper discourse of our Lord, closing with the prayer in chapter xvii., began with this verse (xiii. 33); (5) As from these, and all the considerations, the most natural suggestion from John's account, is, that the institution of the Supper was after verse 32, and not after verse 38 (Robinson and others), nor after verse 35 (Editor).-so, in a complete harmony, it would seem best to make this slight, yet not unimportant, change from Dr. Robinson's arrangement.

JESUS BEFORE THE JEWS AND DENIALS BY PETER.

The whole of Dr. Robinson's arrangement of the several trials before the Jews needs readjustment. See the editor's notes and his arrangement there suggested, which with little doubt, is the true order of the trial in that night of the power of darkness. That there was a trial before Annas of a less formal but of a very important character, seems quite certain, and by far the smoothest and best harmony supposes this first trial before him as affirmed by John.

For a complete harmony of the events, if thought best, the denials might be arranged into the harmony of the trial in its chronological order with great accuracy, and with but little break with the current of any of the narratives. But it will probably be thought best by many, to

leave it as the several narratives give it, as a separate account; and as John and Luke place it at the time of the first denial, and Matthew and Mark at the last, the place given it in Robinson is probably the best.

The editor remarks that the denials of Peter occurred during the period from the close of the former trial before Annas, to the end of the examination before Caiaphas. But, if the several accounts are taken in their natural sense, they suggest, that the first denial was before the examination by Annas. The first instance, at the door, as John brought him in, and the second instance of this first episode or denial, was as he sat at the fire waiting for the trial by Annas. (Matt. xxvi. 58 and Luke xxii. 55-57.)

A harmony arranging the denials in their most probable chronological order, would be as follows:

1. Led away to judgment (Matt. xxvi. 57; Mark xiv. 53; Luke xxii. 54; John xviii. 13, 14).

2. Peter follows, brought in by John, and denies, at the door and at the fire, in this first episode (John xviii. 15–18; Matt. xxvi. 58, 69, 70; Mark xiv. 54, 66-68; Luke xxii, 55-57).

3. Before Annas (John xviii. 25).

4. First standing by the fire, second in the porch, in this second episode (John xviii. 25; Luke xxii. 58; Mark 14, 69, 70; Matt. xxvi. 71, 72).

5. Before Caiaphas, (Matt. xxvi. 59-68; Mark xiv. 5565; Luke xii. 63–65.

6. Third Episode (John xxviii. 26, 27; Matt. xxvi. 7375; Mark xiv. 70-72; Luke xii. 59-62).

7. "As soon as it was day," a formal condemnation, and handed over bound to Pilate. (Luke xxii. 66–xxiii. 5; Matt. xxvii. 1, 2, 11-14; Mark xv. 1-5; John xviii. 28–38).

This arrangement in a harmony would be better than putting the denials together, first, for the sake of completeness, and then again on the whole it dislocates the several accounts less. John's narrative in either case is not disturbed. Luke's narrative in this latter order is

disturbed but slightly in four verses, while in the usual order it is not disturbed, while Matthew and Mark both are less disturbed in this more chronological order of the narratives. In any case it may be said there is no dislocation worthy of special notice, or that is in the least against the chronological character of any of the narratives.

[To be Continued.]

ARTICLE VI.

USES AND ABUSES OF AN IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE OF INTERPRETATION.

It is an obvious principle of interpretation, that the known nature of the subject under consideration must inevitably modify the significance of the words used. The different shades of meaning conveyed by the word "bring" afford a familiar illustration. If a teacher asks a pupil to bring the book to him, the pupil takes it up by main force and transports it. If the judge commands the sheriff to bring the prisoner, it is not expected that the sheriff will take the prisoner up in his hands as the pupil did the book, but that he will simply make use of those motives of fear which ordinarily compel the prisoner to come into the presence of the judge. If the mother says to her son, "Bring your friend home with you to dinner," the word suggests neither force nor intimidation, as in the other two cases. Thus, in this simple instance, is illustrated the subtile capabilities of language, and the fact that the known nature

of the subject under consideration is an essential factor in determining the meaning of the words employed.

Under the influence of this principle the man of ordinary sense and candor has no difficulty in properly understanding the anthropomorphic language necessarily used when speaking of the attributes and actions of God. If we are to speak of God at all, we must speak of him "after the manner of men." When the sacred writer says, that God has repented of having made man, the very nature of the case implies that he uses the language in such a modified sense as does not ascribe to God the fallibility and vacillation of an imperfect and sinful being.

When we pray that God will not lead us into temptation, our absolute confidence in the goodness of the Creator precludes us from implying that there is any danger that God will, from malice, plot our downfall as wicked men do. The petition can have reference only to those trials of character which may be incidental to a wisely planned moral system, and from which relief may be had beforehand, upon condition of cherishing the spirit of humble dependence which expresses itself in prayer.

Another legitimate and obvious application of this principle relates to the use of language which involves assumptions both of God's foreknowledge and of man's freedom. Such language, on the face of it, often seems to imply that God exercises arbitrary and absolute authority over the human will. But the ordinary common-sense of men precludes such an interpretation of the language, because all men have, at the bottom of their hearts, unwavering confidence in the wisdom and goodness of the Creator, and are, at the same time, equally sure of the freedom of their wills. When, therefore, God is said to have hardened Pharaoh's heart, it does not require the learning of an exegete to prove that God is not thereby charged with acting in an arbitrary manner, or that Pharaoh is not represented as the victim of necessity.

One does not have to reflect long on the constitution of his own nature to see that the adjustments between the freedom of man's will and the omnipotence of God, are too delicate and profound to be accurately expressed in simple words drawn, as all words are, from the realm of nature's absolute continuity. Pharaoh's heart was not hardened by God as steel is hardened by the blacksmith. Any one who has had any moral experience at all has had enough to make this distinction. And so, as a matter of fact, readers of ordinary candor have very little difficulty in properly understanding this language concerning Pharaoh, and feel no incongruity when, on the other hand, Pharaoh is said to have hardened his own heart.

In the preceding instances the knowledge of the subject is that derived directly from experience or from the intuitions of the mind. But there are other sources of information which may legitimately lead to the same result, and are duly recognized in the ordinary canons of interpretation. For example, it is an important rule that a single passage in a literary document should be considered contextually, and that the general scope of the author's writings must be duly regarded before final decision is rendered as to its meaning. Now, study of the context is only another way of increasing our information concerning the nature of the subject under discussion, for the purpose of being able to make proper allowance for the subtile influences of this knowledge upon the writer's language. The same principle is sometimes expressed in another form, namely, that we should interpret a man's words by all that he has said upon the subject, and should aim so to construe his language that it shall be consistent with itself. Often this is an impossibility, since men do not have complete comprehension of any subject, and what they say at one time may actually contradict what they say at another time. Hence it may be that a document may defy all attemps to show its consistency; yet, in construing important papers which have been prepared