sist on the restoration of the old monarchy, as an indispensable condition of peace. He eagerly maintained, that the perils attending the present war, did not equal those that would result from such a peace as could be made between the two countries, at this uncertain crisis. The internal situation of France, and the well-known disposition of its rulers, rendered every compact with them precarious and unstable. Terror and severity, though somewhat abated since the fall of Roberspierre, still subsisted in full force, and parties were still animated against each other, to a degree that left them no other security for their respective existence, than the destruction of their antagonists, whose measures they obstinately reprobated, as tending to the destruction of the commonwealth. While such were the reciprocal sentiments of these furious and implacable enemies to each other, whatever was effected by the one would be controverted by the other, as injurious to the state; and annulled on the very first opportunity. Could, therefore, any other state securely rest on the faith of any contract or stipulation made with people of this character? Until another system took place of this one, he could not think himself authorized in reason to enter into any negotiation with those who held the reins of government, in the midst of such incessant fluctuations. A powerful proof, how great the number was of those, in France, who were inimical to the present government, evidently appeared in the prodigious sums levied by confisca tions: the total had not been less, during the foregoing year and a half, than three hundred millions sterling. Did not this sufficiently

evince the fallacy, or the error, of those who asserted the inconsiderable quantity of adherents to monarchy ? These were, to a man, the friends to this country, and waited only an occasion to declare themselves ready to second our efforts in their cause. Would it be policy to deprive our selves of the good wishes and co. operation of the multitudes, whom no errors nor barbarities had been able to reduce to any degree of sub. mission to the existing system? but were we disposed to negotiate with the French republicans, could we be certain of a similar disposition on their part? was it not notorious, that they harboured an irreconcile. able hatred to this country, and its inhabitants; and that the principal motive of their willingness to make peace with the other members of the confederacy, was, that they might convert their whole rage against us? would they not interpose such obstructions to a pacification, that it must remain unattainable without sacrificing, at once, both our honour and our interest to obtain it? The very principles on which the French republic was founded, were such, that to acknowledge it, which must be done in case of a treaty, was to confess all other governments founded upon injustice. A peace built on such grounds would be not only disgraceful, but fatal to our own constitu tion, by undermining its principles, and empowering its many domestic enemies to represent it as inequitable and oppressive. Such a peace would be worse than war. French emissaries, under the various pre. tences of business and commercial transactions, would be let loose upon us in swarms, and, united with the discontented and factious here,

would

and enthusiasm of justly excited indignation. As to the apprehension of danger, from the influx of French principles, experience had taught the English to beware of imitating their unhappy neighbours, and to adhere, more firmly than ever, to the principles of their own constitution. He concluded, by reminding Mr. Pitt, that, notwithstanding the declaration made by his father, that the English should die, on the last breach, before they consented to the independence of America, he did not think himself bound to abide by it, and had commenced his political career, by declaring for their inde. pendence. By the same rule he ought to retract his determination respecting France.

Mr. Dundas opposed the motion in question, on the ground that it would interfere with the plans of government, and that the arrangement for the ensuing year were so promissory, that we had every mo. tive to expect a change of fortune in our favour. The allegations of ministry occasioned Mr. Grey to resume the subject with great warmth and perseverance. He dwelt principally on the improbability of those calamities that were pretended by the adversaries to a negotiation. Other powers had treated with France, without expressing any dread of the consequences; why should Great Britain, therefore, entertain any? His motion was negatived by a majority of 183, and that of Mr. Pitt carried.

- In the house of lords, a motion was made on the 27th of February, by the duke of Bedford, the purport of which, like Mr. Grey's, was, that no form of government that might prevail in France, should preclude a negotiation with that

country, or prevent a peace, when. ever it could be made consistently with the honour, interest and security of this nation. He supported his motion with a variety of argu. ments. Such a declaration would not oblige ministry to accept of any other conditions than they chose, nor to treat but at their own time. Were it to be admitted as a fixed rule, that no peace should be sued for but by the aggressor, wars might be endless. But the French, strictly speaking, had not begun the contest. They had formerly retracted the decree that had given so much offence, and had made it an article of their new constitution, to interfere with the government of no country. As to that permanency of peace so scru pulously required, had the world ever witnessed any peace that lasted beyond the interest or conveniency of either of the contracting parties? the duration of a peace was chiefly founded on its equitableness, and, he would add, more likely to be lasting with a republic than with a monarchy: the decision for peace or war in the former of these, rested on the judgment and consultation of many; but in the latter was in the breast of only one individual, usually influenced by personal motives, and whom no one dared to contradict. Our proposed exertions, doubtless, would be great, to repair the disasters of the preceding campaigns: but could they possibly be greater than those that had already been made to so little effect? Our allies manifested unequivocal dispo. sitions to peace; why should we be more averse to it than they were, who certainly could not be more in. terested in procuring peace than ourselves? The situation of the French republic was in no wise to

be

be considered as less formidable than at its primary formation. The suc cesses of France had been stupen. dous, and the people were animated with the conviction, that they were fighting for their existence, and that no medium remained for them, but to conquer their enemies, or become their slaves. While this idea, which was a just one, was uppermost in their minds, they would sacrifice their property with. out reluctance to preserve them selves from so great an evil as that of becoming a conquered nation. This war, he noticed, had been dignified by its abertors, as waged in the cause of God, and humanity: but was it promoting the honour of the divine Being, or the welfare of the human race, to sacrifice hun. dreds of thousands of men in the field of battle, and to involve whole countries in misery and desolation? The unbiassed and unprejudiced agreed, that the condition of the g nerality of people in France, espe. cially the inferior classes, who con. stituted every where the bulk of so. ciety, was preferable to what it had been under the former monarchy. What, therefore, could be our pre. tence for insisting on the propriety of a change of government in that country? Whatever had been as. serted about the vast proportion of royalists, and their resolution never to submit to the republicans, facts had proved that they could not avoid submission, and that they were con. stantly not only overcome, but out. numbered wherever they ventured to rise against the government. Their resistance now was no other than of banditti, associated for the purposes of plunder. Was it on such inen, without order or dis eipline, that we could depend for

ege.

anyregular and substantial assistance? Peace therefore was the most judi. cious, as well as the safest measure we could embrace: France, it was experimentally found, was not to be subdued by force of arms. Neither did it appear that we should be able to weary out the French by dint of superior finances: the depreciation of their assignats had not operated as we had long expected and predicted. Such as they were, they still upheld the fabric for the support of which they had been created, and had proved more serviceable than our hatred and prejudices would permit us to acknowledge. Our own finances had undeniably suffered through this war, and it would be wise to termi. nate it before we made a much longer trial how far the resources of this country might be stretched, without bringing it to ruin.

The duke was answered by lord Grenville, who re-adduced those numerous arguments, so often al. leged against treating with France in its present situation. He assert. ed, that it appeared to him that a majority of the French were in clined to the royal cause. A Frenchman, of sense and erudi. tion, had lately published a performance, wherein he expressed a doubt which of the two parties was the most numerous in France,. the royalists or the republicans. But so great was the alarm of the French government, lest the royal party should be proved the most numerous, that the work was suppressed, and the author threatened to be brought before the revolutionary tribunal. A proof of the instability of that system of moderation, said to prevail at pre. sent, was the difficulty which that party experienced in bringing ta

justice,

justice, Lebon, one of the most wicked and execrated associates of Roberspierre. Other instances might be mentioned to prove that tyranny and terror were far from being laid aside, and that the vio. lence and audacity of those who opposed the ruling party, were supported by such numbers, that its duration was daily becoming extremely precarious. In such a state of uncertainty, no confidence could be placed in the faith of negotiations, framed with either of the parties. No peace, therefore, was desirable in the present cir. cumstances of affairs, and he would, for that reason, move a vigorous prosecution of the war, as the most effectual means of arriving at a solid and secure peace.

This motion was opposed by the duke of Norfolk, and support ed as earnestly by the earl of Darnley. The bishop of Landaff took this occasion to make an animated discourse on the subject of the war. Though Scripture, he observed, did not condemn, in express terms the practice of war among nations, yet few were the occasions when it could be law. ful. Justice and necessity were indispensable to authorize the use of the sword but what might be just, was not therefore necessary: no war could conscientiously be undertaken, without previously employing all the possible means to avoid it. He would not assert, whether we had or not exerted our utmost endea. vours to avert it; but he would declare himself of opinion, that the close of the campaign of 1792 had offered a fair opportunity to prevent the calamities that followed. After the attempts of

Austria and Prussia had been frustrated, Great Britain might, with great propriety, have interfered, so far, as to have insisted that France should have used her successes with moderation; and, con. formably to her constitutional principles, have confined herself with. in her ancient limits. But this interference should also have been accompanied with a solemn engagement, on our part, to have abstained from obtrusion in their domestic affairs, and to have left the settlement of them entirely to themselves. It was absurd to consider the war as indispensable, to stop the propagation of repub. lican principles. Armies and coercion were feeble instruments against opinions that were acceptable to mankind, and lenity alone could render royalty desirable. In this country especially, while the crown remained within the limitations assigned by the constitution, a king had nothing to apprehend. The disaffected among us were few, and could easily be contained within hounds by the existing laws. The title of republic might be assumed in France, without causing any alarm in England. The history of those nations that had adopted repub. licanism had nothing fascinating nor enviable; and neither the constitutions of France nor of Ame. rica, however founded on the popular maxims of universal rights and equality, could be proposed as objects of imitation, till the experience of many years had shewn they were deserving of it: this experience was conspicuously on the side of the British constitution; and the people of this country were so well convinced of it, that

there