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8 7808. When Statute Relating to Service of Ordinary Process Governs. - It has been held in Georgia, in the ab

sence of any statute directing a special method of service in such actions, that the only manner in which garnishment can be served upon a corporation is by personal service upon its president, or other officer fulfilling the duties of president for the time being, as at common law; and that service upon an agent under a statute authorizing a summons so to be served is valid.' But this decision seems to have proceeded upon an unsound view, and it was better held in Maryland that the word "process” used in a statute relating to ordinary actions against corporations, which authorized service upon the president or any director or manager or other officer, was sufficiently comprehensive to embrace a notice of garnishment; so that a service of such notice on two officers and directors was sufficient.?

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8 7809. Officer to Make Disclosure not Necessarily Officer to Receive Service. — Upon this subject it should be kept in

mind that, upon principle, it is not necessary that the officer or agent of the corporation upon whom the notice of garnishment is served, should sustain such a relation to the corporation that the disclosures made by him, in case he should undertake to answer for it, would bind it. As we shall presently

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pearance; but proof that Lewis Owen by it, though it was not communiwas the president of the company at cated, - since the statute authorized the time of the service must have service on any director.” Ibid. been made to the court, and the fact Where the statute relating to the sermust appear in the judgment. Mont- vice of ordinary process upon corporagomery &c. R. Co. v. Hartwell, 43 tions prescribed that service must be Ala. 508.

had on the president or other head of · Clark 0. Chapman, 45 Ga. 486. the corporation, or on the secretary, See also Hebel v. Amazon Ins. Co., 33 treasurer, or other managing agent Mich. 400.

thereof, and there was no special pro* Boyd v. Chesapeake &c. Canal Co., vision relating to the service of notice 17 Md. 195; 8. c. 79 Am. Dec. 646. It of garnishment, such a notice could was further held that, where the no- not be served upon the paying-teller tice was given to one of the directors of a banking corporation so as to bind in his official capacity, to the end that the corporation. Kennedy v. Hiberit might be communicated by him to nia &c. Society, 38 Cal. 161. the board, the corporation was bound

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see, the question what agent is entitled to bind the corporation by his disclosures made in the garnishment proceeding, is quite a different question from the question what agent sustains such a relation to the corporation that notice to him will, in theory of law, affect the corporation with knowledge. If there is no special provision of statute on the subject, then a service of the garnishment upon any officer or agent who sustains such a relation to the corporation that a service upon him of a summons, in an ordinary action in personam, would give the court jurisdiction to proceed to judgment, will give the court jurisdiction to proceed against the corporation, and to compel a disclosure as garnishee, or to render a judgment by default or confession in the absence of a disclosure. This will be more apparent when it is considered that, although, as against the principal debtor, who may be a non-resident, the action is merely a proceeding in rem, having for its object to compel bis appearance by impounding his property, and to satisfy the debt which he owes the plaintiff out of that property, - yet, in so far as it is a proceeding against the person or corporation holding that property for the principal debtor, it is in the nature of an action in personam.

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§ 7810. Authority of Officer or Agent to Make Disclosure. If the statute prescribes what officer or agent of the corporation must make the disclosure, it is conceived that it must be followed; and, outside of any statutory provision, it is obvious that the corporation cannot be bound by the act of every agent who may volunteer to make the disclosure in its behalf. On the other hand, it seems equally clear on principle, that if the corporation is duly served with garnishment so as to be affected with notice under the principles relating to service of process upon corporations, then it is bound to appear in the person of some officer capable of making the disclosure for it;' and

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• Karp v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 76 Mich. 679; 8. C. 43 N. W. Rep. 680.

ou A failure to answer by some officer or agent who can answer knowingly, would authorize a judgment for


when it does appear by one of its officers, the natural presumption would be that such officer was authorized by it to make the disclosure. In the absence of any statute specially controlling the question, the obvious legal rule would be that whatever officer or agent of the corporation sustains such a relation to it as to possess authority to bind it by his declarations or admissions in respect of the subject-matter of the garnishment, would be its officer or agent to make the disclosure; and this question has already been considered.' And here another distinction must be taken, and that is between ihe power of an officer or agent of a corporation to bind it by his admissions in the form of a pleading, and his power to make admissions as a witness which will be competent evidence against it, subject to explanation or rebuttal. The power to testify to the fact that the corporation owes a debt, and the power to appear as the representative of the corporation and confess that it owes a debt, for the purpose of the rendition of a judgment against it, which shall be a complete estoppel against it, are essentially different, and the latter must rest upon some clear principle of agency. There must have been an authori. zation in some form, clearly expressed or fairly implied. As

e seq.

want of an answer, subject to be made that two of the judges concurred on final, as in other cases." Stone, C. J., another ground, and that one of them in Ex parte Cincinnati &c. R. Co., 78 dissented. Ibid. Two judges, Eustis, Ala. 258, 260.

C. J., and Rost, J., were of the opin· Ante, 98 4656, 4777, et seq., 4912, ion that the power of answering in

terrogatories on oath cannot be con• It has been held that an author- ferred upon one person by another, ity to an agent “to appear before all Ibid. But this is a clear aberration. judges and justices of the peace, in The power of answering interrogany court or courts, there to do, say, atories can be conferred by one perpursue, implead, arrest, attach, and on another, and whether the prosecute, as occasion shall be or re- answer shall be on oath or without quire,” — does not authorize the agent oath, is a question which is modal in to make a conclusive acknowledgment its character, relating merely to the of a notice by the corporation in an course of procedure in the particular answer in his behalf as garnishee. forum. Power can be conferred by Dickson v. Morgan, 7 La. An. 490. one person upon another to bind the This holding can be regarded as hardly former by his admissions, and everymore than the opinion of a single thing else relates merely to the judge; for it is weakened by the fact mode of making the admissions. It

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already stated,' it does not at all follow, as a principle of statutory construction, that the answer is to be made by the officer designated by statute to receive service of summons. Therefore, where the statute designates the officer on whom the notice is to be served, it will be sufficient if the affidavit in answer is made by some other appropriate officer. Thus, where the writ was served on the treasurer of a corporation, and the affidavit making this disclosure was made by its assistant treasurer, this was sufficient."

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$ 7811. Process Directed to Corporation and not to Agent. We have already seen that, according to the theory of some courts, denied by others, if the corporation is the principal debtor, its officer or agent holding its funds may be summoned as garnishee by process directed against him in his own


has been held that where a prin- cipal officer of such corporation," and
cipal places money in the hands that it should "be the duty of the
of his agent to pay a debt due officer so served, or of the proper offi.
from him to another person, and cer of such corporation having knowl-
such person, at the time, has no edge of the facts, to appear before the
knowledge of the direction and acts justice at the return day,” etc.,
of the principal, and the agent, while was held that the assistant treasurer of
on his way to make the payment, is a railroad company was its proper offi-
duly garnished at the instance of cer, for the purpose of making a dis-
certain judgment creditors of his prin- closure in a proceeding in which it
cipal, — the money is to be applied, in had been summoned as garnishee.
the proceeding by garnishment, to Whitworth v. Pelton, 81 Mich. 98;
satisfy the claims of the judgment 8. C. 45 N. W. Rep. 500. The general
creditors; and after the garnishment, agent of a foreign corporation doing
the money being in custodia legis, the business in Michigan, who is author-
agent is not liable for it to the person ized to receive service of process in its
to wbom he was directed by his prin- behalf, has authority, under the gov-
cipal to pay it over. Center v. Mc- erning statute, when he has been
Questen, 18 Kan. 476.

served with garnishee process against Ante, $ 7809.

his company, to make an answer or * Duke v. Rhode Island Locomo- disclosure in its behalf, and the cortive Works, 11 R. I. 599. Where the poration is not to be considered in statute provided that the summons

default for want of an answer after a in the garnishment proceeding might disclosure filed by such agent. Lorbe served on the president, cashier, man v. Phønix Ins. Co., 33 Mich. 65. secretary, treasurer, general or special Compare Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. agent, superintendent, or other prin- Hunt, 39 Mich. 469.


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name; but where the corporation is not the principal debtor, but the object of the process is to attach in its hands money which it owes to the principal debtor, then the process must run against it, and not against its agent holding its funds."

7812. Garnishment of Receivers of Corporations. "Receivers are officers of the court, and consequently money in their hands is in custodia legis, under precisely the same circumstances, and subject to the same conditions, as it would be so held when in possession of the clerk of a court." The money or property in his hands, provided it is such as might rightfully come into his hands, is therefore held by him as the mere officer or hand of the court which has appointed him, for the purpose of administration under the control and direction of the court, and is not subject to garnishment by creditors of the corporation whose property it is. Some close questions have arisen with respect of the time when this immunity from attachment arises, and also in respect of the time when it ceases to operate. We find holdings to the effect that the mere appointment and qualification of the receiver does not prevent a seizure under attachment of the property of the principal debtor until the receiver has reduced the

1 Ante, § 7805.

Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v. Seeligson, 59 Tex. 3; Insurance Co. v. Friedman, 74 Tex. 56; s. c. 11 S. W. Rep. 1046. Thus, although a foreign corporation, doing business within the domestic State, was subject to garnishment (Selma &c. R. Co. v. Tyson, 48 Ga. 351; Insurance Co. v. Friedman, 74 Tex. 56; s. c. 11 S. W. Rep. 1046), yet it was necessary that the process should be directed against the corporation itself, and it was not sufficient merely to summon its local agent representing it within the domestic State, and having the custody of some of its funds there. A garnishment directed against the agent personally would not bind the funds of the corporation unless he had such

funds in his hands at the time of the answer; and if, after money was sent by the corporation to such agent, a second garnishment was served upon him, it was the latter service which fixed the lien of the attaching creditor. Daniels v. Meinhard, 53 Ga. 359.

2 Wade Attach., § 424; citing Field v. Jones, 11 Ga. 413; Bentley v. Shrieve, 4 Md. Ch. 412; Hagedon v. Bank of Wisconsin, 1 Pinn. (Wis.) 61; 8. c. 39 Am. Dec. 275; Nelson v. Conner, 6 Rob. (La.) 339.

Ante, § 6931; 2 Wade Attach., 424; citing Taylor v. Gillean, 23 Tex. 508; Farmers' Bank v. Beaston, 7 Gill & J. (Md.) 421; s. c. 28 Am. Dec. 226.

• Ante, §§ 6919, 6920.

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