as the decision in one individual case would be no bar to any other, there would be no end to litigation and strife.1 The doctrine is analogous to that relating to bills in equity by private persons for injunctions against public nuisances, the rule being that such actions cannot be maintained unless the complainant shows a particular injury to himself distinct from that which he suffers in common with the rest of the public. When, therefore, the slack-water navigation of the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company maintained, by means of pumps, locks, and other devices, was destroyed by a flood, it was held that a bill in equity could not be maintained by another corporation, to enjoin the former corporation from neglecting to repair and put in operation their navigation; and that the complainants had no right to a decree compensating them for any damages suffered as an incident to the non-repairing. 1 Buck Mountain Coal Co. v. Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co., 50 Pa. St. 91, 99; s. c. 88 Am. Dec. 534. Bigelow v. Hartford Bridge Co., 14 Conn. 565; s. c. 36 Am. Dec. 502. Buck Mountain Coal Co. v. Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co., 50 Pa. St. 91, 99; s. c. 88 Am. Dec. 534. On analogous grounds, a mandamus was denied by Lord Ellenborough, in the Court of King's Bench, to a brewery company, to assess damages against a dock company for polluting the waters of a public navigable river, from which the brewery company had been accustomed to draw water by pumps, wherewith to brew their beer. Lord Ellenborough was of opinion that a private proprietor cannot have such a right in the waters of a public navigable river as would give him a right to compensation for the deterioration of the same by a company proceeding under an act of Parliament. The injury, if any, was to all the king's subjects, and that was the subject-matter of indictment, and not of action. Otherwise, every person who had before used the water of the river might equally claim compensation, for which there was no pretense. And by the same rule, if the salubrity of the air in Bristol were impaired in consequence of the docks, every inhabitant of the place might as well claim compensation. For general injuries, common to all the subjects, the remedy is by indictment; and suppose that is taken away by the act (which was admitted), then the act has taken away the only remedy which the law would have given for this general injury. Rex v. Bristol Dock Co., 12 East, 429, 432. Analogous decisions denying private right of action for the redress of injuries common to the whole public-many of them so unjust that their doctrines have been measurably discarded in modern times, - are: Rose v. Miles, 4 Maule & S. 101; Ivison v. Moor, 1 Lord Raym. 486; Earle's Case, Carth. 173; Wilkes v. Hungerford Market Co., 2 Bing. N. C. 281; Greasly v. Codling, 2 Bing. 263. § 7782. Injunctions against Strikes, Boycots, and Other Combinations among Workmen. Within the last few years the powers of courts of equity have been called into play to an extent hitherto unprecedented, at the suits of employers of labor, individual and corporate, to restrain strikes, boycots, and other combinations and conspiracies among their employés, injurious to the property and business of the complainants. The use of the injunction in such cases is vindicated upon the ground that equity exercises this species of jurisdiction for the protection of property and business against irreparable injury, threatened by persons who are insolvent, and who, by reason of their numbers, cannot be impleaded in proceedings at law, without a multiplicity of actions. An extended discussion of this subject cannot be regarded as germane to a work on corporations; but, briefly stated, it may be said that injunctions have been granted to restrain striking employés from intimidating other employés, so as to induce them to quit their employment, or to prevent persons from engaging in the employment of the plaintiffs;2 to restrain 1 Cœur d'Alene Consolidated Mining Co. v. Miners' Union of Wardner, 51 Fed. Rep. 260; s. c. 19 L. R. A. 382; Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union, 45 Fed. Rep. 135; 8. c. 12 L. R. A. 193 (where there is an extensive note on the subject); State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46; s. c. 3 Am. St. Rep. 23; Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212; 8. C. 9 Am. St. Rep. 689; Murdock v. Walker, 152 Pa. St. 595; 8. c. 34 Am. St. Rep. 678; Barr v. Essex Trades' Council (N. J. Eq.), 30 Atl. Rep. 881; Continental Ins. Co. v. Board of Underwriters, 67 Fed. Rep. 310; Longshore Printing &c. Co. v. Howell, 26 Or. 527; s. c. 38 Pac. Rep. 547 (where the injunction was refused on the ground that the injury did not appear to be irreparable); Wick China Co. v. Brown, 164 Pa. St. 449; 8. c. 35 W. N. C. 330; 25 Pitts. L. J. (N. s.) 151; 30 Atl. Rep. 261; Reynolds v. Everett, 144 N. Y. 189; s. c. 63 N. Y. St. Rep. 89; 39 N. E. Rep. 72 (where a permanent injunction was refused because the strike had ceased, and the injury did not appear to be irreparable); Farmers' Loan &c. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 803; Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 310 (appeal in the preceding case); California R. Co. v. Rutherford, 62 Fed. Rep. 796; United States v. Elliott, 64 Fed. Rep. 27; United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. Rep. 724; Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564. See also Davis v. Foreman [1894], 3 Ch. 654 (where an injunction was refused to restrain an employé from quitting his employment). 2 Coeur d'Alene &c. Min. Co. v. Miners' Union, 51 Fed. Rep. 260; s. c. 19 L. R. A. 382; Wick China Co. v. Brown, 164 Pa. St. 449. persons from gathering in crowds at the plaintiff's place of business and interfering with his workmen;1 to restrain the continuation of a so-called "boycot" against a newspaper;2 in courts of the United States, under the Act of Congress of July 2, 1890, to restrain striking railway employés from interrupting the operations of interstate commerce;1 to restrain railway employés, while continuing in their employment, from refusing to perform their duties, when such refusal interferes with the transmission of the mails and with the operations of commerce between the States; to restrain the employés of the receivers of a railway, appointed by a court of the United States, from entering into combinations or conspiracies for the purpose of crippling the property in the hands of the receivers, and embarrassing the operation of the rail. roads under their management, either by disabling the engines, cars, etc., or by interfering with their possession; or by actually obstructing their control and management of the property; or by using force, threats, or other wrongful methods against the receivers, their agents, or employés remaining in their service; or by using like methods to cause their employés to quit their service; or by preventing or deterring others from entering their service in the place of those leaving it; but not to enjoin them from merely quitting the service singly or in a body, for the purpose of securing better wages or better terms of employment. The Federal doctrine 1 Murdock v. Walker, 152 Pa. St. 595; 8. c. 34 Am. St. Rep. 678; Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212; s. c. 9 Am. St. Rep. 689. 2 Barr v. Essex Trades' Council, (N. J. Eq.) 30 Atl. Rep. 881. 8 26 U. S. Stat. 209. United States v. Elliott, 62 Fed. Rep. 801; and 64 Fed. Rep. 27; United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. Rep. 724; 8. c. 27 Chicago Leg. News, 139. See also Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564; Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 730, 746; s. c. 19 L. R. A. 387, 395; United States v. Workmen's Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. Rep. 994; . c. 26 L. R. A. 158; Thomas v. Cincinnati &c. R. Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 803; United States v. Debs, 63 Fed. Rep. 436; Re Charge to Grand Jury, 62 Fed. Rep. 828; Re Grand Jury, 62 Fed. Rep. 834; Re Grand Jury, 62 Fed. Rep. 840; United States v. Cassidy, 67 Fed. Rep. 698. Compare United States v. Patterson, 55 Fed. Rep. 605, where this use of the injunction is disapproved by Mr. Circuit Judge Putnam. on this subject may be said to have culminated in a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, which must remain for all time the leading Federal case on this subject, in which the court unanimously affirmed the proposition that the United States may, by a bill in equity in its own courts, restrain the striking employés of railway companies from interfering with the operations of interstate commerce, and with the transportation of the United States mails, and may punish them for contempt, without trial by jury, for disobeying such restraining orders. The court proceeds upon the view that the United States has jurisdiction over every foot of soil within its territory, and that it is entitled to exert its authority directly upon each citizen, -a principle unquestionably sound and of the very greatest importance. The jurisdiction to grant an injunction in such cases is upheld. upon the settled doctrine of the English Court of Chancery, that an injunction would be granted at the suit of the Attorney-General to restrain purprestures of public highways and navigations. The opinion of the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Brewer, is a very learned and conclusive presentation of the subject, and is, throughout, clear and strong.1 § 7783. Other Decisions Illustrating the Use of Injunctions in the Case of Corporations.- Injunctions have been granted in England to restrain the prosecution of corporate work, at the suit of 8. c. sub nom. Farmers' Loan &c. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 803. 1 The leading Federal case, so far decided, relating to the extent of the power to enjoin striking employés, is Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 310; 8. c. 25 L. R. A. 414, decided by the United States Court of Appeals, in a very learned and well-considered. opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan in 1894; modifying an injunctive order previously granted by Mr. Circuit Judge Jenkins, in the same case, reported under the name of Farmers' Loan &c. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., -- 60 Fed. Rep. 803. The opinion of Mr. District Judge Philips in United States v. Elliott, 64 Fed. Rep. 27,-a case growing out of the Debs conspiracy, is likewise learned, clear, and persuasive. Some of the cases above referred to incidentally decide that the act of Congress "to legalize the incorporation of National Trades Unions" (24 U. S. Stat. 567), does not operate to restrain the exercise of the jurisdiction here spoken of: Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 310; s. c. 25 L. R. A. 414; Farmers' Loan &c. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 803. shareholders, on the ground that the corporation has not sufficient funds to complete the work, and that the undertaking is likely to prove abortive;1 to restrain breaches of trust on the part of a trustee at the suit of a private corporation;' to enjoin a disproportionate issue of shares upon a reorganization after a foreclosure; to enjoin the infringement of a patented invention, the managing officers of the corporation being joined as defendants, in order that contempt proceedings may go against them; to remove the name of the plaintiff from a register of shareholders-that is "to rectify the register"; at the suit of judgment creditors, to enjoin the corporation and its managing officers from making a fraudulent disposition of its property, or from disposing of it to prefer certain creditors, and for the appointment of a receiver- but not at the suit of a general creditor; and to enjoin a fraudulent scheme, by which the assets of a railroad company are turned over to a rival company." § 7784. Cases where Such Injunctions not Granted. — An injunction will not be granted, at the suit of a tax-payer, to enjoin a railroad company from receiving State aid without complying with the conditions under which such aid has been granted, since this is a question which can only be raised by the public authorities; nor to restrain the prosecution of an action at law against the plaintiff 1 Agar v. Regent's Canal Co., MS., cited by Lord Eldon in King's Lynn v. Pemberton, 1 Swanst. 243, 250; s. c., on another point, Coop. Cas. 77. But Lord Eldon refused to extend this principle so as to restrain a corporation from prosecuting work on its own land, upon the ground that an injury would ensue to the complainants provided they should complete the work; since this would involve the absurdity of asking the court to interfere on the ground that they had not funds to complete the work, when no injury could accrue to the complainant until the work should be completed. King's Lynn v. Pemberton, 1 Swanst. 243, 251. Kent, 1 Colo. 336. See also Georgetown v. Glaze, 3 Colo. 230. Lincoln Nat. Bank v. Portland, 82 Me. 99; s. c. 7 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 297; 19 Atl. Rep. 102. Iowa Barb Steel Wire Co. v. Southern Barbed-Wire Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 123, opinion by Thayer, J. ⚫ Routh v. Webster, 10 Beav. 561; Taylor v. Hughes, 2 Jones & Lat. 24; Shortridge v. Bosanquet, 16 Beav. 84. Compare Bullock v. Chapman, 2 De Gex & Sm. 211; ante, § 1446. • Consolidated Tank-Line Co. v. Kansas City Varnish Co., 43 Fed. Rep. 204; s. c. 8 Rail.& Corp. L. J., 457. Erie R. Co. v. Wilkesbarre Coal &c. Co., 9 Phila. (Pa.) 262; ante, § 6877. Langdon v. Branch, 37 Fed. Rep. 449. |