first count of the petition, showing the corporate existence and powers of parties to the action, they need not be repeated in subsequent counts; while in other jurisdictions the averment must be repeated in each count.2 § 7663. Declaring against a Corporation Which has Changed its Name. A change of name by a corporation does not change its character, or abrogate its contracts; and an action against a corporation by a former name cannot be defeated by showing that it has changed its name without any change of membership. Where, since the making of the contract, or the happening of the event which gives the right of action, the corporation liable to the action has changed its name, the plaintiff proceeds against it in its true name, and simply declares that the defendant by the name of-here inserting its old name-made the contract sued on, or did the act complained of; and it is not necessary to explain how its name came to be changed, because the question can only arise on a defensive pleading." 87664. Question of Corporate Existence must be Raised by Defendant. — Under all theories of pleading, whether the declaration or complaint sets out that the plaintiff is a corporation or not, the question will never be noticed unless it is distinctly raised by the defendant by some defensive pleading; and therefore the capacity of the plaintiff to sue, in the 6 1 Aull Savings Bank v. Lexington, 74 Mo. 104; West v. Eureka Imp. Co., 40 Minn. 394; 8. c. 42 N. W. Rep. 87. 1 People v. Central &c. Co., 83 Cal. 393; s. c. 23 Pac. Rep. 303. Ante, § 289. 'Welfley v. Shenandoah Iron &c. Co., 83 Va. 768; s. c. 3 S. E. Rep. 376; Dean v. La Motte Lead Co., 59 Mo. 523. • Ante, § 7597. Contrary to the text is an old case to the effect that where in an action it becomes necessary to plead an authority under a corporation, if the pleader describes the corporation by one name and recites that after a period named it was known by another name, it is incumbent upon him to show in what manner the name of the corporation became changed. Adney v. Vernon, 3 Lev. 243. Young Men's Christian Asso. v. Dubach, 82 Mo. 475. To the same effect is Bulkley v. Big Muddy Iron Co., 77 Mo. 105; Ontario State Bank v. Tibbits, 80 Cal. 68; s. c. 22 Pac. Rep. 66; Rembert v. Railway Co., 31 S. C. 309; s. c. 9 S. E. Rep. 968; South character assumed by it, is always admitted by a default.' It also follows that if it is not appropriately raised by the defendant, the existence of the plaintiff as a corporation will be presumed after verdict, whether the plaintiff's affirmative pleading states that it is a corporation or not.2 § 7665. Plea to the Merits Admits Corporate Existence. Whether the corporation is the plaintiff or the defendant in the action, if its existence is alleged in the declaration, complaint, or petition, a plea to the merits of the action operates as an admission that it is a corporation. Thus, although there are some early and overruled decisions to the contrary, if the action is brought by a plaintiff, alleging itself to be a corpora Yuba Water &c. Co. v. Rosa, 80 Cal. 333; s. c. 22 Pac. Rep. 222; Stanly v. Richmond &c. R. Co., 89 N. C. 331; Exchange Nat. Bank v. Capps, 32 Neb. 242; 8. c. 29 Am. St. Rep. 433; 49 N. W. Rep. 233; Palmetto Lumber Co. v. Risley, 25 S. C. 309; Southern &c. R. Co. v. Purcell, 77 Cal. 69; s. c. 18 Pac. Rep. 886; Imperial Refining Co. v. Wyman, 38 Fed. Rep. 574; s. c. 6 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 94; 3 L. R. A. 503; Bailey v. Valley Nat. Bank, 127 Ill. 332; s. c. 19 N. E. Rep. 695; affirming s. c. 21 Ill. App. 642; Heron v. Cole, 25 Neb. 692; National Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 8 Neb. 452; s. c. 1 2d N. W. Rep. 124; Bliss Code Pl., ed., § 408. Harris v. Muskingum Man. Co., 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 267; 8. c. 29 Am. Dec. 372; Hubbard v. Chappel, 14 Ind. 601; Heaston v. Cincinnati &c. R. Co., 16 Ind. 275; s. c. 79 Am. Dec. 430; McIntire v. Preston, 5 Gilm. (Ill.) 48; 8. c. 48 Am. Dec. 321; Phenix Bank v. Curtis, 14 Conn. 437; s. c. 36 Am. Dec. 492. 2 British American Land Co. v. Ames, 6 Met. (Mass.) 391; Girls' Industrial Home v. Fritchey, 10 Mo. App. 344, 350; Williams v. Bank, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 539. Compare Wolf v. Goddard, 9 Watts (Pa.), 544, 554. 3 Agnew v. Bank of Gettysburg, 2 Har. & G. (Md.) 478; Jackson v. Plumbe, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 378; Dutchess Cotton Man. Co. v. Davis, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 238, 245; s. c. 7 Am. Dec. 459; Wood v. Jefferson County Bank, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 194, 205; Bank of Auburn v. Weed, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 300, 303; Vernon Society v. Hills, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 23, 25; 8. c. 16 Am. Dec. 429; United States Bank v. Stearns, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 314; Bank of Utica v. Smalley, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 770, 778; s. c. 14 Am. Dec. 526; Bill v. Fourth Great Western Turnp. Co., 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 416; Fire Department v. Kip, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 266; Buncombe Turnp. Co. v. M'Carson, 1 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 306; Holloway v. Memphis &c. R. Co., 23 Tex. 465; s. c. 76 Am. Dec. 68; Lucas v. Bank, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 147; Tar River Nav. Co. v. Neal, 3 Hawks (N. C.), 520; Bank of Michigan v. Williams, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 478; 8. c. affirmed, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 539; Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. tion, a plea of the general issue at common law admits the corporate existence of the plaintiff, and its right to sue in the character which it has assumed; and the same effect is ascribed to the general denial under the codes and practice (N. Y.) 480; s. c. 24 Am. Dec. 51; Rees v. Conococheaque Bank, 5 Rand. (Va.) 326; 8. c. 16 Am. Dec. 755; Grays v. Turnpike Co., 4 Rand. (Va.) 578; Jackson v. Bank, 9 Leigh (Va.), 240; Carmichael v. Trustees, 3 How. (Miss.) 84; Taylor v. Bank, 5 Leigh (Va.), 471; Hargrave v. Bank, Breese (Ill.), 122; Jones v. Bank, Breese (Ill.), 124; Society v. Young, 2 N. H. 310; Farmers' &c. Bank v. Troy City Bank, 1 Dougl. (Mich.) 457; Lewis v. Bank of Kentucky, 12 Ohio, 132; 8. c. 40 Am. Dec. 469; Smith v. Adrian, 1 Mich. 495. The rule in England seems to be as held in these earlier American cases: 1 Kyd on Corp. 292; Norris v. Staps, Hob. 210 b; Dutch West India Co. v. Van Moses, 2 Ld. Raym. 1535. This rule is hence frequently spoken of in the American law books as the "rule of the common law." See, for example, Central Land Co. v. Calhoun, 16 W. Va. 361; and Smith v. Adrian, 1 Mich. 495; and compare Etna Ins. Co. v. Wires, 28 Vt. 93. 1 Alderman v. Finley, 10 Ark. 423; 4. c. 52 Am. Dec. 244; Yeaton v. Lynn, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 224, 231; Mississippi &c. R. Co. v. Cross, 20 Ark. 443; Phenix Bank v. Curtis, 14 Conn. 437; 8. c. 36 Am. Dec. 492; Rails back v. Liberty &c. Turnp. Co., 2 Ind. 656; Jones v. Cincinnati Type Foundry Co., 14 Ind. 89; Hardy v. Merryweather, 11 Ind. 203; Hubbard v. Chappel, 14 Ind. 601; Harrison v. Martinsville &c. R. Co., 16 Ind. 505; s. c. 79 Am. Dec. 447; Carpenter v. Mercantile Bank, 17 Ind. 253; Board of Commissioners v. Bright, 18 Ind. 93; 1 Penobscot Boom Corp. v. Lamson, 16 Me. 224; 8. c. 33 Am. Dec. 656; Savage Man. Co. v. Armstrong, 17 Me. 34; 8. c. 35 Am. Dec. 227; Putnam Free School v. Fisher, 30 Me. 523; Roxbury v. Huston, 37 Me. 42; People v. Ravenswood &c. Turnp. & Bridge Co., 20 Barb. (N. Y.) 518; Orono v. Wedgewood, 44 Me. 49; s. c. 69 Am. Dec. 81; Rheem v. Naugatuck Wheel Co., 33 Pa. St. 356; Bank of the Metropolis v. Orme, 3 Gill (Md.), 443; Monumoi Great Beach v. Rogers, 1 Mass. 159; Concord v. McIntire, 6 N. H. 527; Whittington v. Farmers' Bank, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 489; Taylor v. Bank of Illinois, 7 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 576, 584; Methodist Episcopal Church v. Wood, 5 Ohio, 283, 286; Price v. Grand Rapids &c. R. Co., 18 Ind. 137; Liberian Exodus Jointstock S. S. Co. v. Rodgers, 21 S. C. 27; Union Cement Co. v. Noble, 15 Fed. Rep. 502; Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Wetherbee, 2 Cliff. (U. S.) 555; Bank of Genesee v. Patchin Bank, 13 N. Y. 309; Lake Superior Bldg. Co. v. Thompson, 32 Mich. 293 (under a statute); Swift & Co. v. Crawford, 34 Neb. 450; 8. c. 51 N. W. Rep. 1034; Smith v. Adrian, 1 Mich. 495; Commercial Ins. &c. Co. v. Turner, 8 S. C. 107; Bailey v. Valley Nat. Bank, 127 Ill. 332; 8. c. 19 N. E. Rep. 695; Hart v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 6 W. Va. 336; McKiel v. Real Estate Bank, 4 Ark. 592; Prince v. Commercial Bank, 1 Ala. 241; s. c. 31 Am. Dec. 773. But see Carmichael v. Trustees, 3 How. (Miss.) 84; Proprietors &c. v. Horton, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 501; Wolf v. Goddard, 9 Watts (Pa.), 544; Society v. Pawlet, 1 acts, and to a special plea to the merits. It is substantially another statement of this rule to say that, in an action by a plaintiff declaring itself to be a corporation, the question of its corporate existence can only be raised by a plea in abatement, a plea of nul tiel corporation, or other pleading designed to raise that question distinctly, and that a plea to the merits of the action, in any form, admits the capacity of the plaintiff to sue in the name assumed.' 4 Pet. (U. S.) 480; School District v. Blaisdell, 6 N. H. 197; Christian Society v. Macomber, 3 Met. (Mass.) 235; Zion Church v. St. Peter's Church, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 215. 1 Rembert v. Railway Company, 31 S. C. 309; s. c. 9 S. E. Rep. 968; Palmetto Lumber Co. v. Risley, 25 S. C. 309; Imperial Refining Co. v. Wyman, 38 Fed. Rep. 574; s. c. 6 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 94; 3 L. R. A. 503; Herron v. Cole, 25 Neb. 692; 8. c. 41 N. W. Rep. 765; National Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 8 Neb. 452. ⚫ Central Land Co. v. Calhoun, 16 W. Va. 361; Bailey v. Valley Nat. Bank, 127 Ill. 332; s. c. 19 N. E. Rep. 695. Taylor. Bank, 7 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 576, 584; Putnam Free School v. Fisher, 30 Me. 523; Savage Man. Co. v. Armstrong, 17 Me. 34; 8. c. 35 Am. Dec. 227; First Parish v. Cole, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 232, 245; Monumoi Great Beach v. Rogers, 1 Mass. 159; Kennebeck Purchase v. Call, 1 Mass. 483, 484; Methodist Episcopal Church v. Wood, 5 Ohio, 283; Ministerial &c. Fund v. Kendrick, 12 Me. 381; Penobscot Boom Corp. v. Lamson, 16 Mc. 224; s. c. 33 Am. Dec. 656; Gilbert v. Nantucket Bank, 5 Mass. 97; Society v. Pawlet, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 480; Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pet. (U. S.) 386; Freeman v. Machias Water &c. Co., 38 Me. 343; Penobscot &c. R. Co. v. Dunn, 39 Me. 587; Whittington 14 v. Farmers' Bank, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 489; Stone v. Congregational Soc., Vt. 86; School Dist. v. Blaisdell, 6 N. H. 197; Concord v. McIntire, 6 N. H. 527; Bank v. Allen, 11 Vt. 302; Boston &c. Foundry v. Spooner, 5 Vt. 93; Heaston v. Cincinnati &c. R. Co., 16 Ind. 275; 8. c. 79 Am. Dec. 430; Hubbard v. Chappel, 14 Ind. 601; Oldtown &c. R. Co. v. Veazie, 39 Me. 571; Orono v. Wedgewood, 44 Me. 49; s. c. 69 Am. Dec. 81; Jones v. Cincinnati Type Foundry, 14 Ind. 89; Guaga Iron Co. v. Dawson, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 202; Dunning v. New Albany &c. R. Co., 2 Ind. 437; Railsback v. Liberty &c. Turnp. Co., 2 Ind. 656; Cicero &c. Co. v. Craighead, 28 Ind. 274; Adams Exp. Co. v. Hill, 43 Ind. 157; McIntire v. Preston, 10 Ill. 48; s. c. 48 Am. Dec. 321; Phenix Bank v. Curtis, 14 Conn. 437; s. c. 36 Am. Dec. 492; Prince v. Commercial Bank, 1 Ala. 241; s. c. 34 Am. Dec. 773; Montgomery &c. R. Co. v. Hurst, 9 Ala. 513; West Winsted &c. Asso. v. Ford, 27 Conn. 282; s. c. 71 Am. Dec. 66; Litchfield Bank v. Church, 29 Conn. 137; Board v. Bright, 18 Ind. 93; People's Sav. Bank v. Collins, 27 Conn. 142; Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Wetherbee, 2 Cliff. (U. S.) 555; s. c. 3 Fisher, 87; Bennington Iron Co. v. Rutherford, 18 N. J. L. 105; s. c. 35 Am. Dec. 528; Butterfield's Overland Dispatch Co. v. Wedeles, 1 N. Mex. 528; Kenton Furnace Railroad & Man. Co. v. McAlpin, 5 Fed. Rep. 737; Na § 7666. How Question of Corporate Existence Raised in Pleading. It has been elsewhere said, in a State practicing under a code, that the question must be raised by demurrer or answer, or it will be deemed waived;1 but as a demurrer has no larger office under the codes than a special demurrer had at common law, it is clear that it cannot be raised by demurrer, unless the declaration, complaint, or petition affirmatively shows that the party described is not a corporation. At common law, and under some of the modern codes, it is necessary, in order to raise the question, to plead in abatement that the party is not a corporation. This plea in abatement is called, in the language of common-law pleading, a plea of nul tiel corporation; and this, where that system of pleading prevails, is generally the plea by which such an issue is raised. Under some modern statutes it can only be raised by tional Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 8 Neb. 452; School District v. Bragdon, 23 N. H. 507; Reed v. Benton &c. R. Co., 4 How. (Miss.) 257 (under a statute). 'Young Men's Christian Association v. Dubach, 82 Mo. 475, 480. South Yuba Water &c. Co. v. Rosa, 80 Cal. 333; s. c. 22 Pac. Rep. 222; Exchange Nat. Bank v. Capps, 32 Neb. 242; s. c. 29 Am. St. Rep. 433; 49 N. W. Rep. 223; Crane Bros. Man. Co. v. Reed, 3 Utah, 506; Stanly v. Richmond &c. R. Co., 89 N. C. 331. Contra, in Massachusetts, prior to the Code of 1881, ch. 113: Goodwin Invalid Bedstead Co. v. Darling, 133 Mass. 358; citing Hungerford Nat. Bank v. Van Nostrand, 106 Mass.559; Mosler v. Potter, 121 Mass. 89; Hebron Church Deacons v. Smith, 121 Mass. 90, note; Williamsburg &c. Ins. Co. v. Frothingham, 122 Mass. 391. It has been held in Missouri that where the incorporation is not by public act, and where the action is not upon a contract made by the defendant with the plaintiff in the name by which it sues, so as to raise an estoppel, the fact of the incorporation of the plaintiff should be averred, and if a general denial is pleaded, should be proved. Girls' Industrial Home v. Fritchey, 10 Mo. App. 344, 349. So, as elsewhere seen (ante, § 7665) it was the early theory in several American jurisdictions, and notably in New York, that, under a general denial, the plaintiff suing as a corporation was required to prove the fact of its incorporation : Bank of Auburn v. Weed, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 300; Williams v. Bank, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 539. • Ontario State Bank v. Tibbits, 80 Cal. 68; 8. c. 22 Pac. Rep. 66; Imperial Refining Co. v. Wyman, 38 Fed. Rep. 574; s. c. 6 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 94; 3 L. R. A. 503. Bailey v. Valley Nat. Bank, 127 Ill. 332; s. c. 19 N. E. Rep. 695; affirming s. c. 21 Ill. App. 642; Stafford v. Bolton, 1 Bos. & Pul. 40, 44; Mellor v. Spateman, 1 Saund. 339, note 2; Gaines v. Bank, 12 Ark. 769; Bank of Auburn v. Aikin, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 137; Hoereth v. Franklin Mill Co., 30 Ill. 151; Gauga Iron Co. v. |