the case in which the Supreme Court of the United States first took its departure from what had been the general doctrine in the Circuit Courts, the court was careful to distinguish the question from that which might arise in case of an alien corporation, in the following language: "This case does not present the question what may be the rule in suits against an alien or a foreign corporation, which may be governed by different considerations." Soon afterwards the question was presented in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, in an action by a citizen of the United States for an infringement of a patent, against the Hamburg-American Packet Company, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Kingdom of Hanover, in the Empire of Germany, in which the service of original process was made upon the financial and business agents of the company, who did its business in the city of New York. The Circuit Court dismissed the suit, on the ground that the foreign corporation was not suable in the city of New York by service upon its financial and business agents there residing, not being an "inhabitant" of that Federal district, within the act of Congress under consideration; but that the action ought to be brought in the State of New Jersey, where its ships landed and where it loaded and unloaded its cargoes. Subsequently, a mandamus was sued out in the Supreme Court of the United States by the plaintiff, to compel the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, to take jurisdiction and proceed in the cause; and the court, in a learned opinion by Mr. Justice Gray, endeavored (but seemingly without success) to make it clear that a distinction exists, in regard of this question of jurisdiction, between the case of an alien corporation and the case of a corporation created under the laws of another State of the Union from that in which it is sued. 157 U. 8. 201, where the question related to the right to remove & cause from a State court to a Federal court. 1 Shaw v. Quincy Min. Co., 145 U. S. 444, 453, opinion by Mr. Justice Gray. Hohorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 273. 373 5953 The court accordingly held that service of process, in case of a foreign corporation, is well had upon its financial agents through whom it transacts its business in the United States; and it accordingly awarded a mandamus to compel the Circuit Court to take jurisdiction.' 5954 1 Re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653. CHAPTER CLXXIX. JURISDICTION AS DEPENDING UPON PROCESS AND ITS SERVICE. ART. I. WHAT PROCESS USED IN ACTIONS AGAINST CORPORATIONS. 88 7495-7498. II. SERVICE OF PROCESS ON CORPORATIONS GENERALLY. 88 7502-7547. SUBDIV. I. Upon Whom Service Made. §§ 7502–7530. SUBDIV. II. Place and Manner of Service and Return. §§ 7538– 7547. ARTICLE I. WHAT PROCESS USED IN ACTIONS AGAINST COR SECTION 7495. Writ of summons. 7496. Subpoena in equity. PORATIONS. SECTION 7497. Capias: warrant of arrest. 7498. Distringas and sequestration. § 7495. Writ of Summons.- In actions in personam against corporations, the defendant is now brought into court in the same manner as is a natural person when so sued, and the usual process is a writ of summons. The writ will command the sheriff to summon the corporation, and not its president or other officer. If it commands him to summon "the president" of a certain named company, and the president is served, it is a service upon him individually, the superadded words designating the company being mere descriptio persona; and it is not admissible to strike out the words "the president of," and make it a service of process against the corporation without authority or consent. But it is not necessary to describe the defendant as a corporation. For instance, - 'The original writ in assumpsit Mechanics' Bank, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) against a corporation must be in 127. the nature of a summons, and not Plemmons v. Southern Imp. Co., by pone or attachment. Lynch v. 108 N. C. 614; s. c. 13 S. E. Rep. 188. it has been held sufficient to describe the defendant as "The Burlington and Lamoille Railroad Company, a company organized under the laws of this State." In such a case it will be presumed that defendant is a corporation.' Pending a motion to quash the writ of summons for an irregularity in an action against a foreign corporation, it is proper to allow the plaintiff to amend by making the writ sufficiently formal.3 § 7496. Subpoena in Equity. If the suit is in equity, the original process is a subpoena, except in those jurisdictions where legal and equitable remedies are blended by statute, in which case the same process is issued both in actions at law and in equity, as in the case of a summons at law. A subpœna in equity will be directed to the corporation, and not to the particular officer upon whom it is to be served. A subpœna directed to "John B. Norris, President of the Branch of the Bank of the State of Alabama at Mobile," to answer a bill of complaint exhibited against him and others, is not process against the bank in question. - § 7497. Capias: Warrant of Arrest. A capias was never issued against corporations, for the reason that a corporation, being an intangible person, could not be arrested and imprisoned. Warrants for the arrest of persons are, however, issued in aid of actions against corporations. Thus, in New York, 1 Nye v. Burlington &c. R. Co., 60 Vt. 585; s. c. 11 Atl. Rep. 689. Jarbee v. Steamboat, 19 Mo. 141; Stone v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 78 Mo. 655. The principle was thus stated in an earlier case: "If a variance between the declaration and writ can be taken advantage of at all, it is not seen on what principle a party can avail himself of it by a motion to quash. According to our practice, the declaration is filed before the writ issues, and the declaration being the foundation of the writ, and accompanying it, the party would look to it in order to ascertain the nature of the At demand against him, and by whom it on an application by a receiver of a dissolved corporation for a warrant of arrest against a person for concealing and embezzling corporate property, there must be an affidavit furnishing competent proof that there is good reason to believe that property of the corporation has been concealed and embezzled by such corporation; and under a statute1 notice of the application for the warrant must be served on the Attorney-General.2 § 7498. Distringas and Sequestration. - Originally, the manner of coercing the members of a corporation, in an action against it, was by distraint of its goods and chattels, and for this purpose a writ of distraint was issued. This writ was also issued in aid of an execution against the corporation. |