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constitution of a State declares that no person shall be sued elsewhere than in the county in which he resides, an act of the legislature declaring that railroad companies may be sued for injuries done by them to stock, etc., in the counties in which the injuries may have been committed, is not unconstitutional, since the company may be deemed to reside in those counties.

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§ 7425. Further of This Theory. — Under this principle, for the purpose of determining the time within which a rail. road company may appeal from a judgment rendered against it by a justice of the peace, in a county other than where its principal office is situated, but within which its road lies, it is to be deemed a resident, and not a non-resident of the county, within the meaning of the statute regulating the appeal.? Another court has laid down, theoretically, at least, a still broader doctrine, to the effect that a private corporation has no commorancy or residence at any place within the State creating it, but that for the purposes of jurisdiction it resides throughout the limits of the State. Such corporations were not, therefore, in Massachusetts, within the provisions of a general statute prescribing what actions must be brought in the county where one of the parties lives, but they might bring an action in whatever county they chose.'

" Davis 0. Central Railroad &c. Co., 17 Ga. 323. The court reasoned that the meaning of the constitutional provision was that all civil cases were to be tried in the county in which the defendant resided, such county being ascertained by the law of residence which may happen to be in existence at the time when the case arises, or, perhaps, when it should be tried. Ibid., p. 335. There is a note on the residence and citizenship of corporations in 35 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. 507.

* Slavens v. South Pac. R. Co., 51 Mo. 308; Crutsinger 9. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 82 Mo. 64.

8 Taunton &c. Turnp. Corp. o. Witing, 9 Mass. 321. Under a statute of the same State, providing that actions may be brought by or against a corporation “in any county in which such corporation has an established or usual place of business" (Gen. Stats. Mass. 1860, ch. 123, 85, subsec. 3), it is held that a toll-house of a turnpike company, at which tolls are collected and tickets sold by an agent of the corporation, and where workmen employed by the corporation are sometimes paid by the treasurer, is “an established or usual place of business” which the corporation “has” within the county. The

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8 7426. Suable in Any County in the State. The rule as to venue deducible from the foregoing section is that a corporation, whether foreign or domestic, having a general residence in the State for the purposes of jurisdiction, is deemed to reside throughout the entire limits of the State,' and especially in those counties where it carries on its business and exercises its franchises, and is hence suable in any county where it has an agent upon whom process against it may lawfully be served. It should be carefully kept in mind, however, that this rule is not so much a theory of the courts as to the legal situs of a corporation for the purposes of jurisdiction, as it is a rule in particular States, founded on the express language of statutes; and that, in so far as the States have the same rule, it is rather a rule depending upon a concurrence of legislation, than upon a concurrence of judicial decisions.' The word "non-resident" in this statute includes corporations, according to a principle of interpretation elsewhere referred to. The point upon which these statutes more frequently concur is that a transitory action may be brought against a railroad company in any county through which it operates its road, provided it has an agent in that county upon whom process may lawfully be served, and this, irrespective of the question of the place where the cause of action accrued, or the injury was done.'

statute," say the court, “is not in. tended to promote the convenience of the company only, but also of persons having claims against it. And we can have no doubt that wherever a plaintiff can find the corporation regularly carrying on any part of its business, there he may bring his suit against it.” Rhodes v. Salem Turnp. &c. Co., 98 Mass. 95, 97. And so, it was early held in South Carolina that a corporation may be made a party to a suit, by service of a writ on its president, in any district where the plaintiff resides, or the cause of action accrues, and that its appearance may be enforced when necessary, by a distringas on its property in such district. Glaize v. South Carolina R. Co., 1 Strobh. L. (S. C.) 70. See Cromwell v. Charleston Ins. &c. Co., 2 Rich. (S. C.) 512.

Yadkin Nav, Co. 0. Benton, 1 Hawks (N. C.), 422; Morehead v. Atlantic &c. R. Co., 7 Jones L. (N. C.) 500; New Albany &c. R. Co. v. Haskell, 11 Ind. 301; Cincinnati &c. R. Co. o. Knowlton, 11 Ind. 339; Davis o. Central R. &c. Co., 17 Ga. 326; East Tennessee &c. R. Co. v. Atlanta &c. R. Co., 49 Fed. Rep. 608; Bonner v. Hearne, 75 Tex. 242; 8. C. 12 S. W. Rep. 38; 6 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 262; Stone v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 78 Mo. 658, per Hough, J. (construing Rev. Stats. Mo. 1879, 9 3481); Estill v. New

York &c. R. Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 849, 853 (construing the same statute, and following the preceding case). The statute reads, “when all the defendants are non-residents of the State, suit may be brought in any county."

· Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549; 8. c. 10 S. E. Rep. 435; Home Protection v. Richards, 74 Ala. 466; Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Pruett, 74 Ala. 487; Bristol v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 15 Ill. 436; Baldwin v. Mississippi &c. R. Co., 5 Iowa, 518; Richardson v. Burlington &c. R. Co., 8 Iowa, 260; Sherwood v. Saratoga &c. R. Co., 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 650; Belden v. New York &c. R. Co., 15 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 17; Slavens v. South Pac. R. Co., 51 Mo. 308; Houston &c. R. Co. v. Ford, 53 Tex. 364; Humphreys v. Newport News &c. Co., 33 W. Va. 135; 8. c. 10 S. E. Rep. 39; Galveston &c. R. Co. 0. Horne, 69 Tex. 643; 8. c. 9 S. W. Rep. 440; Evansville &c. R. Co. v. Spellbring, 1 Ind. App. 167; 8. c. 27 N. E. Rep. 239; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Saucier (Miss.), 1 South. Rep. 511; St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Traweek, 85 Tex. 65; 8. C. 19 S. W. Rep. 370 (under Rev. Stats. Tex., art. 1198, subsec. 21); New Albany &c. R. Co. v. Haskell, 11 Ind. 301.

• Humphreys v. Newport News &c. Co., 33 W. Va. 135; 8. c. 10 8. E. Rep. 39; New Albany &c. R. Co. v. Haskell, 11 Ind. 301; Cincinnati &c. R.

Oo. v. Knowlton, 11 Ind. 339; More- dictional purposes, is suable in any head v. Atlantic &c. R. Co., 7 Jones county of the State. Estill v. New L. (N. O.) 500.

York &c. R. Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 849; * For instance, the code of Indiana 3. C. 8 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 86. enacts that “any action against any

• Galveston &c. R. Co. v. Horne, 69 corporation may be brought in any Tex. 643; 8. c. 9 8. W. Rep. 440 (under county where the corporation has an Rev. Stats. Tex., art. 1198, § 21); Bonoffice, for the transaction of business, ner v. Hearne, 75 Tex. 242; 8. c. 6 Rail. or any person resides, upon whom & Corp. L. J. 262; 12 S. W. Rep. 38 process may be served, unless other- (holding that, under the same statute wise provided in this act” (2 Rev. and under the Texas Act of April 21, Stats. Ind., p. 222, 8 796); under which 1887, relating to receivers, an action statute a railroad corporation is a res- may be brought against a railroad ident for jurisdictional purposes in company for the appointment of a reevery county in which it has an office ceiver in any county where it is otheror agency and an officer or agent upon wise suable); Bristol v. Chicago &c. whom process may be served. New R. Co., 15 Ill. 436; Baldwin v. MissisAlbany &c. R. Co. v. Haskell, 11 Ind. sippi &c. R. Co., 5 Iowa, 518; Rich301; Cincinnati &c. R. Co. v. Knowl- ardson •. Burlington &c. R. Co., 8 ton, 11 Ind. 339. So, a statute of Iowa, 260; Sherwood v. Saratoga &c. Missouri enacts that “when all the R. Co., 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 650; Slavens defendants are non-residents of the V. South Pac. R. Co., 51 Mo. 308; State, suit may be brought in any Houston &c. R. Oo. v. Ford, 53 Tex. county." Rev. Stats. Mo. 1879, $3481, 364; Evansville &c. R. Co. v. Spellcl. 4.

bring, 1 Ind. App. 167; 8. C. 27 N. E. • Post, 6 8060; and hence a foreign Rep. 229; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. corporation doing business in Missouri, Saucier (Miss.), 1 South. Rep. 511; and having a residence there for juris- Belden v. New York &c. R. Co., 15

8 7427. Venue the Same as in the Case of Natural PerBons. — In the absence of special statutory provisions relating to the venue of civil actions by and against corporations, it is a sound conclusion that the same rules prevail which have been established by general statutes, - in other words, that the same rules prevail in the case of corporations as in the case of natural persons. It has been so held in respect of actions by corporations.' So, a constitutional provision requiring all civil cases to be tried in the county in which the defendant resides, is held to apply to corporations as well as to natural persons.

$7428. In the County where the Contract was Broken or the Injury Occurred. - Another rule, founded entirely, it may be assumed, on constitutional and statutory provisions, is to the effect that, a corporation being a resident of the State for jurisdictional purposes, an action against it may be brought in the county where the injury, which is the special matter of the action, was done, or where the contract, which is the subject of the action, was broken; or (at the pleasure of the plaintiff) in the county where the chief office or place of business


How. Pr. (N. Y.) 17 (holding that a arose out of the State, if process can railroad company is not a non-resi- be legally served in such county. dent of any county through which its Humphreys ». Newport News &c. road passes, in such a sense as author- Co., 83 W. Va. 135; 8. C. 10 S. E. izes an action against it by a short Rep. 39. A railroad company is a summons, but that, being a resident, "private corporation," within the it must be sued by a long summons). meaning of a statute (Rev. Stats. So, a railroad company, having an Tex., art. 1198, subsec, 21) providing office in New York City, where it sold that suits against any private corpotickets and checked baggage, was ration may be commenced in any suable there by long summons: Jay v. county where the cause of action Long Island R, Co., 2 Daly (N. Y.), arose, or in which such corporation 401. Under statutes of West Vir- has an agency or representative, etc. ginia, & foreign corporation doing St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Traweek, 84 business in that State, having no Tex, 65; 8. c. 19 8. W. Rep. 370. principal officer or president, or other 1 Holbrook v. Peoria Bridge Co., 3 chief officer resident therein, may be Ill. 32. sued in any county wherein it does • Central Bank of Georgia v. Gibbusiness, where the cause of action

son, 11 Ga. 453.

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of the corporation is situated. Thus, under the constitution of California, "a corporation or association may be sued in the county where the contract is made or is to be performed, or where the obligation or liability arises, or the breach occurs; or in the county where the principal place of business of such corporation is situated, subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial as in other cases.” 1


· Cal. State Const. 1879, art. 12, negligence in the county where the $16. This provision is regarded as liability arose, although not formally permissive, and not mandatory. It incorporated. Kendrick v. Diamond does not prevent the bringing of suits Creek Consolidated Gold Min. Co., in other counties, at the option of the 94 Cal. 137; 8. c. 29 Pac. Rep. 324. plaintiff, and the right to change the Where the action was brought against venue, where this is done, is not ab- & corporation upon a contract made solute. It does not, for instance, pro- in the county of San Francisco, to hibit the prosecution of an action be performed outside the State, and against a national bank in San Joaquin where the alleged breach of contract County, upon a contract which was to occurred outside the State, and the be performed in Fresno County, where action was brought in the county of the contract did not name the county Los Angeles, the defendant was entiwherein payment was to be made by tled to a change of venue to the county the bank. Fresno Nat. Bank v. Su- of San Francisco, because the action perior Court, 83 Cal. 491; 8. c. 24 Pac. was not brought in the proper venue Rep. 157. Under this provision, where in the first instance, - not having a railroad company was sued for dam- been brought where the contract was ages resulting from its wrongful refu- to be performed, or where the obligasal to carry the plaintiff's lumber to tion or liability arose, or the breach market, and there was nothing in the occurred, within the meaning of this body of the complaint to show where constitutional provision. Cohn 0. the breach of obligation occurred, it Central Pac. R. Co., 71 Cal. 488; 8. C. was held that the action was pre- 12 Pac. Rep. 498. This constitutional Bumptively brought in the proper provision has been held to apply to county, and that it devolved upon the cases of torts as well as to cases of railroad company to show that the contracts. Lewis v. South Pac. Coast breach did not occur in that county, R. Co., 66 Cal. 209; 8. C. 4 West Coast in order to entitle it to a change of Rep. 615. A foreign corporation in venue to the county where it had its California has no residence in any principal place of business. Chase v. particular county, in such a sense South Pac. Coast R. Co., 83 Cal. 468; that it can be sued alone in that 8. c. 23 Pac. Rep. 532. It is to be ob- county; but the plaintiff may select served that the above constitutional the county in which he will bring his provision reads "a corporation or an action, provided he can get service of association." It is held that an as- process there. Thomas v. Placerville sociation of persons organized for a &c. Min. Co., 65 Cal. 600; 8. C. 3 West particular purpose may be sued for Coast Rep. 777.

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