diction of the courts of both governments, to administer the statute law enacted by the legislature of either government, the courts of the States have jurisdiction of actions by and against national banks and their receivers, in all cases where such jurisdiction is not excluded by the governing act of Congress, in express terms or by necessary implication. This conclusion results from the principles touching such jurisdiction which were laid down in the Supreme Court of the United States in the following language, in its opinion by Mr. Justice Bradley: "The laws of the United States are laws in the several States, and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the State laws are. The United States is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the several States, but is a concurrent, and, within its jurisdiction, paramount sovereignty. Every citizen of a State is a subject of two distinct sovereignties, having concurrent jurisdiction in the State, concurrent as to place and persons, though distinct as to subject-matter. Legal or equitable rights, acquired under either system of laws, may be enforced in any court of either sovereignty competent to hear and determine such kind of rights, and not restrained by its constitution in the exercise of such jurisdiction. Thus, a legal or equitable right acquired under State laws may be prosecuted in the State courts, and also, if the parties reside in different States, in the Federal courts. So rights, whether legal or equitable, acquired under the laws of the United States, may be prosecuted in the United States courts, or in the State courts, competent to decide rights of the like character and class; subject, however, to this qualification, that where a right arises under a law of the United States, Congress may, if it see fit, give to the Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction." The juris

1 Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 136; citing observations of Mr. Justice Field in The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 411, 429; those of Mr. Justice Story in Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. (U. S.) 304, 334; and those of Mr. Justice Swayne in Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 236. Mr. Justice Bradley added the following judicious

observations: "This jurisdiction is sometimes exclusive by express enactment, and sometimes by implication. If an act of Congress gives a penalty to a party aggrieved, without specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason why it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some act of Congress, by a

diction of the State courts in the cases under consideration, is impliedly conferred by the statute of 1882, already considered,' limiting and restraining the jurisdiction of courts of the United States in these cases. For instance, a State court has jurisdiction of an action founded on a contract brought by a resident of the State of the forum against a national bank located in another State, provided, of course, that service of process can be procured. There is a Federal holding to the effect that a creditor of a national bank has no right of action against the receiver. Said the court: "The receiver has no control over the assets, except to pay their proceeds to the Treasurer of the United States, and would therefore not be liable to the plaintiff in any form of action." The creditor's right of

action was against the bank only.

§ 7321. No Relief against the United States in Actions against the Comptroller or Receiver. When it is consid

proper action in a State court. The fact that a State court derives its existence and functions from the State laws, is no reason why it should not afford relief; because it is subject also to the laws of the United States, and is just as much bound to recognize these as operative within the State as it is to recognize the State laws. The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for the State; and the courts of the two jurisdictions are not foreign to each other, nor to be treated by each other as such, but as courts of the same country, having jurisdiction partly different and partly concurrent. The disposition to regard the laws of the United States as emanating from a foreign jurisdiction is founded on erroneous views of the nature and relations of the State and Federal governments. It is often the cause or the consequence of an unjustifiable jealousy of the United States government, which has been the occa

sion of disastrous evils to the country." Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 137. In the particular case the court held that, under the late bankruptcy law, an assignee in bankruptcy might sue in a State court to recover assets of the bankrupt, no exclusive jurisdiction having been given to the courts of the United States.

Ante, § 7270.

Robinson v. National Bank, 58 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 306. This was an action in the Supreme Court of New York against a national bank, located in North Carolina. The action was commenced by attachment; and a valid attachment was, of course, necessary to support the jurisdiction. But it has been seen that such an attachment is prohibited by the language of the National Banking Act: ante, § 7274. 8 Chemical Nat. Bank v. Bailey, 12 Blatchf. (U, S.) 480; s. c.1 Nat. Bank Cas. 260, 262, per Wallace, J.

• Ibid.

ered that the United States, in their political character, are sovereign, and hence cannot be sued without their consent, and then only in the forum, and for the cause, and under the conditions expressed in that consent,'—it must follow that, in the winding up of an insolvent national bank, the United States cannot be drawn into the litigation in any form of proceeding without its consent, the Court of Claims being the only tribunal which is authorized to adjudicate and establish demands against the United States. It would scarcely be thought necessary to make these suggestions, if it were not for the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States found itself obliged so to hold, in a case appealed to it from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana. Certain creditors filed a bill against the receiver of a national bank, the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States, and two citizens of Louisiana, praying, among other things, that certain debts due to the United States from the bank be ascertained; that the United States be charged with certain sums, and required to account for them; and that a writ of injunction issue, restraining the Comptroller from making a dividend of the funds of the bank until the account be adjusted. The receiver and Comptroller appeared and answered the bill, and the receiver stated in his answer that "he submits, on behalf of the United States, to the decision of the court, the claims of the United States to priority of payment over the allowed claims of the creditors of said bank that are not disputed." The only substantial relief was a decree against the United States, in favor of the creditors of the bank, for the sum of over $200,000, which decree directed that no claim of the United States should have any priority in the distribution of the funds of the bank, except as to the bonds pledged to secure its circulation. On the appeal of the Comptroller and receiver, this decree was reversed. The

1 That actions do not lie against the United States, see De Groot v. United States, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 419; United States v. Eckford, 6 Wall.

265

(U.S.) 484; The Siren, 7 Wall. (U.S.) 152; The Davis, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 15; Case v. Terrell, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 199; 8. c. 1 Nat. Bank Cas. 67.

5825

court held that neither the Comptroller nor the receiver, by appearing and answering such a bill, could draw the United States into the controversy, since neither of them represented the United States for the purpose of subjecting it to the jurisdiction of the court. The receiver represented the bank, its creditors and stockholders, and did not in any sense represent the government; nor could such authority be conceded to the Comptroller of the Currency. If the government was liable and its liability was denied by its proper accounting officer, or payment refused, the Court of Claims had jurisdiction, and no other court had.1

§ 7322. What Actions Lie against the Comptroller.— An ordinary action at law, by a creditor of the bank, will not lie against the Comptroller of the Currency. It was said that if an action could be maintained against him, it would be one to enforce a proper distribution of the fund; and it was accordingly held that an action of assumpsit would not lie against him, for it was not an appropriate remedy for that purpose.

§ 7323. Effect of Receiver being Substituted as Defendant. Where an action is brought in a State court against a national bank, and a receiver of the bank is appointed by the Comptroller of the Currency, and the receiver, on his own application, is substituted as defendant, this does not estop him from questioning the jurisdiction of the State court.

87324. Payment of State Taxes.-The status of taxes assessed by the State against national banks upon the property of such banks in the hands of a receiver, will depend upon considerations adverted to in another connection. If, under the taxing laws of the State, not in conflict with the constitution or any of the statute laws of the United States, the tax had become a lien upon the specific property of the

1 Case v. Terrell, 11 Wall. (U. S.) Chemical Nat. Bank v. Bailey, 12 Blatchf. (U. S.) 480; s. c. 1 Nat. Bank Cas. 260.

199; 8. c. 1 Nat. Bank Cas. 67.

Cadle v. Tracy, 11 Blatchf. (U. S.) 101; s. c. 1 Nat. Bank Cas. 230. • Ante, § 2854, et seq.

bank, prior to its passing into the hands of the receiver, such lien will, it may be assumed, attend the property in the hands of the receiver, and the Comptroller of the Currency will be obliged to respect it in making distribution. But where, under the taxing laws of the State, a tax, not having been levied upon specific property of the bank at the time when it passed into the hands of the receiver, was merely a debt due to the State, it stood on the footing of any other debt, and was not entitled to priority of distribution; nor could the taxing officer of the State lawfully seize property belonging to the bank to satisfy such a tax; and where such seizure was made, it was held that the receiver was entitled to an injunction to restrain the same.' The personal assets of an insolvent national bank should, in the hands of such a receiver, be exempt from taxation, to the same extent to which they were exempt in the hands of the bank before his appointment."

7325. Actions against Receiver for Taxes.-We have already had occasion to notice a scheme of taxation adopted by many of the States, under an enabling act of Congress, by which they lay taxes upon the shares of the capital stock of national banks, as distinguished from the capital itself. The only theory which justifies this mode of collection is, that the corporation is in privity with its shareholders, and is, in fact, their trustee for the protection of their rights as shareholders, and hence, that the corporation may easily reimburse itself from its shareholders, by withholding dividends from them, or by asserting a lien against their shares. But this scheme of taxation can only be justified on the assumption that the shares have some value, out of which the corporation can recoup itself in respect of what it has disbursed in payment of the tax. Construing such a statute, it was held that

I Woodward v. Ellsworth, 4 Colo. 580; s. c. 2 Nat. Bank Cas. 216.

: Rosenblatt v. Johnston, 104 U. S. 462; s. c. 3 Nat. Bank Cas. 32.

2913.

Ante, §§ 2813, 2854, et seq., and

That this is the relation of a corporation to its shareholders, see ante, § 2486, et seq.

The statute was Pub. Stat. Mass., ch. 13, §§ 8, 9, and 10, which provided that shares of stock in all banks, State