The Federalist: A Collection of EssaysColonial Press, 1901 - 488 páginas |
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Página 31
... provision . The procrastinations of the former would excite the resentments of the latter . The settle- ment of a rule would in the meantime be postponed , by real differences of opinion and affected delays . The citizens of the States ...
... provision . The procrastinations of the former would excite the resentments of the latter . The settle- ment of a rule would in the meantime be postponed , by real differences of opinion and affected delays . The citizens of the States ...
Página 73
... provision for their discharge . Have we valuable territories and important posts in the posses- sion of a foreign power , which , by express stipulations , ought long since to have been surrendered ? These are still retained , to the ...
... provision for their discharge . Have we valuable territories and important posts in the posses- sion of a foreign power , which , by express stipulations , ought long since to have been surrendered ? These are still retained , to the ...
Página 83
... provisions , so as not to ap- pear , and of course not to excite any alarm in the people for the safety of the Constitution . The State leaders may even make a merit of their surreptitious invasions of it on the ground of some temporary ...
... provisions , so as not to ap- pear , and of course not to excite any alarm in the people for the safety of the Constitution . The State leaders may even make a merit of their surreptitious invasions of it on the ground of some temporary ...
Página 90
... provision for the efficacy of the federal powers , they took an oath mutually to defend and protect the united cities , to punish the violators of this oath , and to inflict vengeance on sac- rilegious despoilers of the Temple . In ...
... provision for the efficacy of the federal powers , they took an oath mutually to defend and protect the united cities , to punish the violators of this oath , and to inflict vengeance on sac- rilegious despoilers of the Temple . In ...
Página 100
... provision for accommodating disputes among the cantons . The provision is that the parties at variance shall each choose four judges out of the neutral cantons , who , in case of disagree- ment , choose an umpire . This tribunal , under ...
... provision for accommodating disputes among the cantons . The provision is that the parties at variance shall each choose four judges out of the neutral cantons , who , in case of disagree- ment , choose an umpire . This tribunal , under ...
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Términos y frases comunes
admit advantage America Amphictyonic appear appointment army Articles of Confederation authority bill of rights branch Britain causes circumstances citizens commerce common confederacy confederation Congress consideration considered Convention councils courts danger declare defence degree duties effect elections equal eral ernment established executive exercise existence experience extent favor federacies federal government force foreign former greater impeachments important influence instance interests jealousy judges judicial judiciary departments jurisdiction lative latter lature laws legislature less liberty Macedon magistrate means ment militia mode Montesquieu national government nature necessary necessity objects observations officers particular parties peace Pennsylvania persons political possess President principle proper proportion proposed Constitution propriety provision PUBLIUS question reason regulation render republic republican requisite respect revenue Senate situation society South Carolina Sparta spirit stitution supposed Supreme taxation taxes tion treaties trial by jury Union United usurpation
Pasajes populares
Página 135 - That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is against law.
Página 247 - No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
Página 288 - In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger...
Página 429 - Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.
Página 435 - NEXT to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support.
Página 268 - In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them : the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them : the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
Página 246 - Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.
Página 47 - ... of legislators, but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side, and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are and must be themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail.
Página 50 - It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the...
Página 429 - there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.