Ineffectual Expedition of the English against the Spanish Island of PortoRico.-Transactions in the West Indies.-Favourable to the English, both by Sea and Land-Great Preparations against England, in the Ports of Holland and Spain.-Spanish Fleet defeated by an English Squadron greatly inferior in Strength and Numbers, under the Command of idmiral Sir John Jervis.-Other gallant Exploits of this Squadron.--Unfortunate Attempt of the English on the Island of Teneriffe-Dutch Armament destined, as was supposed, against England.-Puts to Sea, under order to join the French Fleet at Brest.—Encountered, and after an obstinate Engagement defeated with great Loss, by an English Squadron under Admiral Duncan.-Yet Preparations still continued in Appearance, by the French, for an Invasion of England.-Calamities brought on the Dutch by their Junction with the French. Two WO months after the reduction of Trinidad, an expedition expedition was undertaken against the island of Porto Rico. The Spanish privateers, from this place, were numerous, and greatly annoyed the British trade in the West Indies. The planters had repeatedly recommended an attack of this island, the capture of which they represented as of the highest utility, as it would not only deprive the Spaniards of an important possession, but clear the navigation from the windward to the leeward islands, from much of the danger attending it. Admiral Harvey and general Abercromby willingly undertook, for these reasons, to perform so essentiala service. They sailed accordingly for PortoRico, where they arrived on the seventeenth of April. The whole northern coast of this island being bounded by a reef, it was with much difficulty that a narrow channel was discovered, through which the lighter vessels, with the troops, were able to effect their passage into a small bay. Here these landed, and advanced immediately towards the town. But the approaches to it were so strongly fortified, and defended by so many batteries, that it was found impossible to make any impression upon them, with the inconsiderable artillery that had with great exertions been brought ashore. An attempt was made to bombard the town; but this proved, on account of the distance, totally impracticable. It appearing, therefore, that no endeavours, however vigorous, could surmount these obstacles, and that no combined efforts of the sea and land force could in any manner be effectual in the present circumstances, it was judged advisable to desist from the at tempt, tempt. The loss, of men upon this occasion, notwithstanding the superiority of the enemy, was small, and the troops reimbarked without any molestation. The French were, in the mean time, making preparations, in their islands, to attack some of those belonging to the English, which these bad taken from them. As the forces, which they intended to employ, consisted of a numerous proportion of blacks, it was proposed by the British commander-in-chief of the land forces, general Abercromby, conformably to his instructions, that a large body of negroes should be raised, and formed into regiments, for the protection of the British islands. But this proposal was highly disapproved by the representative bodies of the inhabit ants, who unanimously concurred in condemning the measure, as full of danger. The emancipation of the negroes, in the French islands, had filled those in the English with sanguine expectation that they would be placed on the same footing. They were greatly dissatisfied at their disappointment, and their dissatis faction was daily heightened, through the communication they maintained, by various means, with the French negroes, who warmly solicited them to procure their freedom through force, as they would not obtain it otherwise. While such apprehen sions hung over the planters, they could by no arguments be prevailed upon toput arms into the hands of the negroes, whom they considered as much readier to attack their masters, than to protect them. The preparations made by the French, against the English, were of little effect: they landed a body of picked men at Anguilla, a small island, where meeting with no resistance, from its defenceless situation, they committed great ravages. Happily for the inhabitants, captain Barton, of the Lapwing frigate, being apprized of their danger, sailed immediately to their relief. On his approach, the French reembarked: but their shipping was attacked, and totally destroyed, and the whole of their land and sea force either killed or taken. This happened in the latter part of 1796. In the commencement of the following year, they prepared for other attempts: but whether from the discouragement, occasioned by this check, or that they were not in sufficient readiness, they remained inactive till the ensuing June, when, instead of making any of their threatened attacks upon the islands in possession of the English, they confined their exertions to St. Domingo, where they endeavoured to retake some places in the hands of those French planters that had put themselves under the protection of Great Britain, or were possessed by the British troops. They laid siege, in the month of April, to Trois, a strong post recently taken from them. Captain Rickets, of the Magicienne, caine fortunately to its assistance, and attacked the ships and transports, laden with ammunition and necessaries for carrying on the siege: they were all taken, and the besiegers on shore, thus deprived of the supplies they wanted, were, by the united fire from the garrison and the British frigate, driven from their position, and compelled to abandon the attempt. Some days before this repulse, general Rigaud, commander of the republican forces, resolved to make an attempt upon the fort of Trois, the the retaking of which was con- In the month of June ensuing, the French laid siege to the town of St. Mark,a place of consequence,defended by a body of those French planters that had joined the English, and by a small number of these. As they were closely pressed, general Churchill hastened, by forced marches, to their relief. The enemy had. taken possession of the fort and district of Mirebaiais, which afforded them great advantages in the prose cution of the siege. Expecting the English general would attempt the retaking it, they posted a large body on his way. But as soon as he had been joined by a sufficient reinforcement, to cope with their numbers, he attacked them with such resolu• tion, that they were immediately broken, and fled with the utmost precipitation. The siege of St. Mark had, in the mean while, been carried on with much vigour, and some of the out-works had been taken: but this defeat encouraged the garrison to so resolute a defence, that it disconcerted all their measures, and they were driven from this place, on the arrival of the victorious troops, with very considerable loss. The transactions in the West Indies, during the remainder of the year, were remarkably favourable to the English, both at sea and land. Numbers of the enemy's armed ships were taken, and little damage done to the English trade. The French were not either in the disposition or in force to execute any plan against the English possessions. In Europe the expectations of the French had been highly raised, by the great preparations made against England, in the ports of Holland and of Spain. In this kingdom, their influence over the ministry was such, that they procured the equipment of a very large number of ships, to act conjointly with their remaining strength at sea, against that of England, which they hoped would find it extremely difficult to make head against so vast an accession of force force to France. Conformably to the plans of the French and Spanish ministers, the most considerable part of the Spanish navy was to have effected a junction with the French feet at Brest; and, after being joined by a numerous squadron of Dutch ships of war, they were to have put forth all together to sea, to the amount of more than seventy sail of the line; a strength which, they entertained sanguine hope, would prove more than sufficent to support effectually the execution of their designs against the British dominions. In the list of the Spanish fleet, intended for Brest, were six of one hundred and twelve guns, and one of a hundred and thirty-six, esteemed the largest vessel in Europe; of the. other ships composing this formidaable armament, two were of eightyfour, and eighteen of seventy-four guns: but they were manned by an inconsiderable proportion of seamen. The Spanish ministry had imagined, that this deficiency might be remedied by the substitution of a number of expert artillery-men; but even of these there was not a sufficiency procured to encounter the skill and activity of the British seamen. The officer pitched upon for the command of the squadron, destined to act against this great force, was admiral Jervis, whose naval abilities had been conspicuously displayed on many preceding occasions, and who was accompanied by other officers of such distinguished merit, that no doubt was entertained, by the public, that, notwithstanding the vast superiority of strength and numbers, on the part of the Spaniards, they would not prove equal in battle to the British officers and sea men. The squadron, under the command of admiral Jervis, amounted to no more than fifteen ships of the line, and some frigates. He was cruizing off Cape St. Vincent, on the coast of Portugal, when he received intelligence of the Spanish fleet's approach, and he prepared immediately for battle. On the fourteenth of February, at the dawn of day, it was discovered, amounting to twenty-seven sail of the line, By carrying a press of sail, he closed in with the enemy's fleet before it had time to connect, and form into a regular order of battle. Such a moment, to speak his own words, was not to be lost: confiding in the skill, valour, and discipline, of his officers and men, and conscious of the necessity of acting with uncommon resolution on this critical occasion, he formed a line, with the utmost celerity, in order to pass through the enemy's fleet, and having completely effected his design, he thereby separated one-third of it from the main body, and by a vigorous cannonade compelled it to remain to leeward, and prevented its rejunction with the centre till the evening. After having thus broken through the enemy's line, and, by this daring and fortunate measure, diminished his force from twentyseven ships to eighteen, it was perceived that the Spanish admiral, in order to recover his superiority, was endeavouring to rejoin the ships separated from him, by wearing round the rear of the British lines; but commodore Nelson, who was in the rear-most ship, directly wore and prevented his intention, by standing towards him. He had now to encounter the Spanish admiral of one hundred and thirty-six guns, aided by two others, each of them them three deckers: he was happily relieved from this dangerous position, by the coming up of two ships to his assistance, which detained the Spanish admiral, and his seconds, till he was attacked by four other British ships; when, finding that he could not execute his design, he made the signal for the remainder of his fleet to form together for their defence. The British admiral, before they could get into their stations, directed the rear-most of them, some of which were entangled with each other, to be attacked. This was done with so much judgement and spirit, that four of them were captured, one of which struck to his own ship. In the mean time, that part of the Spanish fleet which had been separated from its main body had nearly rejoined it, with four other ships, two of which were not in the engagement. This was a strength, more than equal to that which remained of the British squadron, fit, after so severe a contest, for a fresh action. Had it been renewed, the Spaniards had still thirteen ships unhurt, while of the fifteen, of which the British squadron consisted, every one had suffered in se unequal an encounter. It drew up in compact order, not doubt ing of vigorous efforts, on the part of the enemy, to retake his lost vessels: but the countenance and position of the British squadron was such, that the Spanish, though so powerfully reinforced, did not dare to come into close action. Its fire was distant and ineffectual, and it left the British squadron to move leisurely off with the four captured vessels, two of them carrying one hundred and twelve guns, one eighty-four, and the other seventy four. The slain and wounded, on board of these, before they struck, amounted to six hundred, and on board of the British squadron to half that number, The amount of the killed and wounded in the other Spanish ships was computed equal to that in those that were taken. The superiority of naval skill, displayed in this celebrated action, struck all Europe with astonishment. Nothing less indeed could have procured a victory over an enemy so much superior in strength and numbers, and no ways deficient in courage. The people in Spain were loud in their complaints, that their countrymen were impressed into a service for which they were unqualified, and against a nation with which they had no reason to quar rel. The upper classes, and the government itself, were looked up, on, by the generality, as acting under constraint: but the remon strance of the recent victories of the French, over their best troops and commanders, and of the danger to which the monarchy had been exposed, effectually silenced all degrees of men, while the majority bore, with secret indignation, the ignominy of a yoke which they were ashamed to avow. The ancient and noble kingdom of Spain was, at this time, in a situation not more humiliating than odd and whimsical. The Spaniards, in general, detested the French, and particularly the French infidels: the throne of Spain was occupied by the second branch of the house of Bourbon; and which, in 1792, had manifested an anxious solicitude for the life of Lewis XVI. yet the king and people of Spain were leagued with the regicides against the 7 |