Dalmatia, with all the Venetian islands in the Adriatic, lying to the north-west of the Gul h of Lodrino, the city of Venice, with a large portion of the dominions of that republic, chiefly those lying between the Tyrol, the Lake of Guarda, and the Adriatic.

It was stipulated, between the contracting parties, that no individual, in the countries occupied by the French o Austrians, should be prosecuted for his opinions or conduct during the war between them.

The duke of Modena was to receive, as an indemnification for the loss of his duchy, the province of Brisgaw, in the proximity of the Rhine.

A congress should be held, at Rastadt, consisting of plenipotentiaries from France and the empire, for the negociating of a peace.

The ceremonial and etiquette between Austria and France should remain as in times past, and the Cisalpiue republic should be placed on the same footing, in this respect, as the late republic of Venice.

The provisions of this treaty extended, as far as they were applicable, to the commonwealth of Batavia.

In order to ascertain the neutrality to be observed, with regard to the belligerent powers, it was reciprocally agreed, that no assistance or protection of any kind should be given to the enemies of either of the contracting parties, and that not more than six of their ships of war, at one time, should be permitted to enter the Austrian or French harbours, during the present war.

Such were the principal articles of the treaty of Campo-Formio.

The countries given to the house of Austria, to counterbalance the scquisitions of France, in the Netherlands, were allowed to be an equivalent beyond what it could have justly expected, considering the debilitated condition to which it had been brought, by the arms of the French republic, and the inveteracy expressed upon all occasions against it by the court of Vienna and its adherents.

But there were other articles in this treaty, deemed of an unostensible nature, in the actual situation of Europe, especially of the German empire, with the princes and states of which both France and Austria seemed equally inclined to act with more freedom, than they were conscious would be justifiable, or approved of by those whom their designs were to affect.

By this secret convention the emperor engaged to consent, that the Rhine should, conformably to the desire of the republic, be the boundary between France and Germany, and to use his mediation for the procuring of the like consent, on the part of the states and princes of the empire. Were they to refuse their assent, he agreed to furnish no more than his bare contingent of troops, in case hostilities resulted from this refusal. The French, in return, were to exert their influence in procuring the cession of Saltzburgh, with some considerable districts in Bavaria, to the emperor. For every acquisition made by France in the empire, it was stipulated that he should receive an equivalent: and for every one that he made, France should receive another in like manner. The republic, in order to induce the assent of the king of Prussia to those arrangements,

rangements, restored his dominions on the left bank of the Rhine, and allowed a territorial indemnification to be given to the Stadtholder, provided it were not in the neigh bourhood of the Batavian republic. To this the emperor also consented, on condition it were not in the vicinity of his own dominions: carefully stipulating, at the same time, that Prussia should make no new acquisition. He gave his formal assent to the dispositions made in Italy by the French, of the various Imperial fiefs in favour of the Ligarian and Cisalpine respublics; and

promised to concur, jointly with France, in soliciting the diet of the empire to give up its feudal sovereignty over those districts. He farther agreed to act in concert with the republic, in order to obtain the consent of the empire, that the three ecclesiastical electors, and the other princes of the empire, who suffered any loss of territory, either in consequence of this convention, or of the pacification to be concluded hereafter between France and the empire, should be proportionably indemnified in Germany.

CHAP.

the nobles, many of whom were not averse to it, the public imagined that the only change in the state of Venice, would be from an aristocratic to a democratical republic. This alteration had also been introduced as a punishment on the nobles, who alone were represented a inimical to the French, the commonalty being reputed warmly devoted to them. By the terms of the treaty between Venice and the French, and which these agreed punctually to fulfil, though all its possessions were ceded to the French, yet part of them were to be restored on the final settlement of affairs in Italy. A large sum of money, no lesss than eighty millious of livres, had at the same time been paid to them, by way of atonement and compensation. . These various circumstances induced the public to expect,that content with the transforming of Venice from a lordship, as it was styled, to a popular state,the French would have left it in that condition, which would have placed it on the same footing as the Cisalpine and Ligurian republics. This too was considered, by some very shrewd politicians, as the surest method of preserving Italy from the yoke of Austria, as those three republics would in all likelihood unite for their common defence against the attempts of that dangerous neighbour to recover his former domains. But all these expectations were at once frustrated, by the cession not only of several of the provinces of Venice, but of the very capital of that ancient state, to the house of Austria. This, in fact, was to annibilate all hopes that Venice would ever again resume its station in the political system of Europe: VOL. XXXIX.

experience having long proved, that every country, that fell into the possession of that family, had never recovered its primitive situation, but through the most violent struggles, and the most extraordinary and unexpected events.

The friends to liberty had beheld, with marked satisfaction, the abolition of the Venetian senate, and especially of the council of ten, and of the inquisition of state. The election of fifty individuals, by the suffrages of the community, with six commissaries nominated by Buonaparte, had been greatly approved of, as a very fair and equitable government. As it had continued several months, and been exercised with moderation, an idea had naturally prevailed, that it would have remained unaltered, and the inhabitants enjoyed their new acquired freedom. It was therefore, with deep regret and indignation, that these found, that they were to be stripped of what they began to consider as their constitutional rights, and delivered over to the dominion of Austria: a power of which they well knew the despotic maxims, and dreaded to become the subjects more than ever ; since the introduction among them of French principles and regulations. The commonalty, which felt a particular partiality to these, bitterly complained, that they should have experienced them to no other purpose, than to grieve for their loss when subjected to the severity of the Austrian government.

Thus ended, for the present, the contest between France and Austria, to the great satisfaction of the people of both countries. In France,

the exultation was boundless. In

imitation of the precedents of for

[E]

mer

mer times, the reign of Lewis the XIV. particularly, calculations of the number of victories and trophies won by the French armies were pompously distributed to all the members and departments of government, and published with much splendour and solemnity in all parts of the republic. In these it was stated, that the French had been victorious in two hundred and sixty engagements, thirty of them pitched battles. Of their enemies upwards of one hundred and fifty thousand had been slain, and near two hundred thousand made prisoners. About eight thousand pieces of cannon had been taken, and one hundred and eighty thousand muskets. These atchievements had taken place within the space of three years and a half, commencing with September, 1793, and ending with February, 1797. Since which, upwards of twenty thousand more of the Austrians had either been killed or taken during the hostilities that preceded the armistice, and preliminary pacification, concluded in April following, between France and the

emperor.

While the arms of France were obtaining so many successes abroad, the internal peace of that country was continually shaken, by the irreconcileable disposition of those who opposed the present constitution. Stung with resentment at the many disappointments they had experienced in their efforts to overturn it, these, instead of relaxing, had rather encreased their resolution to persevere, and fall in the attempt, should such a fate attend them, than desist from what they looked upon as equally apoint of honourand of duty.

Such still continued to be the character of that resolute party which opposed the republic, and was determined, at all hazards, to labour for its destruction, and the restoration of monarchy. These two objects were incessantly in their contemplation. The blood that had been so profusely andvainly shedfortheir accomplishment was considered only a just and necessary tribute, which every loyal subject should hold himself under the most conscientious obligation to pay, when summoned to do it by those who bore the lawful commission of the sovereign, and whenever any prospect appeared of acting to advantage in his service.'

These principles were strongly current among large numbers in every part of France. The persecution and sufferings which those, who professed them, were liable to undergo, did not seem to make much impression upon them: undeterred by the vigilance, with which their motions were watched, they acted together with a concert and boldness that exposed them to perpetual detection. But such was their courage and firmness, that they took little or no care to conceal their principles. Their conduct, in fact, bordered on temerity, their zeal being such as to overleap all the bounds of discretion, and to set their oppressors at defiance.

Among men of this description it was not difficult to find agents, as well as adherents, by those strenuous friends to royalty, who still abounded in France: the staunch republicans dreading the effects of this unconquerable antipathy to their cause, and alarmed by the frequent intelligence of threatened insurrections, contracting on their