"Proinde ubi se videas hominem indignarier ipsum
Post mortem fore ut aut putrescat corpore posto,
Aut flammeis interfiat, maleisve ferarum;
Scire licet, non sincerum sonere, atque subesse
Cæcum aliquem cordi stimulum; quamvis neget ipse
Credere se quemquam sibi sensum in morte futurum.',

The Law Journal says: "Lucretius, so far as rusty
scholarship can follow a crabbed style, appears to
be dealing rather with the different forms of death
and ideas of the future than of the disposal of the
body, while the passage from Lucan is apposite
and graceful." These English judges are quite apt
to be right in their classics.

Mrs. Kilgore tried again for admission to another section of the Philadelphia Common Pleas, and was refused, Judge Finletter dissenting. The court put the denial partly on the ground of protection to woman, partly on the ground of nature's order, and partly on the ground of the shock to sentiment. No stress seems to have been laid on the phraseology of the statute. The court remarked: "The very fact that the employment of woman to do that which by common consent a man only should do causes a shock, is an argument of some force from nature itself. It is the emphatic assumption of a general principle. I do not stop to reason by analogy from the lower creation, for there the instinct implanted at once settles the question. The argument drawn from the abuse of power by the male sex does not destroy the principle which is assailed. Legislation itself has of recent years largely extended and protected the rights of married women, and yet any one familiar with the decisions of our own Supreme Court has not failed to notice the fact that recent decisions have curtailed the liberal interpretation of the laws relating to married women which at first swayed the court, because it was found by experience that that which was properly intended as a shield had in many cases proved to be a doubleedged sword; and it is a question yet to be solved how far this inversion, so to speak, of the order of nature will not finally produce an unnatural competition between the sexes, and what is worse, a condition of society wherein worthless husbands, fathers, sons and brothers will depend upon the exertions of those who ought to receive and enjoy that protection which nature intended." This is amusing. "Common consent "- whose "common consent?" Why, that of the men, for a majority of the human race, namely, the women demand the right to earn their own living, in their own way. We are heartily tired of this nonsense about competition between the sexes wrought by the ameliorating laws of married women, and if women ask for the right to support their husbands, fathers, sons and brothers, we do not know why they should not have it. One would suppose these Philadelphia common pleas people were living forty years back.

Children, containing 2,000 names, with their meaning and the countries from which they originated.” The names are arranged in two general divisions of sexes, and alphabetically, under each, but are not alphabetically sub-arranged, which is a grave defect. We note some appropriate for forthcoming lawyers: Arnold, a maintainer of honor; Aristides, a lover of justice; Austin, lover of justice; Brian, having a thundering voice; Harold, a champion; Hector, a stout defender; Hortensius, an orator; Ibzan, a judge; Lycurgus, a lawyer; Marcus, a defender; Othniel, a judge; Allam, Sergius, Torquil, counsellor; Solon, lawyer; William, defending many.

The Codes have at last got out of committee in the Senate. The Civil Code has been reported favorably, by a majority of one. The revision by Mr. Throop is also favorably reported by a majority of one. We hardly think the people need both measures. We believe they need the Civil Code, and we think much of the Throop revision is well enough, although as a whole it would be out of the question if the Civil Code were to be adopted. Now the question is just where it ought to be, and we hope the lay element in the Senate will assert its judgment independently of the lawyers who are so nearly equally divided in opinion.

NOTES OF cases.

TN People v. Peterson, 31 Hun. 421, the petitioner
Ν
claimed the exemption of $1,500 allowed by
statute to ministers of the gospel. He was, and
since 1830 had been, a minister of the Reformed
Church, in America, in good standing; by reason
of old age and loss of his sight he had for the last
fifteen years withdrawn from the active duties of
his profession, although he had during all that
period performed its functions occasionally as op-
portunities presented themselves. He was engaged
in no secular occupation. Held, that he was enti-
tled to the exemption. The court said: "Being a
minister, and engaged in no other calling, he was
entitled to the exemption, notwithstanding he was
disqualified for active duty by age and infirmity.”

In State v. Roberts, 59 N. H. 484, it was held that a person is liable for catching fish in the prohibited season from water, though within his own land, unless it be so enclosed as to prevent the free passage of the fish. The court said: "The right of the Legislature to enact penal laws to prevent the undue destruction of fish does depend upon the fact that any particular body of water does not furnish a supply mals they are free, and the owner of the soil under of fish, but upon the fact that like other wild anithe water containing them has not on that account any property in them. The fact that the defendant owned the land around North pond gave him no We have received a very interesting pamphlet, exclusive property in the four trout before they entitled "A Dictionary of Baptismal Names for were caught, unless their natural freedom had been

destroyed by falling under the absolute control of the riparian owner. If the trout were not the prolific source of other trout for connecting streams, their freedom of passage to and from and through the pond prevented the defendant, a riparian owner, from acquiring property in them against the right of the State to preserve them for the enjoyment of future anglers. The fact that the fish were in water surrounded by the defendant's land, unless the water was so inclosed as to be absolutely within his control, and the free passage of the fish to and from it was entirely and rightfully obstructed, gave him no more property in them than he would have obtained in a wild deer that came upon his land, or a wild bird that might have alighted upon it. If the fish had free passage to and from the pond, their capture out of season by the defendant was within the prohibition of the statute."

flict punishment to gratify a cruel and revengeful disposition: Com. v. Hodgson, Lewis Crim. Law, 103. He may also apply to the Court of Quarter Sessions for the punishment of the apprentice by imprisonment, under the Act of September 29, 1770, and in such case, if his complaint be just, the court ought to and will enforce the law by confining the apprentice as long as may be necessary to accomplish his reform."

In the case of Spring Valley Water Works v. Supervisors of San Francisco, which appears elsewhere in this number, the Supreme Court of the United States hold that where a corporation framed to supply water to a locality and its inhabitants was organized under a California statute, which provided that water should be furnished consumers at reasonable rates to be fixed by an impartial tribunal designated therein, but which by reason of a constitutional restriction reserved to the State the right to amend and alter the charter of such a corporation, the State is not forbidden by the Federal Constitution to confer upon the authorities of the locality the power to fix the rates at which the corporation shall supply water to consumers. Justice Field dissented from the conclusion reached by the majority of the court. He declares that the impression which exists in the minds of some lawyers and judges, that the reservation in charters of cor

Mr.

In Com. v. Guildhart, Quarter Session of Philadelphia, March 14, 1884, Leg. Int. March 21, 1884, it was held that an apprentice may be punished for misconduct by imprisonment. The defendant, a tanner's apprentice, was imprisoned for twentyfour hours in the witnesses' part of the county prison, for willfully quitting work, whereby his master's skins soured and were spoiled. The court said: "It is to be regretted that the system of apprenticeship has nearly gone out of use. The rela-porations and in laws authorizing the formation of tion of master and apprentice was one of the most valuable relations in society. Some of the most worthy, reputable and wealthy citizens of this country commenced work as apprentices and rose to the highest positions in the government. There are yet living in this city many excellent persons who were apprentices in their youth. A system so beneficent ought not to be suffered to fall into disuse; but it seems that it is being gradually abandoned, and we are becoming dependent for skilled mechanics upon immigration from foreign countries. A trade education is as important as a college education. If the latter is regarded as a distinction worth acquiring, the former is equally so, for it supplies the necessities of society that depend on skill and knowledge in the practical business of life. Boys who have such an opportunity as this defendant to learn a good trade are to be congratulated. There are thousands of boys, and men too, who would be glad to have such a position. Under the old custom the apprentice lived with his master, and was clothed, fed and treated as one of his family; but after a time, a money payment in lieu of domestic custody and care was substituted, and this met the approval of the Supreme Court (Com. v. Conrow, 2 Barr, 402), and was subsequently authorized by statute (Act of March 17, 1865). When the indentures are entered into, certain duties and obligations arise on both sides, which may be enforced by the court. If the apprentice lives with his master, the latter may administer proper punishment upon the apprentice, and is not liable for unjust punishment arising from error of judgment; but he cannot in

corporations, of a power to alter or repeal such charters or laws operates as a gift to the State and to the Legislature of uncontrolled authority over the business and property of the corporations, is unfounded in principle and unsupported by authority. The reservation applies only to the contract of incorporation, to the corporate existence, franchises and privileges granted by the State. With respect to every thing else it gives no power that the State would not have had without it. It does not withdraw the corporation from the guaranties of the Federal Constitution. The corporation holds the property it acquires under the same guaranties which protect the property of individuals from spoliation. See Dartmouth College case, 4 Wheat. 708, 712; Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall. 458; Railroad Co. v, Maine, 96 U. S. 510; Detroit v, Howell, Plank Road Co., 43 Mich. 140, 147. Applying these principles to the case in question, he holds that water collected in reservoirs, as it falls in rain, is private property and cannot be appropriated to public use without compensation to the owner; that such compensation must be fixed by an impartial tribunal and not by the consumers of water or their agents. It is an elementary principle of natural justice that no man shall sit in judgment where he is interested, no matter how unimpeachable his personal integrity. The principle is not limited to cases arising in the ordinary courts of law in the regular administration of justice, but extends to all cases where a tribunal of any kind is established to decide upon the rights of different parties. City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 687; Hall v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 221: Lamsden

v. Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 485, 494. While the State may take private property for public use, it cannot exercise the right except upon the payment of compensation to be fixed by an impartial tribunal. In the enforced sale of property of a corporation at prices to be fixed by the agents of those purchasing it, the line is passed which separates regulation from spoliation.

THE

CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE.

I.

ПHЕ case of Parker v. Conner, 93 N. Y. 118, is an interesting one on the subject of constructive

notice. It was the case of an alleged fraudulent sale of personal property, and held that one who purchases in good faith from the vendee, is not chargeable with constructive notice of the fraud by mere negligence and omission to investigate facts calculated to awaken suspicion in prudent minds. Rapallo, J., learnedly reviews the subject, and concludes that in such cases the doctrines applicable to transfers of negotiable paper are applicable. This case is reported in the forthcoming 45th volume of American Reports, and the editor appends the following note:

It will thus be seen that the distinction between

ject to be rebutted or explained. Constructive notice is thus a conclusive presumption, or a presumption of law, while implied notice is a presumption of fact. If this distinction were carefully preserved by writers upon this subject, it would enable us to escape a good deal of confusion in regard to the subject of notice."

KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS TO PUT ON INQUIRY.A purchaser having knowledge of any fact sufficient to put him upon inquiry as to the existence of some right or title in conflict with that he is about to purchase is presumed either to have made the proper investigation or to have been guilty of negligence, etc., fatal to his claim as a bona fide pur

chaser. Williamson v. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354; Cambridge Bank v. Delano, 48 id. 326; Walworth v. Farm

ers' Loan Co. 1 id. 433. But the basis of this rule

is negligence, and it is only applicable to cases where the purchaser or incumbrancer is chargeable with gross negligence in not making the examination. Acer v. Westcott, 46 N. Y. 384. The rule that what is sufficient to put a purchaser upon inquiry is notice of whatever the inquiry would have disclosed, applies to actual, not constructiue notice. Battenhausen v. Bullock, 11 Brader (Ill.), 665.

Circumstances amounting to mere suspicion of "Constructive notice" has been defined as fol- fraud are not to be deemed notice, and where an inlows: In Birdsall v. Russell, 29 N. Y. 220, 249, the ference of notice is to affect an innocent purchaser court said; "Constructive notice is a legal infer- it must appear that the inquiry suggested if fairly ence from established facts." Constructive notice pursued would result in the discovery of the defect. I take to be in nature no more than evidence of Simons v. Morse, 2 Fed. Rep. 325; Maul v. Rider, notice the presumptions of which are so violent that 59 Penn. St. 167; Wilson v. Hunter, 30 Ind. 466. If the court will not allow even its being controverted. the transferee of property has before him facts Plumb v. Fluitt, 2 Anst. 438; Rogers v. Imes, 8 N. which would put a person of ordinary intelligence H. 270. Chanceller Kent laid down the rule in and prudence on his guard or create a suspicion Sterry v, Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 261, in these words: which being followed up would lead him to find out "I hold him chargeable with constructive notice or that there was a fraudulent intent on the part of the notice in law because he had information sufficient transferrer, his abstaining from making such inBurnham v. Brento put him on inquiry." Constructive notice is of quiry is a want of good faith. two kinds, that which arises from testimony and nan, 42 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 51. By reasonable diligence that which results from a record. Griffith v. is meant that implied where there is some reason to Griffith, 1 Hoff. Ch. 153. awaken inquiry and direct diligence in a channel in which it would be successful. Maul v. Rider, 59 Penn. St. 167; Cambridge Bank v. Delano, 48 N. Y. 326. So the legal presumption is that all conveyances are made in good faith and not fraudulently, and the burden of proof rests upon one who seeks to impeach the same for fraud. O'Neal v. Boone, 82 Ill. 589. To impeach a sale for fraud as against the vendor's creditors, both the vendor's fraudulent intent and the vendee's knowledge of it (or of circumstances which charge him with the duty of inquiry) must be shown. Hopkins v. Langton, 30 Wis. 379; Tantum v. Green, 21 N. J. Eq. 364; Jaeger v. Kelley, 52 N. Y. 274; Newman v. Cordell, 43 Barb. 448. There need not be "good and substantial evidence of the vendor's fraudulent intent such as sends conviction home to the mind and establishes a well founded belief" to charge the vendee with notice thereof. A less degree than this will charge the vendee with the duty of inquiry. Hopkins v. Langton, 30 Wis. 379. When the facts and circumstances

"actual" and "constructive" notice lies essentially
in this: "actual notice is a question of fact for a
jury, Tufts v. King, 18 Penn. St. 157; Bradbury v.
Falmouth, 18 Me. 65, to be determined by evidence
either direct or circumstantial or both and may be
rebutted." On the other hand "constructive" notice |
is a presumption of law which cannot be rebutted,
whether from evidence of facts or of knowledge or
circumstances, which if they had been acted on
would have brought to light the very facts which
would charge the party with actual notice and is a
question of law for the court. Birdsall v. Russell,
29 N. Y, 220; Rogers v. Jones, 8 N. H. 264. But in
Wade on Notice, § 40, p. 22, citing Story's Eq. Jur.,
§ 410, it is said that "Such notice as depends upon
possession, upon knowledge of an agent, upon facts
to put one upon inquiry, and some other similar
matters, although often called constructive notice,
is rather implied notice or presumptive notice sub-

are such as to put a reasonable man on inquiry, that obligation is not satisfied by an inquiry addressed to the chief actor in the suspected fraud, and who has every motive for concealing the truth, when better and reliable sources of information are open to him. Singer v. Jacobs, 11 Fed. Rep. 559. To make a sale void for fraud as against the creditors of the seller, the buyer must have had notice of the intended fraud if his purchase was in good faith and for a valuable consideration. McCormick v. Hyatt, 33 Ind. 546; Ruhl v. Phillips, 48 N. Y. 125 If a grantee without knowledge of the intended fraud becomes a purchaser for value he should be protected, although the grantor acted from fraudulent motives. Holmes v. Clark, 48 Barb. 237. It is not enough that the vendee has knowledge of the fraudulent intent, it must be made to appear that he participated in it. Dudley v. Danforth, 61 N. Y. 626. To avoid a sale made to defraud creditors it is not required that the purchaser should have had actual knowledge of the fraudulent purpose of the vendor. It is sufficient if he had constructive notice. Singer v. Jacobs, 11 Fed. Rep. 559; Atwood v. Impson, 29 N. J. Eq. 150. But see to contrary, Stearns v. Gage, 79 N. Y. 102.

plainly means that actual notice shall be given of the fraudulent intent, or knowledge of circumstances which are equivalent to such notice. Circumstances to put the purchaser on inquiry where full value has been paid are not sufficient. If he knew of the fraud that would be enough. It is not found that he had such knowledge in the case considered. As there is no such finding, we may assume that he had no knowledge of the fraud, and without this no case is established which would invalidate the conveyance to him and warrant the conclusion of the referee. No authority has been cited which sustains the principle that a purchaser for a valuable consideration without previous notice is chargeable with constructive notice of the fraudulent intent of his grantor, and such a rule would carry the doctrine of constructive notice to an extent beyond any principle which has been sanctioned by the courts, and cannot be upheld." The ruling in Stearns v. Gage was applied in the case of Farley v. Carpenter, 27 Hun, 359. In that case the defendant Abram Carpenter (the grantee), a brother of Charles Carpenter (the grantor), on examination supplementary to execution among other things testified, "I did not know at that time (meaning the time when the conveyance was made), that he owed any thing aside from me; thought something up from the way he talked; he asked me to deed this house and lot to his wife; Wednesday went to his

The notice of fraudulent intent to affect the title of a purchaser for value must exist prior to the perfecting of the sale. Gottberg v. Conner, 44 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 554. Where constructive notice is alleged to result from facts or circumstances, the presump-house, he sent for me; he wanted to sell me his tion may be repelled. Griffith v. Griffith, 1 Hoff. Ch. 153; Rogers v. Jones, 8 N. H. 264. A purchaser for a valuable consideration is not chargeable with constructive notice that the conveyance to him was made by his vendor with intent to defraud his creditors; actual notice is required to impair his title. Stearns v. Gage, 79 N. Y. 102. In this case the court (pp. 186-8), after stating the rule of constructive notice of fraud as laid down in Williamson v. Brown, 15 N. Y. 362, and Baker v. Bliss, 39 id. 70, say: "In the case at bar it is not apparent that the purchaser was acquainted with any fact which might create a well grounded belief that there was any defect in the title of his grantor. There is evidence to show that he had reason to believe and did suppose, that a full consideration had been paid for the farm, independent of the agreement to support the father of his grantor. He also knew that his grantor had worked for his father for a number of years and had no occasion to question the validity of the claim allowed for his services. Under such evidence it cannot be claimed that any question as to constructive notice was presented upon the trial. Be that as it may, however, we think that this is not material, as actual notice is required where a valuable consideration has been paid. The statute relating to fraudulent conveyances (2 R. S. 137, § 5), provides that its provisions shall not be construed in any manner to affect or impair the title of a purchaser for a valuable consideration unless it shall appear that such purchaser had previous notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor, or of fraud rendering void the title of such grantor. This

farm; I said 'what is up?' he said 'you need not ask any questions nor say any thing for two or three days; if I don't sell this to you I shall to some one else,' and I did not; what was up didn't know, but thought there was something; he was always a square fellow before this; supposed he was at this time." The referee found that the conveyance was taken by Abram without the knowledge of the fraudulent intent of his grantor, and in considering the question the court say: "Fraud implies an evil intent or illegal intent. Such intent can only exist in case of knowledge. Under this statute fraud is not a question of negligence, it is a question of knowledge and intent. A party may be negligent in not examining the records for liens and incumbrances in real estate before purchase and still be strictly honest and innocent of fraud. The appellant's counsel contends that this decision (79 N. Y. 102), is in conflict with numerous other decisions in the Court of Appeals and he cites the cases of 15 N. Y. 354; 39 id. 10; 50 id. 345; 76 id. 386. *** In neither of those cases was fraud alleged or claimed to exist on the part of the persons held to be chargeable with constructive notice. * Our attention has not been called to a single case in the Court of Appeals brought under this statute where fraud is charged as the gravamen of this action, in which it has been held that there can be a recovery against the grantee without actual notice of the fraudulent intent of his grantor."

*

It is not the duty of the purchaser to inquire into the motives of the seller for making the sale. Hence he is not chargeable with knowledge of a fraudulent