of Tennessee, as she was in her better days. They are already preparing, by efforts to secure a representation in Congress, and to resume the functions of civil government, to sit down in fraternal communion with the patriotic people of sister States, at the feast of constitutional liberty, which the hand of Washington spread for all. The people of Bolivar and Hardeman County have entered zealously into this work, and are uniting in measures to perfect it. It is but fair and legitimate to hope that social hindrances, with those of a more marked character, will disappear. It is but just to believe, that when a man of honor takes the oath of allegiance, he does so with a full and loyal purpose, and without reservation. Not only his own conduct, but his influence and authority must be on the side of loyalty. He is, by God's wise arrangement, and the law of the land, the head, the king, the patriarch of his own household, and responsible, on his oath, for all who find shelter under his roof. It is not well that while the husband and father stands on the side of the Union, and enjoys in his business the blessings of recognized citizenship, the wife and daughter shall nurse the viper of sedition at home. It is not well, that while he publicly invokes peace and the prevalence of law, they continue to court the horrors of war and disorder. Can he suffer them to entertain traitorous emissaries at his boardto prepare supplies, (paid for by him,) and send them to the rebel army-to collect packages of letters filled with unlawful information, and, with passes obtained upon his good character, or granted in courtesy to their sex, carry them concealed upon their persons outside the lines to emissaries sent to receive them? Can he permit this and not be compromised? It will not do to say, he is clear, and the wife and daughter responsible. They are responsible to him-he to all the world -all being finally accountable to the law. Man stands at the threshold woman sits by the hearthstone! God has so willed. Let them not seek to change places. By command of Brig.-General M. BRAYMAN. grip. Not to put too fine a point upon it, they came very near capturing our whole command, and making a muss of the expedition. My narrative left us at Water Valley, with the following order of march for the morrow: Col. Mizener with the Third brigade in the advance; Col. Lee with the First brigade in the centre, and Col. Hatch with the Second brigade in the rear. This order was changed in the morning by Col. Mizener taking a road running parallel with the Coffeeville road, which brought him to the rear of Col. Lee's column when he reached it. The column was thus led by Colonel Lee. At seven o'clock Friday morning, the column started in the order indicated above. At a proper distance from the river, a large advance-guard was sent forward, and a company of mounted men deployed to the right and left of the road as skirmishers. At this point the skirmishing became heavy, and the enemy holding their ground, Colonel Lee brought forward a ten-pounder James rifled gun, and unlimbered the piece. Hardly had our gun opened before a full rebel battery replied, and dropped solid shot, grape, and canister, in rapid succession, before, behind, and all about us. At least a hundred shots were fired before there was any cessation. While this cannonading was going on, in front were heard rapid, heavy, and continuous volleys of musketry. It proved that our dismounted skirmishers, moving slowly over a low piece of ground, driving those of the enemy, were suddenly confronted by long double lines of infantry, which rose from the ground where they had been concealed, and poured volley after volley of musketry into our ranks. Our skirmishers, of course, fell back precipitately, save those whose dead and wounded bodies lay before this fearful fire. Meantime the enemy's battery was sending its fiery messengers into our midst, two shells bursting within ten feet of our gun. The rebels had our range exactly, and served their battery admirably. THE RETROGRADE. MOVEMENT. At once Colonels Dickey and Lee discovered that the position was untenable, and that a force far different in character and strength from any they had anticipated was attacking us, and that a retrograde movement must be executed and speedily. Flanking parties and skirmishers were at once called in and sent back, and slowly the gun with its support of dismounted rifles moved backward. Two squadrons of the Fourth Illinois cavalry, under Capt. Townsend, were left in front to delay the advance of the army. Hardly had our gun crossed the valley and reached the position from which we had first fired, when our advance and protecting squadrons followed us, driven before the enemy's infantry, who were charging forward with cheers and yells. On our right advanced two regiments of rebel infantry with their colors; on our centre another, while two more regiments were marching in column toward our left flank, endeavoring to attack that exposed point; simultaneously with our gun opened the deadly revolving rifles of our dismounted cavalry. The enemy fell in heaps; but for every one killed two stepped forward to take his place. Their impetuous charge could not be stopped, and when they were within four rods of the mouth of our cannon Colonel Lee ordered the piece limbered up and moved to the rear. All behind us now was woods, hills, and deep ravines. For a moment covering the retreat of the gun, our riflemen held the enemy in check, and then slowly retired up the hill, halting every few rods to throw a volley on the advancing lines now immediately on their rear. Thus did they march for a quarter of a mile-a march through a continued storm of leaden rain. of our Arriving at the top of the hill, the eyes brave boys were gladdened by the sight of two long extended lines of kneeling riflemen flanking each side of the road. As I have before indicated, two regiments of rebel infantry-one in line, the other in columnwere advancing on double-quick, cheering like madmen. Hatch reserved his fire until the enemy was within twenty yards, and now up rose our gallant cavalry and forth rolled the volleys like echoing thunder. Five rapid discharges from three hundred rifles would check a stronger than this rebel force. They halted, wavered, and fell back; but new accessions being received, the enemy advanced upon our left and right flanks. To avoid being cut off, our boys fell back through the dense timber, contesting every inch of the ground as they retired. Meantime new lines were formed, fresh troops were brought up from the rear, and wearied ones marched back. But as fast as those orders could be executed, fresh troops were brought against them. The great danger was from flanking movements, which the enemy's great numbers allowed him easily to make, and a hasty retreat was ordered. So went the battle for two long hours. Up and down the wooded hills till night fell, and the moon shone out bright and clear to light the work of death, continued the struggle. Officers and men did nobly. Colonels Dickey, Lee, and Mizener, Lieut.-Colonels Prince and McCullough, Majors Coon, Love, and Rickards, and those under them, were everywhere exposed to the most galling fire, and personally directed the movements of their commands. One of Col. Lee's best officers was killed, and five of Col. Hatch's were wounded. Lieut.-Col. McCullough, of the Fourth Illinois cavalry, fell bravely at the head of his column, shot in the breast. He is doubtless dead, or, if alive, a prisoner. Col. Hatch's horse was killed under him, and Colonel Lee's disabled by a Minie bullet. At length, having continued this expensive pursuit for three miles, the enemy desisted and drew off his forces. Our column formed again and again, but backward we passed over the road of the morning, having by the sacrifice of precious blood demonstrated the proposition that two thousand cavalry, in a country where they cannot act as such, cannot cope successfully with five thousand infantry. FIGHT NEAR LEBANON, TENNESSEE. REPORT OF COLONEL CHARLES ANDERSON. Captain William Morgan, A.A. G., Fourth Brigade, Second Division, Fourteenth Army Corps, Department of Cumberland: SIR: In obedience to the order of Col. Buckley, commanding Fourteenth brigade, delivered this afternoon, and devolving upon me the defence of the forage-train, I halted my command at about three o'clock, parallel and close to the rear. Whilst waiting in this position for the train to move on, upon the top of a hill, a little west of the Franklin and Lebanon road, south-west from the house of Mr. and above that of Mr. I saw a number of the enemy on foot, led by three horsemen, rushing down the valley, which lies to the north of my position, in a westerly direction. They made great clamor by shouting, and their purpose evidently was to intercept the train in its march homeward, upon the slope of the hill, and at the bend of the road, as it enters into the valley. I immediately ordered my regiment to march in double-time through cer tain gaps and gates upon the eastern side of and close to the road, which was then filled with our wagons. My purpose was having a slight advantage in distance, as well as in the declivities of the hill-to make the same point before them, and to cut them off from any attack upon my charge. In this effort I succeeded, but not in sufficient time to prevent their spreading themselves on most favorable ground and shelter, before my regiment could ensconce itself behind the fence which I desired as a cover. After a volley from company F-company A having been detached in support of a battery in advance-a rapid and irregular fire now ensued throughout both bodies of combatants. This lasted until, apparently, being satisfied that the Ninety-third could not be moved from its position, and, conse quently, that they could not succeed in the purpose of their ambuscade and assault, they fled, precipitately and universally, as far up the valley as we could see. Our loss in this action was but one killed and three wounded. Considering the closeness of the range, the deliberateness and duration of the enemy's fire, and the almost rash exposure of several of my companies, these casualties are strangely small in number. What injury was inflicted upon the enemy I cannot undertake to say, and will not guess; neither will I, in my inexperience in such matters, profess to estimate his numbers. They certainly seemed to be largely in excess of our own, and the whole command of the expedition was, in my opinion, surrounded by large numbers of our foes. It greatly delights me to speak of the gallantry and firmness of this new regiment in this its first fight. Every officer and man seemed resolved to do his best, and where all have so well succeeded, it might be invidious to distinguish by name particular persons. Notwithstanding, however, my disposition to regard that restraint upon special praises, I feel myself compelled to specify two instances of marked courage and pertinacious bravery. The one was that of William Gosshorn, Fourth Corporal, company F, and the other that of William C. Stewart, private, company C, acting as color-bearer. The former, after being painfully wounded in the thigh by one of the first rounds of the engagement, went deliberately into line and loaded and fired at the enemy seven or eight times. The latter, in this, his first battle, stood out in front of his company and of the regiment, with his tall person and our glorious banner elevated to their highest reach; nor could he be persuaded to seek cover, nor to lower his colors. In conclusion, perhaps overrating the merits of my regiment and the importance of its conduct, I feel free to say, in justice to its men and officers, that I think any less merit than that shown in this fight would have probably lost us our entire train; and it seems to me now, that this attack, at this time and place, was preconcerted, together with various feints elsewhere, to accomplish that special object. Vanity or undue partiality to my own regiment may mislead me in this opinion. If so, I can only offer the apology that the error is as natural as it is frank. should be in possession of a sufficient number of facts to furnish a clear and reliable statement. Since that time, the paroled prisoners have arrived from Murfreesboro; minute accounts of the disaster have been presented by members of all the Union regiments concerned. At Hartsville, the Cumberland River, which runs north-west from Rome in Smith County, makes a not very abrupt curve, and for a few miles pursues a course almost due south. Two little streams enter the river at the bend, and between these lies the town of Hartsville, about a mile from the river-bank. Leaving the town and approaching the river, you enter tolerably heavy woods; after which you come to some old fields abandoned and partially overgrown with brushwood. Crossing these, you are confronted by a high, steep, rocky hill, at the southern foot of which the Cumberland flows. Upon the northern declivity of the hill, and in the old fields at the foot, our troops were encamped the One Hundred and Eighth Ohio nearest the town, the Second Indiana cavalry nearest the river. Two pieces of cannon belonging to the Thirteenth Indiana battery, Captain Nicklin, were planted in a commanding position near the summit of the hill. West of the hill is a ravine, which an enemy attacking from that direction would be compelled to cross. A similar hollow lies to the east. From Hartsville a road runs north to Lafayette. A stronger position can scarcely be imagined. The depth of the river as it runs past the hill I have mentioned, and the almost perpendicular southern face of the hill itself, rendered an attack from that direction utterly impracticable. A liberal use of axes for a few hours would have made an advance from toward the town exceedingly dangerous for an attacking force. Comparatively slight earthworks along the ravines would have enabled their defenders to repulse a largely superior force coming either from the east or west; while the hill itself, with some labor, could have been made an almost impregnable fortress, to which our troops, as a last resort, might have retired, and which they might have held against ten times their numbers. Yet strange to say, not a tree seems to have been felled, and not a spadeful of earth thrown up. Col. Moore, of the One Hundred and Fourth Illinois, commanding the force, well knew that he occupied an exposed position on our extreme left; a position liable to be attacked at any moment; and still in apparently reckless disregard of the safety of his command and the great interests intrusted to his care, he neglected to take even the most ordinary precautions for his defence. The cavalry force at his disposal, with which he might have scoured the country in every direction, instantly detecting any attempt of the enemy to approach him, was not used at all, except that a few videttes were posted behind the pickets a short distance from the camp. An apathy, which boded destrucIn a letter dated the eighth instant, I gave you tion, seemed to have taken possession of the such imperfect accounts of the affair at Harts- whole force. So much was this the case, that ville, as had then come to hand, mentally resolv- some of the pickets are said to have been capturing that I would write no more about it until Ied by the enemy while fast asleep upon their All of which is respectfully submitted. By order of Colonel CHARLES ANDERSON. D. P. THRUSTON, Adjutant Ninety-third Regiment O.V.I. Doc. 65. BATTLE AT HARTSVILLE, TENN. CINCINNATI "GAZETTE" ACCOUNT. NASHVILLE, TENN., December 14. posts, and others came running into camp, upon the approach of the rebels, without having fired off their guns. It was between twelve and one o'clock, on the night preceding that unfortunate Sunday, that the rebels commenced crossing the river, both above and below our camps. From the best information of which I can get possession, I am inclined to believe that the principal portion of the rebel force crossed above our position, left a part of their number in the woods north-east of us, passed entirely around the village of Hartsville, and then came up upon the west side of the ravine which I have described as lying west of the high wooded hill. It was during this circumnavigation of our camp that they captured the sleeping pickets. At a lower ford a negro reported during the night, to a captain in command there, that the enemy were advancing, five thousand strong. The captain reported this startling announcement to the officer in charge. The latter either said nothing about it to Colonel Moore, or was unheeded when he did. Suffice it to say, that the bands of Morgan and Duke were all around and about the camp of the fated Thirty-ninth brigade, before any of its members were aware of their proximity. In this sense, the thing was a complete surprise. A contraband seems to have given the first alarm. He saw the enemy forming upon the opposite side of the western ravine, and forgetting for the time that he was nothing but a "nigger," he ran energetically through the camp, calling out: "Fall in! fall in! forty millions of de enemy are jest upon us!" It was just at daybreak; none of the men had arisen; the cold was intense; but with a commendable alacrity, they sprang up, jumped into their clothes, and hastened to form in line of battle upon the opposite side of the western ravine, across which the rebels had already commenced to fire. At first the One Hundred and Sixth Ohio occupied the extreme left, nearest the river; the One Hundred and Fourth Illinois was in the centre, and the One Hundred and Eighth Ohio, Captain Pivot, company A, commanding, was on the right. Strong detachments were sent down into the ravine, to take the place of the pickets who had fled, and support the few who remained. Captain J. W. Palmer, company K, One Hundred and Fourth Illinois, commanded those from his own regiment, the Second Indiana cavalry advanced for the One Hundred and Sixth, and Captain Pivot, of the One Hundred and Eighth himself led two companies of skirmishers in advance of his regiment. Several times these skirmishers checked and drove back the enemy, who were pressing down into the ravine, until Captain Palmer, fancying, or really perceiving that our men, formed in line of battle upon the edge of the ravine, were firing into his company, retired and took position upon the left of his regiment. The cavalry continued in an irregular style to keep up the fight, but gradually retired to the principal line of battle. Captain Pivot, before descending into the ravine, ordered Adjutant Hahn to bring forward the rest of the regiment to his support, as soon as he should be fairly engaged with the enemy. This, Adjutant Hahn failed to do, being ordered, as he says, by Colonel Moore, to keep his position. Lacking the expected support, Captain Pivot immediately retired. Thus, in less time than I can relate it, our advance line of skirmishers had gone forth and returned, leaving us wholly dependent upon the main line of battle. The cry now rang through our ranks to bring forward the artillery, which was on the hill. Colonel Moore himself went back to order it up, and, while he was gone, Col. Tafel, of the One Hundred and Sixth Ohio, took the somewhat extraordinary resolution to change his position, without the order, consent, or knowledge of Col. Moore, believing that such a step would promote the best interests of the command, and not knowing when Col. Moore would come back. Upon the return of the latter, however, he saw what Colonel Tafel was about, and gave his sanction to the change. In the mean while, one piece of artillery was got into position upon the right of the One Hundred and Fourth Illinois, and the firing became general along both lines. The Ninth Kentucky rebel infantry, Captain T. J. Morehead, commanding, fought against the One Hundred and Fourth Illinois, the Second Kentucky against the One Hundred and Sixth Ohio, while a cloud of Duke's, Gano's, and Bennett's cavalry, mounted and dismounted, assailed the One Hundred and Eighth Ohio, and enveloped our extreme left wing. The piece of artillery brought into action did excellent service, and at the second fire one of the enemy's caissons was exploded, and five of their men killed. But the heavy fire of the rebel artillery, which played upon our ranks both from across the ravine, and, with less effect, from the other side of the river, caused some dismay amongst our soldiers, and killed most of the horses attached to the piece which had been brought forward, as well as to that still stationed upon the hill. The superior numbers of the enemy enabled them to turn both our flanks, and after the fighting had continued three quarters of an hour, Colonel Moore gave the order to retire to the hill upon the river-side. By a part of the forces this order was misunderstood; by another part it was disobeyed; and by still another portion, it was taken as the signal for a general dispersion and flight. In itself the order was an unfortunate one. It is very difficult for new troops, under any circumstances, to retire in order while exposed to a storm of cannon and rifle-balls In this case there could be no good reason for retreating to the hill, because that, being totally destitute of defensive works of any kind, was the most exposed portion of the whole field. The men, once upon it, could be picked off with ease and safety by the rebels in the woods below. But Colonel Moore had doubtless somewhere read "that the highest ground upon a field of battle was the most defensible;" forgetting that fortifications of some sort are necessary to render it so, and that, without these, to place men upon a hill, is to make of them an elevated and visible target for every bullet of the enemy. "A little learning is a dangerous thing." But what, it may be asked, was Colonel Moore to do? His first position had doubtless become untenable; upon this all authorities agree. But several courses were still left open to him. He might gradually have retired to his encampment, and with his left wing resting upon the steep hill, his right upon the thick woods lying between the old fields and the town, he could have maintained his ground for a long time behind the wagons belonging to the brigade. For be it remembered that the enemy did not assail his rear, except by a distant cannonade from across the river, and could only advance to do so through the woods upon the north, or up a small ravine upon the north-east, so narrow that a very insignificant force could have held it against almost any number of the enemy. In a few hours General Dumont would have arrived with the remainder of the division, and the rebels would have been routed hip and thigh; unless, long before such arrival, they had given up the contest in despair, and retreated across the Cumberland. Again, if Colonel Moore had possessed sufficient intrepidity, he might, by a determined charge across the large ravine on the west have gained the Gallatin road, and made safe his retreat in that direction. This would have required both courage and coolness, and however much of the former quality we may allow Colonel Moore, he seems from the beginning of the action, to have been wholly destitute of the latter. His leaving his command early in the fight, in order himself to bring the piece of cannon, sufficiently demonstrates that his excitement had bewildered his judgment. Let us return to the time when Colonel Moore ordered his force to retreat from the edge of the ravine to the hill. The left wing of the One Hundred and Fourth Illinois, understood that they were ordered to charge the enemy, and accordingly three companies advanced over the edge of the ravine and down into it, with fixed bayonets. Here they were met by so heavy a fire from the rebels that they were first compelled to lie down, and soon afterward to withdraw in confusion to the hill to which the right wing had retired. Here the whole regiment rallied around the two pieces of artillery and endeavored for a few minutes to make a stand. Almost immediately, however, Colonel Moore perceived the trap into which he had led his men, fell at once into despair, and rushing up to Captain Palmer, asked him if he had a white handkerchief, declaring his determination to surrender. The Captain earnestly entreated him not to do so, reminding him that his other regiments might be somewhere maintaining their ground and that still they might be victorious. "No," said Colonel Moore, "we are whipped; I shall surrender." "Do not, for God's sake," replied Captain Palmer. Upon this Colonel Moore walked away a little distance, frantically wringing his hands, but returned in a and When the order was given to retire to the hill, Colonel Tafel of the One Hundred and Sixth Ohio, perceiving the inevitable destruction in which such a course would involve the command, took upon himself the responsibility of disobeying the order, and retired toward the woods. Coming to the wagon-train, belonging to the One Hundred and Eighth Ohio, he made a stand there, and fought the enemy gallantly for about ten minutes. Separated, however, from the rest of the command, he was unable to maintain his ground, and retreated still further to the vicinity of the headquarters of the brigade, which were near the beginning of the small ravine that I have mentioned, lying north-east of the hill. Here he had scarcely taken position, when a rebel cavalryman, with a blue overcoat, came galloping up the ravine, and called out to Colonel Tafel to surrender, as all the others had done. This was the first intimation that Colonel Tafel had received of Col. Moore's surrender, except the triumphant shout raised a few minutes before, which he thought might have come from our own men. He ordered his men, therefore, to pay no attention to the rebel horseman, and to continue the fight; but soon perceived that the firing had ceased upon the hill, and that his own left was violently assailed by the rebels who, having Colonel Moore no longer upon their hands, now came rushing down in great force upon the One Hundred and Sixth, and almost completely surrounded it. Under these circumstances, Colonel Tafel judged it best to surrender. The One Hundred and Eighth Ohio seems to have been unfortunate from the beginning, as I have already intimated, and, weak and demoralized as it was, played a somewhat inferior part in the whole affair. When the order to retire from the first line of battle was given, a portion of this regiment broke, fled through the woods south of the town, and were picked up by rebel cavalry stationed upon the other side. Another part joined themselves to the One Hundred and Sixth, retired with them, shared their fortunes, fought bravely by their side, and surrendered with them near the headquarters. Captain Reintantz of the One Hundred and Sixth covered the retreat of that regiment from the ravine, with his company, and, in order to ascertain the true position of the rebels, was frequently observed to mount upon some elevated object, and daringly expose himself to a score of bullets which, upon every such occasion, came whistling about his ears. He was shot dead a moment before the surrender |