The

support Cox, and between two and three P.M. Sturgis's division was sent up.

sition to make a detachment for its relief. left, therefore, was ordered to move through Jefferson to the South-Mountains, at Crampton's The contest was maintained with perseverance Pass, in front of Burkettsville, while the centre until dark, the enemy having the advantage as to and right moved upon the main or Turner's Pass, position, and fighting with obstinacy; but the in front of Middletown. During these move-ground won was fully maintained. The loss in ments I had not imposed long marches on the columns. The absolute necessity of refitting and giving some little rest to troops worn down by previous long-continued marching and severe fighting, together with the uncertainty as to the actual position, strength and intentions of the enemy, rendered it incumbent upon me to move slowly and cautiously until the headquarters reached Urbana, where I first obtained reliable information that the enemy's object was to move upon Harper's Ferry and the Cumberland Valley, and not upon Baltimore, Washington or Gettysburgh.

killed and wounded here was considerable on both sides; and it was here that Major-General Reno, who had gone forward to observe the operations of his corps, and to give such directions as were necessary, fell pierced with a musketball. The loss of this brave and distinguished officer, tempered with sadness the exultations of triumph. A gallant soldier, an able general, endeared to his troops and associates, his death is felt as an irreparable misfortune.

About three o'clock P.M., Hooker's corps, of Burnside's column, moved up to the right of the main road by a country road, which, bending to the right, then turning up to the left, circuitously wound its way beyond the crest of the pass to the Mountain House, on the main road. Gen. Hooker sent Meade, with the division of Pennsylvania reserves, to attack the eminence to the right of this entrance to the gap, which was done most handsomely and successfully.

Patrick's brigade, of Hatch's division, was

In the absence of the full reports of corps commanders, a simple outline of the brilliant operatious, which resulted in the carrying of the two passes through the South-Mountains, is all that can, at this time, with justice to the troops and commanders engaged, be furnished. The South-Mountain range, near Turner's Pass, averages perhaps a thousand feet in height, and forms a strong natural military barrier. The practica-sent-one portion up around the road, to turn ble passes are not numerous, and are readily defensible, the gaps abounding in fine positions. Turner's Pass is the more prominent, being that by which the national road crosses the mountains. It was necessarily indicated as the route of advance of our main army.

The carrying of Crampton's Pass some five or six miles below, was also important to furnish the means of reaching the flank of the enemy, and having as a lateral movement, direct relations to the attack on the principal pass, while it at the same time presented the most direct practical route for the relief of Harper's Ferry. Early in the morning of the fourteenth instant, General Pleasanton, with a cavalry force, reconnoitred the position of the enemy, whom he discovered to occupy the crests of commanding hills in the gap on either side of the national road, and upon advantageous ground in the centre upon and near the road, with artillery bearing upon all the approaches to their position, whether that by the main road or those by the country roads which led around up to the crest upon the right and left. At about eight o'clock A.M., Cox's division of Reno's corps, a portion of Burnside's column, in cooperation with the reconnoissance, which by this time had become an attack, moved up the mountain by the old Sharpsburgh road to the left of the main road, dividing as they advanced into two columns. These columns (Scammon's and Cook's brigades) handsomely carried the enemy's position on the crest in their front, which gave us possession of an important point for further operations. Fresh bodies of the enemy now appearing, Cox's position, though held stubbornly, became critical, and between twelve and one o'clock P.M. Wilcox's division of Reno's corps was sent forward by Gen. Burnside to

the hill on the left, while the remainder advanced as skirmishers-up the hill, and occupied the crest, supported by Doubleday's and Phelps's brigades. The movement, after a sharp contest on the crest and in the fields in the depression between the crest and the adjoining hill, was fully successful.

Ricketts's division pressed up the mountain about five P.M., arriving at the crest with the left of his command in time to participate in the closing scene of the engagement. Relieving Hatch's division, Ricketts remained on the ground, holding the battle-field during the night. The mountain sides thus gallantly passed over by Hooker on the right of the gap and Reno on the left, were steep and difficult in the extreme. We could make but little use of our artillery, while our troops were subject to a warm artil lery fire, as well as to that of infantry in the woods and under cover. By order of Gen. Burnside, Gibbon's brigade, of Hatch's division, late in the afternoon advanced upon the centre of the enemy's position on the main road. Deploying his brigade, Gibbon actively engaged a superior force of the enemy, which, though stubbornly resisting, was steadily pressed back until some hours after dark, when Gibbon remained in undisturbed possession of the field. He was then relieved by a brigade of Sedgwick's division. Finding themselves outflanked, both on the right and left, the enemy abandoned their position during the night, leaving their dead and wounded on the field, and hastily retreated down the mountain.

In the engagement at Turner's Pass our loss was three hundred and twenty-eight killed, and one thousand four hundred and sixty three wounded and missing; that of the enemy is esti

Ferry indicated but too clearly the shameful and premature surrender of that post.

The cavalry advance overtook a body of the enemy's cavalry at Boonsboro, which it dispersed after a brief skirmish, killing and wounding many, taking some two hundred and fifty prisoners and two guns.

mated to be, in all, about three thousand. Among our wounded, I regret to say, were Brig.Gen. J. P. Hatch and other valuable officers. The carrying of Crampton's Pass by Franklin was executed rapidly and decisively. Slocum's division was formed upon the right of the road leading through the gap, Smith's upon the left. A line, formed of Bartlett's and Torbitt's brigades, Richardson's division, of Sumner's corps, passsupported by Newton, whose activity was conspi-ing from Boonsboro to Kedysville, found, a few cuous, (all of Slocum's division,) advanced steadi- miles beyond the town, the enemy's forces, disly upon the enemy at a charge on the right. The played in line of battle, strong, both in respect enemy were driven from their position at the base to numbers and position, and awaiting attack. of the mountain, where they were protected by a Upon receiving reports of the disposition of the stone wall, and steadily forced back up the moun- enemy, I directed all the corps, except that of tain until they reached the position of their bat- Franklin, upon Sharpsburgh, leaving Franklin to tery near the road, well up the mountain. Here observe and check the enemy in his front, and they made a stand. They were, however, driven avail himself of any chance that might offer. I back, retiring their artillery in echelon until, after had hoped to come up with the enemy, during an action of three hours, the crest was gained, the fifteenth, in sufficient force to beat them again, and the enemy fled hastily down the mountains and drive them into the river. My instructions on the other side. On the left of the road Brooks's were, that if the enemy were not on the march, and Irwin's brigades, of Smith's division, formed they were to be at once attacked; if they were for the protection of Slocum's flank, charged up found in force and position, the corps were to be the mountain in the same steady manner, driving placed in position for attack, but no attack was the enemy before them until the crest was car- to be made until I reached the front. ried. The loss in Franklin's corps was one hundred and fifteen killed, four hundred and sixteen wounded, and two missing. The enemy's loss was about the same. One piece of artillery and four colors were captured, and knapsacks, and even haversacks, were abandoned as the enemy were driven up the hill.

On the morning of the fifteenth I was informed by Union civilians living on the side of the mountains that the enemy were retreating in the greatest haste and in disordered masses to the river. There was such a concurrence of testimony on this point that there seemed no doubt as to the fact. The hasty retreat of the enemy's forces from the mountain, and the withdrawal of the remaining troops from between Boonsboro and Hagerstown to a position where they could resist attack and cover the Shepherdstown Ford, and receive the reënforcements expected from Harper's Ferry, were for a time interpreted as evidences of the enemy's disorganization and demoralization.

As soon as it was definitely known that the enemy had abandoned the mountains, the cavalry, and the corps of Sumner, Hooker and Mansfield were ordered to pursue them via the turnpike and Boonsboro, as promptly as possible. The corps of Burnside and Porter (the latter having but one weak division present) were ordered to move by the old Sharpsburgh road, and Franklin to advance into Pleasant Valley, occupy Rohrersville, and to endeavor to relieve Harper's Ferry. Burnside and Porter, upon reaching the road from Boonsboro to Rohrersville, were to reenforce Franklin or move on Sharpsburgh, according to circumstances. Franklin moved toward Brownsville, and found there a force largely superior in numbers to his own, drawn up in a strong posi ion to receive him. Here the total cessation of firing in the direction of Harper's

On arriving at the front in the afternoon, I found but two divisions, Richardson's and Sykes's, in position; the rest were halted in the road, the head of the column some distance in rear of Richardson. After a rapid examination of the position, I found that it was too late to attack that day, and at once directed locations to be selected for our batteries of position, and indicated the bivouacs for the different corps, massing them near and on both sides of the Sharpsburgh pike. The corps were not all in their places until the next morning, some time after sunrise.

On the sixteenth the enemy had slightly changed their line, and were posted upon the heights in the rear of the Antietam Creek, their left and centre being upon and in front of the road from Sharpsburgh to Hagerstown, and protected by woods and irregularities of the ground. Their extreme left rested upon a wooded eminence near the cross-roads to the north of J. Miller's farm, the distance at this point between the road and the Potomac, which makes here a great bend to the east, being about three fourths of a mile. Their right rested on the hills to the right of Sharpsburgh, near Snavely's farm, covering the crossing of the Antietam, and the approaches to the town from the south-east. The ground from their immediate front and the Antietam is undulating. Hills intervene whose crests in general are commanded by the crests of others in their rear. On all favorable points, their artillery was posted. It became evident from the force of the enemy and the strength of their position, that desperate fighting alone could drive them from the field, and all felt that a great and terrible battle was at hand.

In proceeding to the narrative of the events of this and the succeeding day, I must here repeat what I have observed in reporting upon the other subjects of this communication, that I attempt in

this preliminary report nothing more than a nently retaken. sketch of the main features of this great engage- Richardson maintained with considerable loss the ment, reserving for my official report, based upon exposed positions which they had so gallantly the reports of the corps commanders, that full gained, among the wounded being Gen. Richarddescription of details which shall place upon re- son. cord the achievements of individuals and of particular bodies of troops. The design was to make the main attack upon the enemy's left-at least, to create a diversion in favor of the main attack, with the hope of something more-by assailing the enemy's right, and as soon as one or both of had lost heavily, several general officers having the flank movements were fully successful, to attack their centre with any reserve I might then have on hand.

not speak too highly of the efficiency of our batteries, and of the great service they rendered. On more than one occasion, when our infantry was broken, they covered its re-formation, and drove back the enemy.

The cavalry had little field for operation during the engagement, but was employed in supporting the horse-artillery batteries in the centre, and in driving up stragglers, while awaiting opportunity for other service.

The signal corps, under Major Myers, rendered during the operations at Antietam, as at SouthMountain, and during the whole movements of the army, efficient and valuable service. Indeed, by its services here, as on other fields elsewhere, this corps has gallantly earned its title to an independent and permanent organization.

The duties devolving upon my staff during the action were most important, and the performances of them able and untiring. At a later day I propose to bring to the notice of the department their individual services.

my, after having been passing troops in the latter part of the day from the Virginia shore to their position behind Sharpsburgh, as seen by our officers, suddenly formed the design of abandoning their line. This movement they executed before daylight. Being but a short distance from the river, the evacuation presented but little difficulty. It was, however, rapidly followed up.

A reconnoissance was made across the river on the evening of the nineteenth, which resulted in ascertaining the near presence of the enemy in some force, and in our capturing six guns.

A second reconnoissance, the next morning, which, with the first, was made by a small detachment from Porter's corps, resulted in observing a heavy force of the enemy there. The detachment withdrew with slight loss. I submit herewith a list of the killed, wounded and missing in the engagements of the fifteenth, and of the sixteenth and seventeenth. The enemy's loss is believed, from the best sources of information, to be nearly thirty thousand. Their dead were mostly left on the field, and a large number of wounded were left behind.

With the day closed this memorable battle, in which, perhaps, nearly two hundred thousand then were for fourteen hours engaged in combat. We had attacked the enemy in position, driven them from their line on one flank, and secured a Foting within it on the other. Under the depression of previous reverses, we had achieved a victory over an adversary invested with the prestige of former successes and inflated with a recent triumph. Our forces slept that night conquerors a field won by their valor, and covered with the dead and wounded of the enemy. The night, however, presented serious ques- The early and disgraceful surrender of Harper's tons; morning brought on grave responsibilities. Ferry deprived my operations of results which To renew the attack again on the eighteenth, or would have formed a brilliant sequence to the to defer it, with the chance of the enemy's re- substantial and gratifying success already related. tirement after a day of suspense, were the ques- Had the garrison held out twenty-four hours tons before me. A careful and anxious survey longer, I should in all probability, have captured of the condition of my command, and my know- that part of the enemy's force engaged in the atize of the enemy's force and position, failed to tack on the Maryland Heights, while the whole mpress me with any reasonable certainty of suc- garrison, some twelve thousand strong, could have ress, if I renewed the attack without reënforcing been drawn to reënforce me on the day of the lumns. A view of the shattered state of some decisive battle-certainly on the morning of the the corps sufficed to deter me from pressing eighteenth. I would thus have been in a position them into immediate action, and I felt that my to have destroyed the rebel army. Under the dity to the army and the country forbade the same circumstances, had the besieging force on sks involved in a hasty movement, which might the Virginia side at Harper's Ferry not been result in the loss of what had been gained the withdrawn, I would have had thirty-five or forty Previous day. Impelled by this consideration, I thousand less men to encounter at Antietam, and waited the arrival of my reenforcements, taking must have captured or destroyed all opposed to frantage of the occasion to collect together the me. As it was, I had to engage an army fresh ispersed, give rest to the fatigued, and remove from a recent, and to them a great victory, and the wounded. Of the reënforcements, Couch's to reap the disadvantages of their being freshly drision, although marching with commendable and plentifully supplied with ammunition and rapidity, was not in position until a late hour in the morning; and Humphrey's division of new troops, fatigued with forced marches, were arriving throughout the day, but were not available antil near its close. Large reënforcements from Pennsylvania, which were expected during the day, did not arrive at all.

While it gives me pleasure to speak of the gallantry and devotion of officers and men, generally displayed throughout this conflict, I feel it necessary to mention that some officers and men skulked from their places in the ranks until the battle was over. Death on the spot must hereafter be the fate of all such cowards, and the hands of the military commanders must be strengthened with all the power of the Government to inflict it summarily.

During the eighteenth, orders were given for a renewal of the attack at daylight on the nineteenth. On the night of the eighteenth, the ene

supplies.

The object and results of this brief campaign may be summed up as follows: In the beginning of the month of September, the safety of the National capital was seriously endangered by the presence of a victorious enemy, who soon after crossed into Maryland, and then directly threatened Washington and Baltimore, while they occupied the soil of a loyal State, and threatened an invasion of Pennsylvania. The army of the

contract. Without such oath, the salt shall be seized by the superintendent or agent of the transportation company for the use of the commonwealth, and notice be immediately given to the Governor of the amount of salt seized, and the name of the person or persons asking for the transportation.

Union, inferior in numbers, wearied by long marches, deficient in various supplies, worn out by numerous battles, the last of which had not been successful, first covered, by its movements, the important cities of Washington and Baltimore; then boldly attacked the victorious enemy in their chosen strong position, and drove them back, with all their superiority of numbers, into the State of Virginia; thus saving the loyal States from invasion, and rudely dispelling the rebel dreams of carrying the war into our country and subsisting upon our resources. Thirteen guns and thirty-nine colors, more than fifteen thousand stand of small arms, and more than six thousand prisoners, were the trophies which attest the suc-moved from the salt-works, and all salt manucess of our arms.

Rendering thanks to Divine Providence for its blessing upon our exertions, I close this brief report. I beg only to add the hope that the army's efforts for the cause in which we are engaged will be deemed worthy to receive the commendation of the Government and the country.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General United States Army.

Brig.-Gen. L. THOMAS,

Adjutant-General United States Army.

Individuals in like manner are prohibited from transporting salt beyond the limits of the State. Any person may seize and hold the same for the State and give like notice.

All salt manufactured in the counties of Smythe and Washington, and on hand on the day when the above act was passed, unless heretofore re

factured after that day, until due notice to the contrary be given by publication in some newspaper printed in the city of Richmond and in the town of Abingdon, shall be thereafter held to be the property of the commonwealth of Virginia, and shall not be removed without authority from the Governor or his duly constituted agent, unless it be salt made to supply some existing contract with the confederate States, or with the separate States of the confederate States, or with individuals, for the benefit of any county, city, or

town.

If the owners of salt-works in said counties shall refuse or cease to manufacture salt other than an amount sufficient to execute existing contracts as aforesaid, then, from and after such refusal or cessation shall appear to the Governor to exist, he will exercise the authority vested in him, and seize, take possession of, and hold and exercise full authority and control over the property, real and personal, of any person, firm, or company so refusing or ceasing to manufacture.

If the supply of salt manufactured be not enough to furnish the people of this commonwealth with a sufficient quantity of salt for home consump tion, then as soon as such fact shall appear to the Governor, he will exercise the authority vested in him, and "disregard any contract made with the separate States of the confederate States" until the State of Virginia is supplied.

When salt is procured by the State of Virginia, and its constituted agent shall offer the same for transportation on the route of any railroad, canal, or other improvement company, the same shall be immediately transported to the dépôt designated, unless such transportation will interfere with the_transportation of troops, munitions of war, and army supplies of the confederate government. Upon refusal of such company to transport the said salt, the constituted agent of the State will be authorized to take control of any such work and to manage the same until the transportation be accomplished.

The like provision shall be observed when it becomes proper to transport that or other things necessary for the production of salt.

1. No railroad, canal, or other internal improvement company in this State shall undertake to transport any salt beyond the limits of the State unless under some contract already existing with the confederate States or some State of the con- The following places are designated for the prefederate States. Before said salt shall be remov-sent as the points at which salt will be concened, the person asking for such transportation, trated for sale and distribution, namely, Milborough shall make oath or affirmation that the removal dépôt, on the Central Railroad, and Dublin dépot, asked for is of salt furnished under such existing on the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.

Other