nati and the Kentucky shore. Held, that the act fixing these tolls was an attempted regulation of interstate commerce and void. Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S., 204.

Ferry rights across navigable rivers between States. The State of Kentucky gave exclusive ferry right from its own shore to opposite side of the river. This right was contested in the Supreme Court. Held:

(1) That, though the State of Kentucky could give and protect an exclusive license of ferriage from its own shore, it could not hinder such from Ohio shore.

(2) That a vessel licensed in the coasting trade by the United States can not be denied the right to land at all customary landings in a navigable river.

(3) But such vessel can not be used for mere ferriage across a river. From such the State may exclude it.

(4) Such exclusion is no violation of the right of Congress to regulate commerce between the States. Conway v. Taylor's Executor, 1 Black., 603.

The transportation of passengers and freight for hire by a steam ferry across the Delaware river between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, by a corporation of one of the States, is interstate commerce and a State exaction upon it is void. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S., 196.

The establishment of ferries across navigable rivers or streams is a subject within the control of the govern

ment, and not a matter of private right (Mills v. St. Clair Co., 8 How., 569), and is reserved to the State (Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black., 603), and the power of Congress to require vessels to be enrolled and licensed, derived from the commercial power, does not interfere with the police power of the State in granting ferry licenses. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S., 365; Fanning v. Gregoire, 16 How., 524.

A municipal corporation, having by its charter an exclusive right to make and maintain wharves within its limits on a navigable river, can charge and collect wharfage on the basis of tonnage. Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S., 80.

Commerce or traffic or intercourse carried on with an Indian tribe or member of such tribe is subject to regulation by Congress, though within the limits of a State. U. S. v. Halliday, 3 Wall., 407. State legislation can not withdraw such Indians from the influence of the act of Congress. Id.

The sale of liquor to Indians can be forbidden by Congress, though the Indian is under State jurisdiction, if he is within charge of an Indian agent, although off

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the reservation. U. S. v. Halliday, 3 Wall., 407. But it is otherwise where the Indian has been naturalized, or made a citizen and is out of tribal relation. Id.

Congress may exclude spirituous liquors from existing Indian country or that ceded to the United States. U. S. v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U. S., 188.

Congress may not only prohibit the introduction of whiskey and sale in the Indian country, but extend the prohibition to territory in proximity to that occupied by Indians. Id.

Lager beer is not "spirituous liquor or wine" within the meaning of U. S. R. S., Sec. 2139, as to introducing such liquor into the Indian country. Sarlls v. U. S., 152 U. S., 570.

Congress can grant a right of way through Indian territory for a railroad, telegraph and telephone line, under power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes. Cherokee Nation v. So. Kans. R'y, 135 U. S., 641.

The State of Georgia passed a law that any white man who should live within the limits of the Cherokee nation should be arrested and forcibly removed. Rev. Samuel A. Worcester entered the limits of the Cherokee nation (then in the State of Georgia) as a missionary of the gospel, as he might do under the then existing treaties between the United States and the Cherokees. He was arrested and punished by State authorities under the State law. The Supreme Court, by Marshall, C. J., giving its opinion, decided that the State laws

were void, as they attempted to interfere with the inter

course with Indian tribes.

Worcester v. State of

Georgia, 6 Pet., 515.

NATURALIZATION.

The Congress shall have power, *

*

"To establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States."

The power of naturalization is exclusively in Congress. Chirac v. Chirac's Lessee, 2 Wheat., 259, 269. "Our foreign intercourse being exclusively committed to the general government, it is peculiarly their province to determine who are entitled to the privilege of American citizens and the protection of the American government." Marshall, C. J., arguendo, Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat., 213, 277.

Under the act of Congress the alien is not required to report himself after arrival to any court; and the time of arrival does not have to be proved by the certificate that he has so reported. It may be proved by other evidence. Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Pet., 393.

The judgment that the alien be admitted, if in legal form, closes all inquiry as to the testimony on which it was rendered. Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Pet., 393. If the records of naturalization are destroyed secondary evidence is admissible to prove the fact. Hogan v. Kurtz, 94 U. S., 773.

The admission of a State on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects involves the admission as citizens of the United States of those whom Congress makes members of the political community and who were recognized as such, with the assent of Congress, in the formation of the new State. Collective naturalization may be effected in this way: Nebraska was admitted into the Union, and the act of admission made citizens of all persons who had under previous territorial law attained to vote on declaring their intentions. So the son of an alien who had declared intentions while son was a minor, became a citizen upon admission of Nebraska into the Union. Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U. S., 135.

POWER TO EXCLUDE OR EXPEL ALIENS.

The United States has the right by virtue of its sovereignty to exclude or expel aliens or any class of aliens. Fong You Ting v. United States, 149 U. S., 698. Wing Wong v. United States, 163 U. S., 228. But before they can be punished or their property confiscated there must be judicial trial. Id. The Chinese exclusion act held valid. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S., 581.